State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 26 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC94924,SC94924
• Parties: State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Justin Floyd Eugene Jones, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

479 S.W.3d 100

State of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Justin Floyd Eugene Jones, Appellant.

No. SC94924

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc .

Opinion issued January 26, 2016

Jones was represented by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender's office in Columbia

State was represented by Rachel Flaster of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City

Paul C. Wilson, Judge

Justin Jones appeals the judgment of the St. Louis County Circuit Court, entered after a jury trial, convicting him of, and sentencing him for, one count of burglary in the first degree and an associated count of armed criminal action, one count of attempted robbery in the first degree and an associated count of armed criminal action, one count of assault in the third degree, and one count of resisting arrest for a felony. On appeal, Jones claims that the trial court erred by: (1) overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal on the armed criminal action charge associated with his burglary conviction; (2) overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal on the resisting arrest charge; and (3) overruling his motion for a continuance. The judgment is affirmed.

Background

The evidence at trial supported the following findings and inferences beyond a reasonable doubt. On February 10, 2010, C.H. returned to her home from grocery shopping shortly after 11 p.m. She drove her vehicle into the driveway, parked, and went inside the home through the front door to ask for help in unloading the groceries. C.H. then walked back outside, opened the automatic garage door, and backed her car into the attached garage. She got out of the car, grabbed a few bags of groceries, and walked toward the interior door between the garage and the house. There, C.H. pressed a keypad to lower the garage door and, as the door began to lower, turned to go through the doorway and into her house. Before she could enter her home, however, C.H. heard the garage door stop and start to go back up, which it was programmed to do if the threshold sensors were triggered. C.H. turned toward the garage door when she heard it start to go back up and saw Jones coming into the garage and holding out a black gun in both hands. C.H. ran into the house, slamming the door behind her, and went into the nearest bedroom, where she activated her home alarm and called the police.

M.H., one of C.H.'s sons, was in the kitchen doing dishes when this occurred. Hearing the interior door to the garage open, slam shut, and open again, M.H. turned toward that door and saw Jones pointing a gun at him. Jones told M.H. to come over to him and, when he did, Jones put M.H. in a "headlock" and repeatedly demanded "dope, money, and weed." When M.H. told Jones he did not have any, Jones pushed M.H. toward the back door. M.H. told Jones he did not want to leave, so Jones began to push him through the house toward the interior door to the garage. On the way, Jones' cell phone rang. Jones let go of M.H. to try to answer his phone, and M.H. grabbed Jones' gun. Jones abandoned his effort to answer his cell phone and began to struggle with M.H. to regain control of the gun. When Jones bit M.H.'s jaw and tried to gouge out his eyes, M.H. was forced to relinquish his hold on Jones' gun. Having regained control of his gun, Jones pointed it at M.H. for a moment and then fled out the back door of the home without firing a shot. The police arrived shortly thereafter, and M.H. pointed them in the direction Jones had fled.

Officer Virgil Avery was on patrol at the time these crimes occurred. When he received the dispatch regarding the incident and a description of the perpetrator, he responded to the area to set up containment. Officer Avery drove to a subdivision that was located directly behind C.H.'s home and separated from that house only by a wood fence. Within seconds of exiting his vehicle, Officer Avery saw Jones running from the direction of C.H.'s house. Jones matched the description of the perpetrator that Officer Avery had just received. Officer Avery identified himself as a police officer and told Jones to stop running. Jones looked at the officer but continued to run away. Officer Avery gave chase, and Jones continued to flee. After approximately 15 seconds, Officer Avery caught Jones from behind, placed him in handcuffs, and arrested him immediately for the robbery attempted in C.H.'s home.

After Officer Avery detained Jones, Officer Robert Dean and Lass, his K–9 partner, performed a "trackback" from the location where Jones was arrested. The track led to the back door of C.H.'s home. Officer Kathryn Mumford then performed a "victim showup," meaning she picked M.H. up from his house, told him that the police had found someone that they would like him to see, and drove M.H. to where Jones was located. When Officer Mumford asked M.H. if he had seen Jones before, M.H. identified Jones as the individual who had just assaulted him in his home.

Jones was charged with one count of burglary in the first degree and an associated count of armed criminal action, one count of attempted robbery in the first degree with a separate associated count of armed criminal action, one count of assault in the third degree, and one count of resisting arrest for a felony. With respect to the first-degree burglary charge, the state alleged that Jones "knowingly entered unlawfully in an inhabitable structure ... possessed by [C.H.] ..., for the purpose of committing Robbery in the First Degree therein, and while in such inhabitable structure there was present in such inhabitable structure [C.H. and M.H.], persons who were not participants in the crime." The associated armed criminal action count alleged that Jones committed the felony of first-degree burglary "by, with and through, the knowing use, assistance and aid of a deadly weapon." With respect to the resisting arrest charge, the indictment alleged that Jones resisted arrest "by fleeing" from an officer.

At the close of the state's case at trial, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge for armed criminal action associated with the first-degree burglary charge because there was no evidence that he actually "used" the gun to effect entry into C.H.'s garage or that he "used" the gun to intimidate C.H. into granting him entry. Jones also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge for resisting arrest because there was no evidence showing that he ran from the officer after the arrest occurred or was attempted. The trial court overruled the motion.

Jones did not present any evidence on his own behalf, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. Jones filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial, which the trial court overruled. The trial court entered a judgment and sentences consistent with the jury's verdicts. Jones now appeals, and this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 10, of the Missouri Constitution.

Analysis

Jones raises three points on appeal.¹ His first and second points challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for armed criminal action in connection with the first-degree burglary and his conviction for resisting arrest. Jones' third point claims that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for a continuance.

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is "whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2011). "The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict." State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). "This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Mo. banc 2012). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, an appellate court "does not act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers" but "gives great deference to the trier of fact." Id.

II. Jones committed the burglary with the aid and assistance of a gun

A "person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if he knowingly enters unlawfully ... a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or inhabitable structure or in immediate flight therefrom," § 569.160.1,² and "[t]here is present in the structure another person who is not a participant in the crime," § 569.160.1(3).³ A person commits armed criminal action when he or she "commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon." § 571.015.1.

In his first point, Jones argues that he cannot be guilty of armed criminal action because there was no evidence that he made "use" of the gun to overcome a physical obstacle in order to enter the garage in that the garage door automatically opened when his foot or leg triggered the sensor at the threshold of the garage. Nor, Jones argues, was the evidence sufficient for the jury to find that he made "use" of his gun to intimidate C.H. into granting him entry because C.H. did not see Jones with the gun until after he had crossed the threshold of the garage. Because Jones contends these are the only means by which the state can convict him of armed criminal action in connection with this burglary, he maintains he must be acquitted as a matter of law. The Court rejects this argument and holds that the evidence was sufficient to support Jones' conviction...