State v. Kalafat

• Decision Date: 22 May 1975
• Citation: 134 N.J.Super. 297,340 A.2d 671
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John G. KALAFAT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 297

134 N.J.Super. 297

340 A.2d 671

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John G. KALAFAT, Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted April 22, 1975.

Decided May 22, 1975.

Lewis, Siegel & Wood, Trenton, for defendant-appellant.

C. Judson Hamlin, Middlesex County Prosecutor, for plaintiff-respondent (Richard A. Feldman, Asst. Prosecutor, on the brief).

Before Judges MATTHEWS, FRITZ and BOTTER.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Middlesex County Court which found the defendant guilty of speeding at the rate of 66 miles an hour in a 55-mile an hour zone, after a trial De novo. The appeal was from a municipal court of Cranbury Township, Middlesex County.

Defendant challenges the County Court judge's ruling that admitted into evidence a certificate issued by the then Deputy Superintendent of the Division of Weights and Measures, Department of Law and Public Safety, describing and verifying a measured one-half mile course in Hightstown, on the ground that it does not come within Evid.R. 63(13) exception to the exclusion of hearsay evidence established in Evid.R. 63. The State contends that the certificate bears an overwhelming indicia of trustworthiness and thus is entitled to classification as a business record under Evid.R. 63(13). See Mahoney v. Minsky, 39 N.J. 208, 218, 188 A.2d 161 (1963); State v. McGeary, 129 N.J.Super. 219, 226, 322 A.2d 830 (App.Div.1974).

The facts are undisputed. On October 23, 1973 Trooper Matusiewicz of the New Jersey State Police issued a summons to defendant charging him with speeding, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4--98. He was found guilty of the offense in the Cranbury Township Municipal Court and he appealed to the Middlesex County Court. At the trial De novo the trial judge accepted Trooper Matusiewicz as being qualified to testify regarding his use of Vascar equipment. Vascar had been employed by the trooper in apprehending defendant.

According to Matusiewicz, he had calibrated his Vascar equipment twice on October 23, 1974 and at least once on October 24. He testified that he checked the accuracy of the equipment's measurement of distance by the use of a pair of markers which had been certified by the Division of Weights and Measures. Defense counsel objected to the admission into evidence of the certificate of accuracy of marked distance because the individual who had measured the distance did not testify as to the mode and accuracy of the measuring procedure. The County Court judge then offered to permit defense counsel to measure the course himself, but that offer was declined. Defendant's objection was overruled. Thereafter, the trooper proceeded to testify as to the calibration of his equipment, how he employed it on the day in question and the result of the readout showing defendant to be travelling at a speed of 66 miles per hour.

The conviction followed.

We agree that the admission of a document as a business record requires that a foundation be laid to insure that the record was made in the ordinary course of business shortly after the transaction, by one who had firsthand knowledge of the facts recorded. See Evid.R. 63(13); State v. Conners, 129 N.J.Super. 476, 485, 324 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1974); McCormick, Evidence, 598--605 (1954). And while we recognize that the State predicated admission of the certificate under Evid.R. 63(13), we find no reason to require that that rule served as the basis for admitting the certificate into evidence. See Isko v. Livingston Tp. Planning Bd., 51 N.J. 162, 175, 238 A.2d 457 (1968).

Under Evid.R. 63(15) a statement by a public official within the...