State v. Jordan
Decision Date | 01 November 1939 |
Docket Number | 364. |
Citation | 5 S.E.2d 156,216 N.C. 356 |
Parties | STATE v. JORDAN. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Criminal prosecution tried upon indictment charging the defendant with the murder of one Dave Fowler.
Verdict Guilty of manslaughter.
Judgment Imprisonment in the State's Prison for a term of three years.
The defendant appeals, assigning errors.
J V. Wilson and Moser & Miller, all of Asheboro, and C. T Kennedy, of Thomasville, for appellant.
Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and T. W. Bruton and George B. Patton, Asst. Attys. Gen. for the State.
Many exceptions appear in the record which offer no serious challenge to the correctness of the trial. We have not thought it necessary to discuss them in this opinion. Meriting more detailed consideration are three aspects of the trial involving exceptions on which the defense more strongly relies:
1. There was evidence on the part of the State tending to show that the defendant shot the deceased through the abdomen, without justifiable cause, and rebuttal evidence on the part of defendant tending to show that the shooting was upon defendant's own premises and in his necessary self defense, under a reasonable apprehension of death of great bodily harm.
Among the exceptions to the instructions relating to the right of self defense, we find the following: "Under the evidence in this case the Court charges you that the defendant was on his own premises; that Dave Fowler, the deceased, also was on the premises of the defendant; that the defendant had the legal right to require Dave Fowler to leave his premises and to use such force as was reasonably necessary to compel him to leave, and that, if Dave Fowler, the deceased, made an assault upon the defendant upon his own premises, the defendant would be under no duty to retreat to avoid a combat, but was legally entitled to stand his ground." Exception to this is upon the ground that it did not contain the further instruction that under such circumstances the person assailed would have the right to kill his adversary without retreating.
Where the subject of complaint is the omission, within the immediate focus of the objection, of something deemed essential, we are mindful of the fact that all the law cannot be crowded into a single sentence without danger to that vehicle of thought, and, so, we look further into the caravan for the missing item. In other words, on a test of its adequacy the charge must be taken as a whole, contextually. Collins v. Virginia Power & Electric Co., 204 N.C. 320, 168 S.E. 500; In re Will of Brown, 203 N.C. 347, 166 S.E. 72; Marriner v. Mizzelle, 207 N.C. 34, 175 S.E. 711; Beal v. Carolina Coal Co., 186 N.C. 754, 120 S.E. 333. In this instance we find no trouble with the charge after the exceptive brackets have been removed.
In the paragraph immediately preceding, we find: .
The right to kill an assailant, in apparently necessary self-defense, under a reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm, is not peculiar to the circumstance that the person so situated happens to be upon his own premises and, therefore, need not retreat, nor is it peculiar to the situation where one is suddenly subjected to a felonious assault, which gives him no opportunity of retreat, and is sufficiently stated in the formula generally covering the right of self defense, as contained in the charge considered as a whole.
Since there was no dispute about the fact that the defendant was at the time of the alleged assault and the killing upon his own premises, and under that score got the benefit of the charge that he need not retreat under any kind of an assault, it would seem to be supererogation to add to it that he would have the same right under a sudden felonious assault.
We have examined the other exceptive assignments of error pertaining to the subject of self defense in connection with the whole evidence and find no error upon this phase of the case.
2. Defendant's counsel objected on the trial to the introduction of the statements made by Dave Fowler, after receiving the fatal wound, as dying declarations. The objection is based upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to show that at the time the declaration was made the deceased was under sufficient apprehension of death.
The evidence pertinent to this injury is substantially as follows:
J. B. Coltrane testified for the State:
D. S. Lee testified for the State:
Dr. T. M. Stanton testified for the State:
The reasons usually advanced in support of the universal practice of admitting dying declarations in evidence on homicide trials is part of the conventional learning of the profession. We do not care to make an unnecessary display of erudition. On that subject a collection of authorities may be found in State v. Stewart, 210 N.C. 362, 186 S.E. 488, and to these we refer. A study of these authorities convinces us that the public policy that has been strong enough to strike down the...
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