State v. Keenan

Decision Date19 August 2016
Docket NumberNo. 108,550,108,550
Citation304 Kan. 986,377 P.3d 439
Parties State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Gregory Vincent Keenan, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Courtney T. Henderson, of Billam & Henderson, LLC, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Beier

, J.:

Defendant Gregory Vincent Keenan challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained when officers entered his home without a search warrant.

The district court judge denied Keenan's motion based on what he described as the existence of reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigation of drunk driving and exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that probable cause to arrest Keenan for violation of a protection from abuse order (PFA) and for drunk driving existed before the officers entered the house and that exigent circumstances—the possible loss, destruction, or concealment of evidence and the doctrine of hot pursuit—supported the warrantless entry. State v. Keenan , 50 Kan.App.2d 358, 365, 371–73, 325 P.3d 1192 (2014)

.

We also affirm the district judge's decision, although our reasoning for doing so differs somewhat from that of the district judge and the Court of Appeals panel. We agree with the Court of Appeals that, based on the undisputed facts before the district court at the time of the suppression hearing, the officers had probable cause to arrest Keenan for driving under the influence before they entered his home. In addition, even if the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution should have prevented the officers from following Keenan

into his home to effect the arrest, any evidence gathered and admitted at trial as a result of the entry was superfluous; it would not have affected the ultimate outcome in Keenan's case. See State v. Thomas , 302 Kan. 440, 451, 353 P.3d 1134 (2015) (court need not determine whether un-Mirandized statements could be used in search warrant affidavit when affidavit already contained evidence sufficient to support finding of probable cause). In other words, even if there was error, an issue we do not decide today, the error was not reversible.

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 23, 2010, Julie Hynes agreed to babysit her 4–year–old grandson overnight. About 11 p.m., Keenan, the boy's father, unexpectedly came into Hynes' residence. He was acting “bizarre,” according to Hynes—speaking nonsensically, slurring his speech, stumbling, and swaying. He also smelled of alcohol. He picked up the sleeping boy and stumbled while carrying him out to his vehicle. It was sleeting outside, and Hynes was concerned about the weather. She thought Keenan was returning the boy to her daughter's residence a couple of blocks away; but Keenan said he was going home to Lenexa. When Keenan drove away, Hynes called Platte County, Missouri, law enforcement and was subsequently connected with the Lenexa Police Department.

Lenexa Police Officer Betsy Madl was dispatched to Keenan's residence, based on a call that he was driving while intoxicated with his 4–year–old son in the car. Dispatch also advised her that a complaint had been made earlier that day about Keenan's alleged violation of a PFA order. Madl parked in front of Keenan's home and observed a vehicle matching the description she had been given drive up the road and pull into Keenan's driveway. Madl did not observe any signs of driver impairment while watching the vehicle. Keenan then got out of the vehicle and retrieved his son. Madl approached and asked if she could speak with Keenan. Keenan asked if he could take his son inside. Madl smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Keenan, and she saw him stumble while carrying the boy toward the home.

Officer Jason Hinkle arrived at Keenan's home and observed Madl speaking with Keenan. Hinkle heard Keenan ask if he could go inside to put his son down, and the officers allowed him to do so. Hinkle asked for permission to follow Keenan into the house, but Keenan said, “No.” The officers followed Keenan inside anyway.

At a later preliminary hearing, Hinkle would provide two reasons for entering the home despite Keenan's refusal of permission. First, Hinkle believed that exigent circumstances existed because Keenan could destroy or manipulate the evidence, i.e ., the amount of alcohol in his body. Second, while en route to the residence, Hinkle had been told that Keenan had violated a protection order involving another party. Hinkle had read about three-quarters of a report on that issue before arriving at Keenan's residence, and he believed there to be probable cause to arrest Keenan for violation of the order.

