State v. Kamalski

• Decision Date: 14 January 1981
• Citation: 429 A.2d 1315
• Parties: STATE of Delaware v. Gary H. KAMALSKI. STATE of Delaware v. Lloyd PENLAND. STATE of Delaware v. Francis MONDZELEWSKI.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 1315

429 A.2d 1315

STATE of Delaware v. Gary H. KAMALSKI.

STATE of Delaware v. Lloyd PENLAND.

STATE of Delaware v. Francis MONDZELEWSKI.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Jan. 14, 1981.

Ralph K. Durstein, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for the State of Delaware.

Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for Gary H. Kamalski.

Carl A. Agostini, Wilmington, for Lloyd Penland.

Donald W. Booker, Wilmington, for Francis Mondzelewski.

STIFTEL, President Judge.

The three named Respondents are before this Court on their separate motions to dismiss the State's separate petitions to have each declared a habitual offender under Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Code. Chapter 28 provides the machinery by which those individuals who continually disobey the motor vehicle laws of this State may have their licenses revoked for up to 5 years. 21 Del.C. § 2802 defines "habitual offender" as any person who has accumulated a certain type and number of traffic offenses within certain described time limits. Without going into further detail, it need only be noted that, if the abstracts of the driving records of our three Respondents are accepted at face value, each of them has fit within the parameters of Section 2802 by accumulating three or more convictions of the type listed in § 2802(1) within five years.

After a person has accumulated a sufficient number of convictions to fit within the bounds of 21 Del.C. § 2802, 21 Del.C. § 2803 requires the Secretary of Public Safety to certify the conviction record or abstract to the Attorney General. The Attorney General must then file a petition in Superior Court against the person named in the conviction record, requesting the Court to determine whether the person named is a habitual offender. 21 Del.C. § 2804. The Court then issues and serves upon the named individual an order requiring that individual to appear and show cause why he should not be declared a habitual offender. 21 Del.C. § 2805. At the hearing, the Court may inquire only whether the person appearing is the individual named in the abstract, and whether that person was indeed convicted of the offenses listed in the abstract. If the Court determines the individual is indeed the one named in the abstract and was convicted of those offenses, the Court must enter judgment against that person, and revoke his license for a period of either 3 or 5 years, depending on the applicable sub-section of 21 Del.C. § 2802. See 21 Del.C. §§ 2806, 2807. Each of the Respondents in this proceeding would be subject to a five-year suspension.

In the present case, the State has filed a petition under 21 Del.C., Chapter 28 against each Respondent to have him declared a habitual offender. Each Respondent moved to dismiss the petitions of the State. Respondents Kamalski and Mondzelewski seek dismissal on the grounds that several of the convictions which render them susceptible to the habitual offender proceeding were invalid because the guilty pleas upon which convictions were based were not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently; one other conviction is alleged to be invalid because it was obtained in violation of the right to counsel.

Respondent Penland alleges that the Habitual Offender Act itself is unconstitutional, contending that the application of its provisions constitutes double jeopardy and does not fulfill the requirements of due process. Also, it is alleged that this Respondent is denied due process because of the seven-month delay in bringing the habitual offender petition against him.

For the sake of judicial economy, I have combined these three motions and will decide all issues raised in this single opinion.

The initial question to be resolved is whether 21 Del.C., Chapter 28 is invalid as violative of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article I, §§ 7 and 8 of the Delaware Constitution of 1897. The first contention of Respondent Penland is that the habitual offender's provision of the Motor Vehicle Code constitutes double jeopardy, in violation of Article I, § 8 of the Delaware Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the provision imposes a second punishment for offenses where punishment has already been imposed. By drawing a vivid picture of the deleterious effects a five-year suspension of driving privileges will have on his life, Mr. Penland seeks to demonstrate that 21 Del.C. § 2802(1) and its enforcement provisions requiring suspensions, the only provisions in issue, impose a "punishment" as contemplated by the constitutional provisions aforementioned. He also points to certain isolated phrases in the provisions of Chapter 28 that, examined out of context, could infer the Habitual Offender Act was intended to inflict additional punishment on Respondent for his numerous traffic violations. However, after a complete examination of the statutory provisions involved and the cases which have considered this issue, I am convinced that 21 Del.C. § 2802(1) and its enforcement provisions do not violate the constitutional provisions prohibiting double jeopardy.

