State v. Juneau
| Decision Date | 27 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | A20-1129 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Edward Juneau, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Johnson, Judge Anoka County District Court File No 02-CR-17-2371
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
An Anoka County jury found John Edward Juneau guilty of a third-degree controlled substance crime based on evidence that he possessed methamphetamine in his vehicle. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Juneau's motion to suppress the evidence of the methamphetamine. We also conclude that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing argument. And we further conclude that the district court did not err by denying Juneau's motion for a downward durational departure from the presumptive sentencing range. Therefore, we affirm.
Juneau's conviction arises from a police officer's stop of his vehicle and subsequent discovery of methamphetamine during a search of the vehicle. On April 11, 2017, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Sergeant Blair of the Coon Rapids Police Department responded to a report that an unknown person was running through the backyards of local residences. After concluding his investigation into that report, Sergeant Blair saw an SUV drive slowly past a particular home. Sergeant Blair became suspicious because he recently had spent a considerable amount of time investigating that home for narcotics-related activity. Sergeant Blair checked the registration of the SUV. His squad-car computer indicated that the vehicle's owner was not a resident of Coon Rapids and also indicated (incorrectly) that the vehicle's registration had expired.
Sergeant Blair followed the SUV. As he did so, he noticed that the driver was speeding up, as if to increase the space between the SUV and the squad car. Sergeant Blair eventually caught up to the SUV and stopped it for an equipment violation. The driver of the SUV came to a rolling stop. Sergeant Blair shined a spotlight through the SUV's rear window and saw the driver make furtive movements toward the center console. Sergeant Blair approached the vehicle and ordered the driver to exit the vehicle. After his third or fourth command, the driver complied. Sergeant Blair immediately recognized Juneau based on past interactions. Juneau told Sergeant Blair that he had been in the area visiting a friend. Sergeant Blair did not believe Juneau and ordered a drug-detection dog to sniff the SUV. The dog reacted positively to the presence of narcotics. Sergeant Blair searched the vehicle and found two small baggies containing a substance that later was determined to be methamphetamine.
The state charged Juneau with one count of third-degree possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016). In July 2017, Juneau moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle. In November 2017, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Sergeant Blair and Juneau testified. In August 2018, the district court filed an order denying Juneau's motion. The district court determined that the dog sniff of Juneau's vehicle was justified by a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity and that Sergeant Blair's search of Juneau's vehicle was supported by probable cause.
The case was tried to a jury over two days in August 2019. The state called two witnesses: Sergeant Blair and a forensic scientist who had tested and weighed the substance found in Juneau's vehicle. Juneau called one witness, J.I., who testified that he-not Juneau-was responsible for the methamphetamine found in Juneau's vehicle. Juneau did not testify.
The jury found Juneau guilty. At sentencing, Juneau moved for a downward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines range. The district court denied Juneau's motion and imposed a sentence of 49 months of imprisonment. Juneau appeals.
Juneau first argues that, for two reasons, the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. First, Juneau contends that the dog sniff of his vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Second, he contends that, even if there was reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff, the dog sniff is invalid because the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics only after entering the vehicle, which he contends is a search that was not supported by probable cause.[1] This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district court's findings of fact concerning an investigatory stop. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). If the relevant facts are undisputed, this court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court's ruling that an investigatory stop is valid. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Minn. 2009).
Juneau first contends that the dog sniff of his vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution guarantee the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the use of a drug-sniffing dog is not a "search" and, thus, does not require probable cause. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-10 (2005). Under the Minnesota Constitution, a law-enforcement officer may not use a drug-sniffing dog on a motor vehicle that is stopped for a routine equipment violation unless the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135, 137 (Minn. 2002). The reasonable-suspicion standard is satisfied if "an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot." State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be more than a "mere hunch" and must be based on "specific and articulable facts." State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 751-52, 758 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. Id. at 752.
In this case, the district court concluded that Sergeant Blair's expansion of the investigatory stop with a dog sniff was justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related activity. The district court determined that three facts provided the requisite reasonable suspicion: (1) Juneau had been in a high-crime area, (2) he had come to a "rolling" stop, and (3) he had made "furtive movements" towards the center console after stopping.
Juneau contends that the first fact on which the district court relied-that he had been in a high-crime area-is clearly erroneous because Sergeant Blair testified that the area in which Juneau was arrested is a "relatively quiet neighborhood." But Sergeant Blair also testified that, in the months preceding Juneau's arrest, he had spent "endless hours" conducting narcotics-related surveillance at the home past which Juneau was driving slowly. Sergeant Blair also testified that he had been involved in narcotics-related arrests in the area and was aware of additional criminal incidents occurring in that area. Thus, the district court's finding that Juneau had been in a high-crime area is not clearly erroneous.
Juneau also contends that the district court's three findings do not indicate drug-related activity so as to justify a dog sniff. See Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137. In evaluating an officer's assertion of a reasonable, articulable suspicion, courts must be "deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye." Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 88-89; Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752. Sergeant Blair testified that, in his experience, a rolling stop is "very typical" in narcotics-related cases. Sergeant Blair also testified that if a car's occupant makes movements toward the center console, the person may be trying to hide something. Sergeant Blair's testimony, which is based on his training and experience, specifically connects his observations of Juneau's behavior to drug-related activity. In this way, this case is similar to State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 2016), in which the appellant was seen leaving a drug house, took an unusually long time to stop, and had recently been arrested for a drug crime. Id. at 487. Accordingly, the district court in this case did not err by concluding that Sergeant Blair had "specific and articulable facts" of drug-related activity that are sufficient to satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard for a dog sniff.
Juneau also contends that, even if the use of a drug-sniffing dog was justified, the dog sniff is invalid because the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics only after entering the vehicle, which, Juneau asserts, must be deemed a search that is not supported by probable cause.
Juneau did not make this argument to the district court. He is making the argument for the first time on appeal. In his reply brief, he urges the court to consider the argument based on an...
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