State v. Juarez-Godinez
Decision Date | 26 July 1995 |
Docket Number | C-21343,R,JUAREZ-GODINE |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Rogelioespondent. 92; CA A78977. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Timothy A. Sylwester, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen.
Helen Lenore Cooper, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Ferder, Ogdahl, Brandt & Casebeer.
The state appeals from a pretrial order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant was issued on the basis of information obtained by the police during a traffic stop. We affirm.
We recite the facts, which are not disputed, as found by the trial court:
Based on the evidence seized during the execution of the warrant, defendant and the two passengers were charged by indictment with three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search was "unconstitutional." 1 He argued that once he was arrested, the basis for the original stop had dissipated and, lacking reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been committed, Burdick had no grounds to detain the vehicle and the passengers. He also argued that because the inquiry should have ended after defendant and the passengers refused to consent to a search, the subsequent 50-minute detention was unreasonably long. Finally, he argued that the use of Bud constituted a warrantless search that was not supported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. After a hearing on defendant's motion, the court reached the following conclusions, and suppressed the evidence:
"Based on the above [findings], the Court finds that the detention of the Defendant's vehicle was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that the application of 'Bud' to the vehicle was overly intrusive and constituted a warrantless search."
On appeal, the state characterizes as the "threshold question * * * whether Trooper Burdick unlawfully 'detained' the vehicle defendant was driving * * * and, if so, whether that illegality provides any basis to suppress evidence." The state argues that the vehicle was not detained, but that even if it was detained, the detention was lawful. 2 The state also contends that the dog-sniff was not a search.
We first consider whether the trial court correctly concluded that the vehicle was detained unlawfully. Based on its findings, quoted above, the trial court concluded that "the detention of the Defendant's vehicle was unreasonable under the circumstances." The legal basis of the court's opinion is not entirely clear. The court may have been analogizing the situation to an investigatory "stop" of a person. Under ORS 131.615(1), an officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime may briefly detain that person to make a reasonable inquiry. The detention and inquiry, however, may be for no longer than a reasonable time. ORS 131.615(2). Although some courts have applied that type of analysis to hold that brief detentions of personal property for investigatory purposes are lawful where the police have a reasonable suspicion that the property contains evidence of a crime, see, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) ( ), we have not done so. Regardless, such an application of those statutes was never presented to the trial court, nor do the parties propose on appeal that we now adopt that approach.
The trial court may have been holding, in essence, that the vehicle was seized unlawfully. If so, we do not agree that the vehicle was seized before the dog-sniff. A seizure occurs when there is a
State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 207, 729 P.2d 524 (1986).
In evaluating whether there was a seizure of the vehicle here, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact if evidence supports them. Cf. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968).
The state contends that the vehicle was not seized, but that it remained at the scene as an unavoidable consequence of defendant's arrest. See State v. Woods, 134 Or.App. 53, 894 P.2d 511, rev. den. 321 Or. 340, 898 P.2d 192 (1995) ( ). Defendant argues that the vehicle was seized because of Burdick's specific actions and statements, and that that seizure was independent of defendant's arrest. After defendant and the passengers refused to consent to a search of the vehicle, Burdick did tell them that officer Milton was coming, that the dog was going to sniff the vehicle, and that, if the dog alerted, Burdick would apply for a search warrant. However, as the trial court found, defendant never asked that the vehicle be released, nor did the passengers, who were not under arrest, ask to leave with...
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