State v. Karey

• Decision Date: 29 June 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 2016–K–0377,2016–K–0377
• Citation: 232 So.3d 1186
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Woodrow KAREY, Jr. a/k/a Woodrow Karey, II
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

232 So.3d 1186

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Woodrow KAREY, Jr. a/k/a Woodrow Karey, II

NO. 2016–K–0377

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 2017

JOHNSON & VERCHER, LLC, Adam Patrick Johnson ; TODD CLEMONS & ASSOCIATES, Todd Samuels Clemons, Lake Charles, for Applicant.

CALCASIEU PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Hon. John F. De Rosier, District Attorney, Cynthia Skerrett Killingsworth, Carla Sue Sigler, Lake Charles, Christy Rhoades May, for Respondent.

HUGHES, J.

This case involves an alleged "agreement not to prosecute," under which the defense claimed that in exchange for the defense providing the names of witnesses who would testify before the grand jury, the sharing of defense attorney work product, and the waiving of the spousal privilege as to the grand jury testimony of the defendant's wife, the prosecution agreed to abide by the grand jury indictment, whether manslaughter or second degree murder. When the grand jury returned a manslaughter indictment, the State nevertheless presented the case to the grand jury again, approximately seven-and-one-half months after the first indictment, and procured an indictment for second degree murder. The defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging the prosecution failed to abide by the agreement. The district court granted the motion, quashing the second degree murder indictment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court and reinstate the district court ruling.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 27, 2013 Ronald Harris, Sr., pastor of Tabernacle of Praise Church in Lake Charles, Louisiana, was shot and killed during a church service by the defendant, Woodrow Karey, Jr. Mr. Karey thereafter surrendered to police, stating, "He raped my wife."

Several conferences were held between defense counsel and the prosecution, which resulted in defense counsel providing the prosecution with a list of four witnesses, along with a written summary of the substance of the testimony that would be provided by these witnesses, and it was agreed these witnesses would testify before the grand jury. The defendant also agreed to waive the spousal privilege as to

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his wife's testimony before the grand jury. Further, the parties agreed that the matter would be "fairly" presented to the grand jury, and the grand jury would decide the appropriate charge (manslaughter or second degree murder). The defense alleged the parties also agreed that they would abide by the decision of the grand jury, and the defendant understood this meant the matter would not subsequently be brought back to a grand jury. The defendant's wife and the witnesses named by the defense testified before the grand jury, which indorsed the manslaughter indictment "a true bill" and the second degree murder indictment "not a true bill." Prosecution was instituted against the defendant for manslaughter, a violation of La. R.S. 14:31, with the filing of the indictment on November 14, 2013.

Sometime after the first grand jury indictment, a different lead prosecutor was placed in charge of the case. Thereafter, the State returned to the grand jury to present "more evidence" on the instant offense, and on June 26, 2014 the grand jury indicted the defendant with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. The State then dismissed the manslaughter prosecution and went forward with the second degree murder prosecution.

On August 8, 2014 the defendant filed a motion to quash the second degree murder indictment, contending: (1) the State breached the agreement to present the case to the first grand jury and to abide by the grand jury decision, in exchange for defense counsel's assistance and cooperation; and (2) although La. C.Cr.P. art. 386¹ authorizes a subsequent indictment or information for the same offense following a grand jury's failure to indict, Article 386 does not authorize subsequent indictment or information for the same offense when the grand jury does indict the defendant for a lesser charge on the same offense.²

Following a January 6, 2015 hearing on the defendant's motion to quash, the district court found that the result desired by both the defense and prosecution from the initial grand jury proceeding was a manslaughter indictment, that there was an "implicit understanding" between the defense and the prosecution "that both sides would live with the result of the initial grand jury—either Manslaughter or Second Degree Murder," and for these reasons the defense revealed information "not otherwise available to the [S]tate." The district court concluded that the State was bound to "what was at the time its desired result" and granted the motion to quash the second degree murder indictment.

On appeal by the State, the appellate court reversed the grant of the motion to quash and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. State v. Karey , 15-0522 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/12/15), 180 So.3d 500. This court granted the defendant's subsequent writ application. State v. Karey , 16-0377 (La. 10/28/16), 213 So.3d 389.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Motion to Quash

The concept of fundamental fairness is inherent in the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment and in La. Const. Art. I, § 2, which do not dictate

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a particular procedure, only a fundamentally fair result. See In re C.B. , 97-2783, pp. 10-11 (La. 3/4/98), 708 So.2d 391, 397. The plea bargaining³ process presupposes fairness in agreements between an accused and a prosecutor. Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Id. , 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.

As a general matter, in determining the validity of agreements not to prosecute or of plea agreements, the courts generally refer to analogous rules of contract law, although a defendant's constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her rights under the law of contract. State in Interest of E.C. , 13-2483, p. 4 (La. 6/13/14), 141 So.3d 785, 787 (per curiam); State v. Cardon , 06-2305, p. 1 (La. 1/12/07), 946 So.2d 171, 171–72 (per curiam); State v. Givens , 99-3518, p. 14 (La. 1/17/01), 776 So.2d 443, 455 ; State v. Louis , 94-0761 (La. 11/30/94), 645 So.2d 1144, 1148–49 ; State v. Lewis , 539 So.2d 1199, 1204-05 (La. 1989) ; State v. Nall , 379 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1980). See also United States v. Ringling , 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Plea bargains rest on contractual principles, and each party should receive the benefit of its bargain. Yet, the analysis of the plea agreement must be conducted at a more stringent level than in a commercial contract because the rights involved are generally fundamental and constitutionally based.").

When a district attorney or assistant district attorney makes a good faith bargain with a person accused of a crime and the defendant, in reliance on that bargain, relinquishes a fundamental right, the State cannot repudiate the bargain. State v. Tanner , 425 So.2d 760, 763 (La. 1983) ; State v. Hingle , 242 La. 844, 859, 139 So.2d 205, 210 (1962) (on rehearing). "[C]ourts should give effect to such agreement[s], for it would not be consonant with the pledge of the [S]tate's public faith, reposed in these officers by the legislative branch of our government, to permit them to repudiate bargains made with persons accused of crimes who are acting in good faith, and, in reliance thereon, comply with their commitments by relinquishing valuable and fundamental rights." State v. Hingle , 242 La. at 865, 139 So.2d at 212. Nevertheless, "[a]bsent any showing of detrimental reliance prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or evidence of devious practice by the government such as bad-faith negotiation designed to psychologically probe the defense or gain some other improper advantage , the government remains free to withdraw from a plea agreement up to the time the plea is entered." State v. Caminita , 411 So.2d 13, 16 (La. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 976, 103 S.Ct. 314, 74 L.Ed.2d 291 (1982) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the district court's January 6, 2015 ruling stated as follows, in pertinent part:

The Court accepts the testimony that the District Attorney had some "family problems," meaning that the decedent's family was pushing for an indictment of Second Degree Murder rather than Manslaughter even though the circumstances of this case, at least on the

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surface and based on what was known at the time, indicated that Manslaughter was the more appropriate charge. The Court accepts the representation that the desired result from both the defense and prosecutors of the initial grand jury proceeding was a Manslaughter indictment. While such an initial indictment is not necessarily binding on the District Attorney's office to prevent a future indictment on a more serious charge, the question becomes whether or not the Defendant voluntarily provided information or gave up rights that he would otherwise have withheld to achieve what was at the time a joint goal.

The initial indictment arguably was a benefit to

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