State v. Juan
| Decision Date | 09 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 31,319.,31,319. |
| Citation | 2010 -NMSC- 041,148 N.M. 747,242 P.3d 314 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cleo JUAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Fine Law Firm, Mark D. Fine, Joseph M. Fine, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Gary K. King, Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
{1} Cleo Juan (Defendant) directly appeals her conviction for child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve years of age contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D) (), alleging that the trial court erred by (1) failing to provide an answer to the jury's question regarding the option of "hanging," (2) denying Defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruction on child abuse not resulting in the death of a child, (3) failing to disqualify the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's office after discovering the alleged familial relationship between the District Attorney and Defendant, and (4) failing to consider mitigating evidence pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15.1 (), which grants the trial court discretion to alter the basic sentence for noncapital offenses in light of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. We conclude that (1) the trial court's improper failure to
answer the jury's question regarding the option of hanging had a coercive effect upon the jury, (2) Defendant presented insufficient evidence to support a lesser included offense instruction on child abuse not resulting in death, (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant's familial relationship with the District Attorney did not create a personal bias that warranted disqualification, and (4) the trial court had the discretion under Section 31-18-15.1 to alter Defendant's basic sentence of life imprisonment. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
{2} We begin with a summary of the facts that the jury reasonably could have found on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to address Defendant's claims on appeal.
{3} Emergency medical technicians (EMT) and Officer Christopher Dale responded to a 911 call reporting that an infant had stopped breathing. The infant was twenty-one-month-old Colby Shirley (Baby Colby), who was in the care of Defendant, his foster mother. When the EMT and Officer Dale arrived at Defendant's mobile home in Gallup, New Mexico, Defendant was performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on Baby Colby, who was lying on the living room floor unable to breath. Defendant told the EMT that she had found Baby Colby floating face down in the bathtub and that he might have slipped in the tub. Baby Colby was admitted to the University of New Mexico Hospital (UNMH), where he died six days later, on March 20, 2006.
{4} Defendant was charged by criminal information with child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve years of age contrary to Section 30-6-1(D)(1) or (2). At trial, the prosecution called Dr. Mark R. Crowley, Baby Colby's attending physician in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit at UNMH, to testify. He testified that, based on several x-rays, computerized axial tomography scans (CT scans), and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), he discovered that Baby Colby had several subdural hematomas. Dr. Crowley stated that a subdural hematoma occurs as a result of significant trauma to the brain that tears the blood vessels connecting the brain and the dura, the brain's covering. According to Dr. Crowley, this injury is the product of an acceleration-deceleration injury involving Since there were multiple subdural hematomas at different stages of healing, Dr. Crowley concluded that these injuries occurred on different occasions. Baby Colby also had retinal hemorrhages, which occur when blood vessels in the eye break due to significant trauma.
{5} Dr. Crowley's conclusions were consistent with those of Dr. Michelle Barry, the forensic pathologist who supervised the autopsy of Baby Colby and who testified at trial. Dr. Barry testified that in the course of the autopsy she found retinal hemorrhages inside both of Baby Colby's eyes, which were notable "because it takes a lot of force for those to occur." She also discovered that Baby Colby had sustained two head injuries that had occurred at different times and concluded that these injuries were the result of child abuse. She further concluded that the cause of Baby Colby's death was "blunt force injuries [to] the head, and the manner of death [was] homicide."
{6} In addition to Dr. Crowley and Dr. Barry, the prosecution called three other expert witnesses: Dr. Karen Campbell, a pediatrician employed by the Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD); Dr. Blaine Hart, a radiologist at UNMH; and Dr. Ken Stewart, an emergency medicine physician. The experts agreed that Baby Colby's death was the result of significant head trauma, likely resulting from forceful shaking. They also agreed that none of the scenarios that Defendant described to the EMT explained Baby Colby's head trauma.
{7} The prosecution also called the lead investigator in the case, Detective Juan Reyes, who had interviewed Defendant and
obtained her signed written statement. During the Detective's interview of Defendant, which was read to the jury, Defendant told him that Baby Colby had fallen on a small yellow toy bus and possibly hit his head. Defendant also described that when she was bathing Baby Colby, his nose began to bleed and he kept slouching toward the end of the tub. She claimed that she took Baby Colby to the living room, and while she was in the bedroom getting his clothes, he stopped breathing. Later in the interview she described another incident in which she pulled off Baby Colby's pants "a little too hard, and he kind of fell back on his head."
{8} In her written statement, which was also read to the jury during trial, Defendant wrote:
She also admitted that she had been having trouble handling the foster children in her care and had made numerous requests to CYFD to remove the foster children from her home but did not receive a response. In addition, she disclosed that she was on anti-depression medication, which she had not been consistently taking. When Detective Reyes asked during the interview what effect not taking her medications usually has on her, she stated that she becomes agitated and mad.
{9} At trial, Defendant sought to prove that her husband had shaken Baby Colby, asserting that on the morning of the incident her husband was alone with Baby Colby, and when she returned home Baby Colby was acting strangely. Defendant relied on the statements of expert witnesses at trial to prove that when a child receives significant brain injuries the child will immediately begin to act abnormally. The experts stated that the immediate symptoms of the injury could include lethargy, a withdrawn disposition, lack of appetite, lack of focus, and irritability. Defendant called her brother, David Smith, to testify that Baby Colby's behavioral changes had already begun when he and Defendant arrived at the mobile home the morning that Baby Colby lost consciousness. Defendant's brother stated that during breakfast Baby Colby was "stiff ... like a doll," seemed to be in a daze, and hardly ate anything.
{10} Defendant was found guilty of child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve years of age. In accordance with NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A)(1) (), Defendant received a life sentence followed by five years of parole. Defendant appeals her conviction pursuant to Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA and Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution, which provide for direct appeals from the district court when a sentence of death or life imprisonment has been imposed. On appeal, Defendant raises four issues: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to answer the jury's question about the option of "hanging," (2) that she was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction on child abuse not resulting in death, (3) that the district attorney's office should have been disqualified as a result of an alleged familial relationship between the District Attorney and Defendant, and (4) that the trial court erred in ruling that it did not have discretion to adjust Defendant's life sentence under Section 31-18-15.1.
{11} At the close of evidence, the trial court issued the following relevant jury instructions:
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