The primary purpose of 21 Del.C., Chapter 28, is to foster public safety on the highways of this State, and not to punish persons who violate traffic regulations. 21 Del.C. § 2801. Statutes similar to Delaware's Habitual Offenders Act have been held to be a proper exercise of the State's police power for the protection of the motoring public. State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash.2d 872, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973), appeal denied, 416 U.S. 964, 94 S.Ct. 1984, 40 L.Ed.2d 554 (1974); Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126 N.W.2d 778, 9 A.L.R.3d 746 (1974). In the exercise of this police power, the Legislature may prescribe procedures for the revocation of licenses of those persons who threaten the safety of the public. State v. Scheffel, supra; Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, supra.

The Courts have consistently characterized these procedures as civil administrative procedures and rejected the contention that they are criminal proceedings. See State v. Wilson, La.App., 354 So.2d 1077 (1978); Goats v. State, Tenn.Supr., 211 Tenn. 249, 364 S.W.2d 889 (1963); Campbell v. State, Dept. of Rev., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385, 60 A.L.R.3d 419 (1971); State v. Scheffel, supra. Since the provision against double jeopardy only prohibits twice punishing a person criminally for the same offense, the State may impose both a criminal and a civil penalty for the same act. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1937); Atkinson v. Parsekian, N.J.Supr., 37 N.J. 143, 179 A.2d 732, 96 A.L.R.2d 602 (1962); State v. Scheffel, supra. When the penalty sought to be imposed is a civil penalty, no question of double jeopardy arises. State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973). It is clear, therefore, that the Habitual Offenders Act contained in Chapter 28 of Title 21 does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

Respondent Penland also maintains that the summary procedure mandated by 21 Del.C., Chapter 28, does not meet the requirements of procedural due process. He contends that the Court should be required to consider all relevant circumstances involved in a revocation proceeding, including the effect of the revocation on his livelihood. I cannot agree.

Although the privilege of driving within a State as granted by a license has never been categorized as either life, liberty, or property, it is unquestionable that the suspension or revocation of this valuable privilege must meet the requirements of procedural due process. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Carter v. Dept. of Public Safety, Del.Super., 290 A.2d 652 (1972). Due process in this type of situation requires that the State afford the Respondent proper notice and a hearing before revoking his license, unless an emergency situation is presented. Carter v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra. The question is not whether the Respondent is entitled to notice and a hearing on the subject of the revocation of his license. That is expressly provided by 21 Del.C. §§ 2805, 2806. The question is whether the summary hearing provided by 21 Del.C., Chapter 28, is sufficient for the purpose of procedural due process.

Due process generally requires civil or administrative hearings in the context of suspension or revocation of benefits or privileges in order to safeguard against erroneous termination of benefits or privileges. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). As the issues to be determined grow less complex, so does the hearing required to satisfy due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977).

It is clearly within the police power of the State to prohibit persons who habitually violate the motor vehicle laws from using the State's highways, in order to protect the general public. Dixon v. Love, supra; State v. Scheffel, supra. See also 60 C.J.S., "Motor Vehicles", §§ 164.1, 164.4, 164.12. In the present situation, the Legislature has explicitly set out the circumstances under which the Court must suspend a person's license. Where the mandate of the Legislature is clear and the statute violates no constitutional provisions, the Court must follow the statute. State v. Nicholson, Del.Super., 334 A.2d 230 (1975). Since the Legislature may prescribe the circumstances under which a person's license may be revoked, there is no question that by this statute the Legislature has limited the issues before the Court to whether the person named in the abstract is the person whose license is to be revoked, and whether that person was convicted of the offenses listed in the abstract which subject him to the provisions of the...