GREMILLION, Judge.
Defendant, George Joseph, was charged by an amended bill of information with fourth offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of La.R.S. 14:98.4. After initially entering a plea of not guilty, on May 3, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to quash alleging that the documents from his prior May 12, 2011 guilty plea did not show he was properly advised of his rights. After a hearing held that day, the trial court denied Defendant's motion and subsequently accepted Defendant's plea to fourth offense DWI pursuant to State v. Crosby , 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). On July 21, 2021, Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years with the Department of Corrections, with two years to be without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Upon release, Defendant is to be placed on supervised probation for five years subject to the conditions set forth in La.Code Crim.P. arts. 895 and 895.1, as well as certain special conditions. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, Defendant's conviction is affirmed, his sentence is vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing.
In October 2019, Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's officers witnessed a gray vehicle commit multiple traffic violations. Upon stopping the vehicle, they noticed the driver, Defendant, exhibited physical signs of impairment. He admitted to drinking before driving, and he was unable to complete the standardized field sobriety test(s) due to possible health issues and safety concerns. Defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. A subsequent blood test revealed Defendant's blood alcohol content was above the legal limit. Defendant was previously convicted in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court on May 12, 2011, of DWI, second offense; in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court on May 16, 2014, of DWI third offense; and in the Thirty-third Judicial District Court on August 31, 2017, of DWI, fourth offense.
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we note several errors patent raised by the State. First, the State claims that the court did not orally impose Defendant's sentence as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 871. Next, it contends that Defendant's sentence is indeterminate because the transcript does not indicate whether his sentence was imposed with or without hard labor. Finally, the State notes that the mandatory $5,000.00 fine required by La.R.S. 14:98.4 was not imposed.
We find the trial court's failure to orally impose Defendant's sentence requires remand for resentencing, rendering the remaining issues raised by the State moot.
At sentencing, the parties stated:
MR. ALGERO:
As it applies to Mr. Joseph, I believe the recommended sentence is going to be that he [be] sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Corrections, ten of those years to be suspended, and be placed on five years of supervised probation upon release from custody, that time to run concurrent to his current DOC time. I believe that's going to have to be under Article 890.1 because he is pleading - - did plead to a second 4th offense, which would require to be consecutive, but under 890.1 we're going to ask that it be run concurrently to the ten years he's serving obviously without benefit, Judge - - or the eight years he's currently serving. I guess it was ten, two without benefit, and he was released on probation.
....
So he has eight left. The conditions of probation upon release are as follows:
General conditions of Articles 895 and 895.1 ;
Pay a fine of $5,000, plus court costs payable over probation;
Upon release from incarceration undergo an evaluation by the Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Behavioral Health to determine the nature and extent of any substance abuse disorder;
Participate in any treatment plan recommended by the Office of Behavioral Health, including treatment in an in-patient facility approved by the office for a period of not less than four weeks followed by out-patient treatment services for a period not to exceed twelve months.
Upon his release he is to be sentenced to home incarceration for five years with electronic monitoring, curfew restrictions, and monthly home visitation by the Office of Probation and Parole.
To perform forty 8-hours days of court-approved community services activities.
To pay monthly fees of $71 to the Office of Probation and Parole for the period of probation.
To not operate any vehicle without an ignition interlock device during the probation period.
To obtain and maintain gainful employment.
To attend five victim impact sessions during the probationary period at a rate of one victim impact panel per year.
Attend one AA/NA meeting per week during the probationary period.
Undergo a driver improvement program approved by the Office of Probation and Parole.
Submit to random drug screens at the discretion of the probation officer.
Pay a one-time fee of $250 to the Traumatic Head Injury Fund pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 46:2633 payable over the period of probation.
MS. TRAUB:
Your Honor, I just want to put on the record that myself, Mr. Algero, and Your Honor had a brief conversation regarding this matter at the bench. I just want to put on the record that Your Honor was able to look at the medical diagnosis from 2020 regarding Mr. Joseph and, Your Honor, for reasons discussed at the bench I've spoken with my client regarding this, at this time that would be a joint recommendation.
The trial court stated, "I'm going to go along with that and I'm going to accept that recommendation, but I just want you to know that ...." The trial court later stated, "[e]very drunk driver thinks they drive better drunk than everybody else until they kill somebody and so just make sure you follow all those conditions." The trial court was then asked to clarify the "without benefit" portion of the sentence:
THE CLERK:
Judge, can you clarify the without benefit portion of it? Is it without benefit, the ten years, or - -
THE COURT:
No, the twenty years - -
MR. ALGERO:
The twenty years is without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension.
MS. TRAUB:
No, no.
MR. ALGERO:
There are two that are mandatory without benefit. Yes ma'am.
THE COURT:
All right. Well, look, y'all have - - let's see. And I will give you credit for any time you've served on the charge from the date of your arrest and it will be concurrent from that date with any other time you're serving and I'll recommend that you be allowed to participate in any substance abuse programs that are available while you're serving your time prior to your release, Mr. Joseph, because I - - it is so important that you get some treatment while you're in there so that when you get out that there's no chance that this could happen again, you know, because I just want to avoid you going back.
The plea form reflects the minimum and maximum penalties and fines, but it does not reflect the recommended sentence.
In State v. Johnson , 19-201, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/4/19), 286 So.3d 493, 497-98, this court found reversible error occurred when the trial court failed to orally pronounce sentence:
We find the trial court's statement that it was going to "rule the same" was not sufficient to impose a sentence on Defendant.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 871 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "A sentence is the penalty imposed by the court on a defendant upon a plea of guilty, upon a verdict of guilty, or upon a judgment of guilt." In the early case of State v. Burks , 202 La. 167, 172, 11 So.2d 518, 519-20 (1942), prior to the enactment of our Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, "sentence" as used in criminal law was defined as "the pronouncement by the judge of the penalty or punishment as the consequence to the defendant of the fact of his guilt."
In State v. Jones , 517 So.2d 402, 406 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1987), writ denied , 522 So.2d 560 (La.1988), overruled on other grounds byState v. Monk , 532 So.2d 1143 (La.1988), the court explained, "The purpose of requiring the defendant's presence at sentencing and of pronouncing the sentence in open court is to insure the defendant is apprised of the punishment imposed, See C.Cr.P. arts. 835, 871 and comments thereunder." See alsoState v. Kinchen , 11-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/8/11), 71 So.3d 344.
In State v. Young , 18-858 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/15/19), 271 So.3d 422, a case with a similar sentencing issue, this court reviewed a scenario where the trial court neither orally stated for the record its reasons for sentence nor the actual sentence; rather, it merely referenced the written sentencing document. As a result, this court vacated defendant's sentence, and on remand, instructed the trial court to pronounce defendant's sentence orally in open court and record it in the court minutes as La.Code Crim.P. art. 871 required.
Here, the trial court did not pronounce Defendant's sentence in open court; rather, it merely referred to Miller [v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ], Montgomery [v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ], and Blakely [v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ], and simply stated without specificity to Defendant's conviction, "considering the sentencing
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