State v. Jordan
Decision Date | 14 May 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 19-1442,19-1442 |
Citation | 959 N.W.2d 395 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Travis James JORDAN, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro & Kozlowski, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney, Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General, Darren D. Driscoll, County Attorney, and Brad M. McIntyre, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
The plea agreement here provided the defendant would plead guilty to his pending charge of third-degree burglary, be released with supervision until sentencing, and be free to argue for probation at sentencing. Additionally, as part of the defendant's supervised release agreement that he signed after entering his plea, he agreed to attend all court hearings. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the other pending charge against the defendant and remain silent at sentencing. However, the defendant absconded after the plea hearing and failed to appear for the sentencing hearing. Following his arrest nearly seven months later, he appeared for sentencing, where the State advocated for a prison sentence, which the district court then imposed.
The defendant appealed, arguing the prosecutor breached the parties’ plea agreement by failing to remain silent at sentencing and his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this breach. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020), which requires ineffective-assistance claims to be brought in postconviction proceedings rather than by direct appeal. After the court of appeals issued its decision, we issued our opinion in State v. Boldon , 954 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 2021), in which we held Iowa Code section 814.7 did not preclude our review of an alleged prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement. Id. at 71. On further review, we hold we have subject matter jurisdiction and authority to consider the defendant's appeal and affirm the defendant's sentence because the defendant forfeited any rights to enforce the plea agreement when he breached it by absconding and failing to appear at the originally-scheduled sentencing.
On September 24, 2018, Fort Dodge Police Officer Jacob Naatz was on patrol in Fort Dodge when he observed Travis Jordan walking down an alley, seemingly going from garage to garage in the area. Officer Naatz continued to patrol the alleys and observed Jordan walk out of a garage with a backpack, leading Officer Naatz to stop Jordan and ask Jordan why he was in the garage. Jordan claimed he was in the garage because he thought it was his friend's and he went in to go to the bathroom. The record is unclear how Officer Naatz discovered the materials in Jordan's backpack, but the record shows Jordan's backpack contained binoculars, gloves, wrenches, a knife, and a flashlight along with Jordan's wallet. Officer Naatz then went into the garage and located a second flashlight on the ground where Jordan had been standing when Officer Naatz first made contact with him. This awoke the homeowner, who came out to talk with Officer Naatz and informed him that the flashlight was his and had been inside his vehicle parked in the garage. The homeowner told Officer Naatz that Jordan had no right to be in the garage.
The assistant county attorney confirmed "[t]hat is the plea agreement reached between the parties," and Jordan also confirmed that was his understanding of the plea agreement. In accepting Jordan's plea, the district court specifically advised Jordan "to contact the Department of Correctional Services within 48 hours [of the hearing] and sign a contract of expectations of release agreement." As part of this agreement Jordan signed after the plea hearing, he agreed to "appear in Court when required."
Jordan's counsel sought a suspended sentence and probation without objecting that the State breached the plea agreement by failing to remain silent. The district court decided to "go along with the recommendation of the PSI and the recommendation of the State," ordering Jordan to "be placed with the Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years."
Jordan filed a timely appeal, arguing his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which concluded it must dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 814.7 because Jordan only raised ineffective-assistance claims. Jordan filed an application for further review, and we granted that application.
A defendant's allegation of prosecutorial breach "is a species of sentencing error." Boldon , 954 N.W.2d at 70. Thus, we review it for the correction of errors at law. See State v. Damme , 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). "We will not reverse a sentence unless there is ‘an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Formaro , 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) ).
The State contends we lack jurisdiction to consider Jordan's appeal under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a )(3), which establishes there is no right of appeal from a guilty plea unless the defendant establishes "good cause." Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a )(3). After the parties submitted their briefs in this case, we decided Damme , in which we held the good cause requirement is satisfied "when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea." Id. at 105. Because Jordan's challenge is to his sentence instead of his guilty plea, he has good cause to appeal and section 814.6(1)(a )(3) does not deprive us of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
The State also argues we lack subject matter jurisdiction to address Jordan's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal under Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020), which requires ineffective-assistance claims to be brought in postconviction proceedings rather than by direct appeal. See Iowa Code section 814.7. We disagree. Section 814.7 does not limit jurisdiction; it limits the authority of Iowa's appellate courts to resolve ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. See Boldon , 954 N.W.2d at 69 ( ); State v. Emery , 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001) .
Here, we have jurisdiction, and we have the authority to resolve the sentencing issue on direct appeal. After the parties submitted their briefs and the court of appeals issued its decision dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we issued our opinion in Boldon . There, we held Iowa Code section 814.7 did not preclude our review of an alleged prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement because the alleged breach was a claim of sentencing error that could be reviewed directly without being cast as an ineffective-assistance claim. Boldon , 954 N.W.2d at 71. As we explained, "[a] prosecutor's...
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...to appeal as a matter of right when the defendant challenges his sentencing hearing or the sentence itself. See, e.g. , State v. Jordan , 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021) (finding good cause to determine whether a prosecutor breached a plea agreement to remain silent at sentencing when the d......
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...814.7 does not prohibit direct appeals of claims that a prosecutor breached a plea agreement at the sentencing hearing. State v. Jordan , 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021) (determining that breach of a plea agreement "was a claim of sentencing error that could be reviewed directly without bei......
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