State v. Jorgensen

Citation758 N.W.2d 830
Decision Date19 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-0296.,07-0296.
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Troy Harley JORGENSEN, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Carlyle D. Dalen and Steven D. Tynan, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

The district court convicted the appellant, Troy Jorgensen, of indecent exposure after store employees, through a closed-circuit video system, observed him follow an unidentified woman through the store while repeatedly exposing his penis and masturbating. On appeal, the court of appeals rejected Jorgensen's contention there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there was no evidence that he knew he was being watched on a closed-circuit video system or that he knew or should have known the employees would be offended by his conduct. We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, and therefore, we affirm the decisions of the district court and court of appeals.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

On June 2, 2006, an employee, working in the loss prevention department at the Shopko in Mason City, Iowa, was watching activity in the store on a closed-circuit video system. She noticed a man, later identified as Troy Jorgensen, walking through the store fondling himself over his clothes. As the employee continued to watch, she saw the man expose his penis several times and masturbate. The employee contacted two fellow employees for assistance. The three employees observed Jorgensen follow a woman through the store while repeatedly exposing his penis and masturbating. The woman may have seen Jorgensen's penis, but she could not be located later and was never identified.

While one store employee contacted the police, two of the employees left the video room to locate Jorgensen. When Jorgensen saw the two employees approach, he stopped fondling himself and attempted to exit the store. He was, however, detained by an off-duty officer.

Upon questioning, Jorgensen claimed he was wearing shorts that were too small for him and that sometimes the fly would open and expose his penis. Jorgensen was arrested for indecent exposure.

None of the three store employees who observed Jorgensen's behavior via the closed-circuit video system were married to him. All three stated they were offended by his conduct.

On June 22, 2006, the State filed a trial information charging Jorgensen with indecent exposure (second offense) in violation of Iowa Code section 709.9 (2005). Thereafter, Jorgensen entered a plea of not guilty.

Jorgensen subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate law points. He argued he did not commit indecent exposure because there was no evidence to support a finding that he knew the store employees might have viewed him through a closed-circuit video system. Jorgensen also asserted there was no evidence he purposefully exposed himself to the Shopko employees knowing, or under circumstances where he reasonably should have known, that the act was offensive to the employees. Therefore, Jorgensen claimed, he could not be convicted of indecent exposure.

A hearing on the motion was held. The court noted the crime of indecent exposure contains four distinct elements. The first element requires either the exposure of the genitals and pubes to someone other than the actor's spouse or that the actor committed a sex act in the presence or view of a third person. The court found the State could not prove indecent exposure by commission of a sex act under the facts alleged. It did, however, find the facts sufficient for the State to proceed under the first alternative: exposure of the genitals and pubes to someone other than the actor's spouse. The court further concluded there was sufficient evidence of the other three elements of indecent exposure.1

Jorgensen waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial on a stipulated record that included the minutes of testimony and the amended trial information.2 On December 27, 2006, the district court issued its ruling, finding the defendant guilty of indecent exposure.

Jorgensen filed a motion for a new trial, asserting the district court erred in allowing evidence the employees saw him expose himself through store security cameras. The court had considered this evidence because it found a reasonable shopper would believe the store would monitor activities of patrons and/or employees through closed-circuit video systems. Jorgensen contended he could not have reasonably known store personnel would see his actions and would be offended by them. The defendant's motion was overruled, and the district court sentenced Jorgensen to a suspended one-year sentence and placed him on probation.

In his appeal, Jorgensen maintained the State produced insufficient evidence of indecent exposure. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the defendant's conviction. We granted further review and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the district court.

II. Scope of Review.

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Hansen, 750 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Iowa 2008). "The district court's findings of guilt are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." Id. Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). "To the extent the issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law." State v. Garcia, 756 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 2008).

III. Merits.

The issue before us is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Jorgensen of indecent exposure. Indecent exposure is defined in Iowa Code section 709.9. In pertinent part it states:

A person who exposes the person's genitals or pubes to another not the person's spouse ... commits a serious misdemeanor, if:

1. The person does so to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either party; and

2. The person knows or reasonably should know that the act is offensive to the viewer.

Iowa Code § 709.9.

We have previously broken down the crime of indecent exposure into four elements:

"1. The exposure of genitals or pubes to someone other than a spouse ...;

2. That the act is done to arouse the sexual desires of either party;

3. The viewer was offended by the conduct; and

4. The actor knew, or under the circumstances should have known, the victim would be offended."

State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Adams, 436 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1989)).

Jorgensen asserts there was insufficient evidence he was aware he was being watched by the store employees or that he would have reason to know his conduct would be offensive to those employees.3 According to Jorgensen, "[n]owhere in the minutes of testimony does it indicate that the security system cameras were visible to store patrons or that there were posted signs warning store patrons that they may be watched by security cameras." He further claims he did not expose himself to the employees with the specific intent to arouse his or their sexual desires, insomuch as he was unaware of their presence via the closed-circuit video system.

It is undisputed the State lacked sufficient evidence regarding the defendant's exposure of his penis to the unidentified woman, the presumed target of his actions. The question raised by this case is whether the statute requires knowledge by the actor of the identity of his actual victim; or, stated somewhat differently, whether the defendant can be found guilty of exposing himself to an audience of whom he was not specifically aware. This question has not been previously addressed by this court.

Our goal in interpreting criminal statutes "`is to ascertain legislative intent in order, if possible, to give it effect.'" State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Iowa 1974)). "`We consider the object sought to be accomplished and the evil sought to be remedied, and seek a reasonable interpretation that will best effect the legislative purpose and avoid absurd results.'" Id. (quoting State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990)). "`When a statute's language is clear, we look no further for meaning than its express terms.'" State v. Kamber, 737 N.W.2d 297, 298-99 (Iowa 2007) (quoting State v. Beach, 630 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 2001)).

Although the statute does not define the term "expose," we have held that indecent exposure is "`essentially a visual assault crime.'" State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1983) (quoting Kermit L. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code: Part II, 29 Drake L.Rev. 491, 541 (1979-80)); accord Isaac, 756 N.W.2d at 819. This interpretation corresponds with the dictionary definition of "expose," which means "to lay open to view ... EXHIBIT, DISPLAY." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 802 (unabr. ed.2002); accord Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 409 (10th ed.2002) (defining "expose" as "to cause to be visible or open to view"); Black's Law Dictionary 783 (8th ed.2004) (defining "indecent exposure" as "[a]n offensive display of one's body in public, esp. of the genitals"). See generally State v. Lane, 743 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 2007) (noting "`we may refer to prior decisions of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage' to determine [the statute's] meaning" (quoting State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 142 (Iowa 2006))). Thus, the first element of the crime requires the defendant to expose or "cause to be visible or open to view" his or her genitals or pubes to someone other than a spouse. As this court noted in...

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