State v. Jordan
Decision Date | 04 November 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 18995.,18995. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Victor L. JORDAN, Sr. |
Pamela S. Nagy, New Haven, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Terence D. Mariani, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.
The two issues that we must resolve in this certified appeal are whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant, Victor L. Jordan, Sr., was not deprived of his right to a fair trial due to the prosecutor's failure to correct the potentially misleading testimony of two witnesses, and whether this court should overrule its construction of the evidence tampering statute, General Statutes § 53a–155,1 in State v. Foreshaw, 214 Conn. 540, 572 A.2d 1006 (1990), and hold that the defendant's conduct in the present case did not constitute evidence tampering under § 53a–155.2 The defendant appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2) and 53a–136, conspiracy to commit robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 and 53a–136, and tampering with physical evidence in violation of § 53a–155. The defendant makes two primary claims on appeal. First, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the prosecutor's failure to correct the potentially misleading testimony of two witnesses denying they were promised benefits by the state in exchange for their testimony did not violate the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Second, the defendant claims that this court should overrule its interpretation of § 53a–155 in Foreshaw and hold that, under a proper understanding of that statute, his conviction cannot stand. We reject the defendant's claim regarding the prosecutor's failure to correct the potentially misleading testimony of two witnesses, and we also reject his claim that Foreshaw should be overruled. We conclude, however, that under a proper understanding of Foreshaw, the defendant's conduct did not come within the ambit of § 53a–155. Accordingly, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the judgment of the Appellate Court, and conclude that the defendant's conviction under § 53a–155 should be set aside.
The relevant facts and procedural history giving rise to this appeal are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. “The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On April 1, 2008, Tannith McDonnell, the assistant manager of the Naugatuck Savings Bank [bank] located at 565 Straits Turnpike in Watertown, met an acquaintance, Patsy Lombardi, in the bank parking lot at approximately 4 p.m. after she had locked the bank's doors for the day. While seated in Lombardi's car, [McDonnell] observed a man approach the bank who was wearing a heavy black coat with a raised hood, a camouflage ski mask, dark jeans and black gloves. The man placed a gloved hand inside his pocket and pulled ‘aggressively’ on the bank door with the other hand. When the locked door would not open, the man walked back down the sidewalk and out of sight. McDonnell waited until the man cleared the corner and then used Lombardi's cell phone to call 911 and report her observations to the police. Watertown [P]olice Officer Jeffrey McKirryher, who was on duty nearby directing traffic, received McDonnell's report over his police radio. McKirryher immediately saw a likely suspect and when he called out to him, the man took off, running.
“Katherine Desantis, who lived on Sprucewood Road, which runs parallel to Birch Meadow Drive, saw a black man wearing a dark jacket, dark jeans and a dark colored ‘do-rag’ on his head, run from behind a neighbor's house. She noted that the man kept looking behind him as if he was being pursued. While the man was in the middle of the street, she saw the man remove his jacket, revealing its bright colored lining. Desantis telephoned the police as the man was in her neighbor's yard, looking around. Desantis next saw the man in her own backyard removing his gray sweatshirt and then going around to the back of her carport. Desantis' husband, Dennis Desantis, arrived home shortly after the police had left and located a sweatshirt ‘crumbled up in a ball’ at the far side of the carport. Two days later, Katherine Desantis located a dark jacket with a bright red-orange lining in a neighbor's trash can. The police collected the gray sweatshirt and the dark jacket from the Desantises. When removing the jacket from the trash can, the police also discovered a ‘black fabric type item’; a ‘neoprene-like fabric mask’ that was black on one side and camouflaged on the other; a pair of black leather gloves; and a ‘small, black plastic ... shopping bag.’
“One of the cell phones discovered by the police led them to Jennifer Campbell, a woman who was romantically involved with the defendant. Campbell testified that the defendant called her at about 8 p.m. on April 1, 2008, and said that he needed help. He asked her to meet him at the Super 8 Motel where, he said, he was going by taxicab and where he would be with his wife and children. Campbell testified that when she arrived at the motel, the defendant asked her to rent a room in her name, and he provided her with money for the cost of the room. According to Campbell, after settling into the room with her, the defendant attempted multiple times to call a person named ‘Jun,’ but he could not reach him. Although she knew who Jun was, she did not learn that his real name was Herman Cordero until after she was arrested. Campbell testified that she had seen the defendant and Cordero, whom she knew as Jun, together ‘[v]ery many’ times, and she described the two men as ‘[v]ery tight ... very close.’
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