State v. Keenan

• Decision Date: 25 April 1889
• Citation: 57 Conn. 286,18 A. 104
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. KEENAN.

18 A. 104

57 Conn. 286

STATE

v. KEENAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 25, 1889.

Case reserved from court of common pleas, New Haven county.

G. M. Gunn, for the State. D. Callahan, for defendant.

CARPENTER, J. This is a criminal prosecution for the violation of an ordinance of the city of New Haven. The city court convicted the defendant, and he appealed to the court of common pleas, criminal side. In the appellate court the defendant's counsel moved to erase the case from the docket on the ground that the alleged offense was not a crime; and on that motion the case was reserved for the advice of this court. The ordinance is as follows: "No vehicle, or the animals attached thereto, shall stand waiting for employment within ten feet of any crosswalk." Another section prescribes a penalty of not less than one nor more than ten dollars for every violation of the ordinance. The only question is whether such violation is a crime. If the legislature itself had prohibited the act and prescribed the penalty in precisely the same terms, there can be little doubt that the act would be a misdemeanor, and might be prosecuted criminally. It cannot be disputed that the legislature in fact granted the power to enact this by-law, and the power has been exercised. Logically it would seem to follow that the by-law should be of the same character, and have the same force within local limits, as if enacted by the legislature. The test, whether a proceeding is civil or criminal, is to determine whether its purpose is to redress a private or a public wrong. Is the law made to prevent a private injury or a nuisance? In Hinman v. Taylor, 2 Conn. 357, which was a prosecution under the bastardy act, it was contended that because the proceeding was in form criminal it must be regarded as a criminal prosecution; but the court took a different view. SWIFT, C. J., held that the proposition that the form of the process decided the character of the action was repugnant to reason and precedent. "Suppose," he says, "the legislature should authorize a forthwith process on a note of hand; no one will seriously pretend that this would convert an action of assumpsit into a criminal suit. To constitute a criminal suit some punishment must be inflicted in behalf of the state." He evidently regarded the object and nature of the suit as determining the character of the proceeding. Judge HOSMER, in the same case, is still more explicit. He says: "The criterion to ascertain...