State v. Kampschroeder, 74596

• Citation: 985 S.W.2d 396
• Decision Date: 02 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 74596,74596
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Daniel KAMPSCHROEDER, Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 396

985 S.W.2d 396

STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Daniel KAMPSCHROEDER, Defendant/Respondent.

No. 74596.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Four.

Feb. 2, 1999.

Gordon R. Upchurch, John G. Meyer, Asst. Pros. Attys., Union, for appellant.

Frank K. Carlson, Union, for respondent.

RHODES RUSSELL, Judge.

State interlocutorily appeals the trial court's order sustaining defendant's motion to suppress evidence in a criminal drug proceeding. We find that the search of defendant was incident to a lawful arrest and the subsequent search of the house was conducted pursuant to consent. However, no valid consent was given to search the automobile. We reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.

The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the ruling is as follows. On the evening of February 19, 1997, Washington city police officers were dispatched to a residence to investigate a report of a husband breaking into a house. When the officers approached the home, defendant's wife answered the door and let the officers into the house. The officers discovered what appeared to be a milk shake thrown on the door. In addition, the door had been ripped off its hinges and was lying on the floor along with clothes, glass, and drops of blood.

Wife told an officer she and her son were gone from the home for a few days. When they returned, they had some difficulty getting in the door, so wife had pushed the door open. Wife related how she refused to let her husband in when he came to the house. She told an officer he threatened to break the glass in the door if she did not let him in the house. She next related that defendant did break the glass, entered the house, grabbed her by the wrist, and pushed her. The officers placed defendant under arrest "for domestic violence" and searched his person finding marijuana and methamphetamine.

An officer testified that wife, after hearing what the officers found, asked the officers to search the residence and signed a form granting permission to search. ¹ In the search of the house, officers found drug paraphernalia. The officers also asked wife for permission to search the automobile defendant had driven to the house. Although State implies in its brief that wife specifically granted permission to search the car as well, the record does not reflect this. Regardless, the officers searched the car and found a portion of a burned hand-rolled marijuana cigarette and a silver tube with marijuana residue.

Defendant was charged with the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance for methamphetamine. He filed a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to suppress statements. The trial court sustained the motion to suppress, but filed no findings of fact or conclusions of law. State appeals pursuant to section 547.200.1(3), (4) RSMo (Cum.Supp.1997).

In its first point on appeal, State argues the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's motion to suppress because defendant was lawfully arrested and the subsequent search of his person was incident to that arrest. Defendant counters that his arrest "for domestic violence" was not lawful because the officers had no probable cause to arrest him. Therefore, evidence found during any searches conducted incident to and subsequent to that arrest would be subject to exclusion as "fruits of the poisonous tree."

Review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's ruling. State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548, 560 (Mo. banc 1997). We view the facts and any reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the ruling of the trial court and disregard any contrary evidence and inferences. Id.; State v. Winston, 959 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Mo.App.1997). The fact there is evidence from which the trial court could have arrived at a contrary conclusion is immaterial. State v. Owsley, 959 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Mo. banc 1997). If the trial court's ruling is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, this court may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. State v. Cook, 854 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Mo.App.1993).

When the parties have not requested findings of fact or conclusions of law and none are entered, the trial court is presumed to have made findings in accordance with the decree entered. Roberts Pallet Co., Inc. v. Molvar, 955 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Mo.App.1997). The judgment will be affirmed under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence. Id.

In order to sustain the motion to suppress the search of defendant's person as not incident to arrest, the trial court must have found that the arrest of defendant was unlawful, for a lawful arrest justifies a warrantless search of the arrestee. State v. Clay, 845 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Mo.App.1993).

A warrantless arrest is only valid if the police have probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Ware, 793 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Mo.App.1990). Probable cause exists when the circumstances and facts would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been committed. Poage v. Director of Revenue, State of Mo., 948 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo.App.1997). The determination of whether an officer has probable cause to make an arrest must be made in relation to the circumstances as they appeared to a prudent, cautious and trained police officer. Id. More than bare suspicion is required to support a finding of probable cause. Ware, 793 S.W.2d at 414. The type of facts needed to determine probable cause is found, inter alia, in the definition of the substantive offense. Because defendant was arrested for "domestic violence," the type of facts needed is found in the definition of adult abuse.

Section 455.085.1 RSMo 1994 provides in pertinent part:

When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a party has committed a violation of law amounting to abuse or assault, as defined in section 455.010, against a family or household member, the officer may arrest the offending party whether or not the violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer ...

Section 455.010(1) RSMo 1994 provides in pertinent part:

"Abuse" includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any of the following acts, attempts, or threats against a person who may be protected under sections 455.010 to 455.085:

(a) "Assa...