The officers followed Keenan down a hallway inside the home and observed him stumble again on his way to a bedroom where he lay his son down. Keenan was speaking on his phone, and he ignored multiple requests from the officers to hang up. The officers observed that Keenan had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, and they smelled an overwhelming odor of alcohol. Keenan stumbled several more times and had difficulty communicating. He refused to perform field sobriety tests, and he was placed under arrest for DUI.

Hinkle offered Keenan an opportunity to make arrangements for his son, and Keenan went into the kitchen to plug in his cell phone. Hinkle told Keenan to stay out of the kitchen because a 12–inch butcher knife was on the counter. Keenan told them to stop being paranoid and continued on. Hinkle grabbed Keenan by the collar, and Keenan stated: ‘I'm fucking Jersey, baby. I've taken care of more cops than you'll know.’ Keenan was then handcuffed. He refused to take a breath test. A subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a half-empty bottle of whiskey, a bottle cap, and full bottles of beer. Later that evening, officers learned that the PFA order was no longer valid.

Keenan was charged with felony DUI as a three-time offender, refusing a preliminary breath test, and transporting an open container. He was bound over after the preliminary hearing, in which Hynes and the officers testified. He pleaded not guilty to all three charges.

Keenan then filed his motion to suppress. The motion is not in the record on appeal. The State's written response and oral argument at the hearing on the motion asserted that exigent circumstances justified the officers' entry into Keenan's home and that officers needed to ensure as part of their DUI investigation that Keenan did not drink alcohol once inside. The State also argued that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because the officers' questions were part of an investigatory interrogation and that the officers had probable cause to arrest Keenan for DUI because of their observations of his impairment. The defense argued that, even if Hinkle believed he had probable cause to arrest Keenan for a violation of the PFA order, a warrant would be necessary to make such an arrest in a residence, absent exigent circumstances. The defense attempted to discount the significance of the officers' reliance on their DUI investigation, saying that the officers had “absolutely zero instances with any kind of DUI issues until they got in the house.” The State disagreed, pointing to Madl's testimony about odor and stumbling before Keenan went inside.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district judge ruled that a recording of the arrest would need to be redacted to eliminate statements obtained from Keenan in violation of his Miranda rights. He also ruled:

“Considering the evidence having been presented and your arguments, it is my finding that the police under exigent circumstances had the duty to enter the home and conduct a DUI investigation, certainly a reasonable suspicion to do so. Upon entering the home, more facts were made known which ultimately led to Mr. Keenan's arrest for DUI.
....
“But as to the first part of the argument that the police should not have entered the residence without a search warrant, I overrule that point. I think the police acted appropriately in entering the home at the time that they did.” (Emphasis added.)

At a subsequent hearing concerning the planned redaction of the recording, defense counsel said that the district judge previously had made “it clear there was probable cause to go in the house without [a] search warrant.” The district judge corrected defense counsel, saying: “Exigent circumstances.”

When Keenan's case came to trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of the recording of the officers' encounter with Keenan and of the alcohol bottles found in Keenan's vehicle. Counsel asserted that the bottles were found in an unlawful search of Keenan's vehicle incident to his arrest; that the search of the house was illegal; and that any testimony arising from the unlawful police conduct should be inadmissible. The district judge adhered to the pretrial rulings and admitted the exhibits.

Keenan was ultimately convicted of felony DUI and transporting an open container. He also was fined for refusing the preliminary breath test.

When Keenan challenged the district judge's suppression ruling before the Court of Appeals, the panel first ruled that, based on all of the evidence available to the officers, they had more than the mere reasonable suspicion upon which the district judge had relied to rule in the State's favor. The panel held that the officers had probable cause to arrest Keenan, both for violating a PFA and for driving under the influence before they entered Keenan's home. Keenan , 50 Kan.App.2d at 364–66, 325 P.3d 1192

.

The panel next addressed whether either exigent circumstances, specifically, such as the potential for loss, destruction, or concealment of evidence or the doctrine of hot pursuit justified the officers' warrantless entry into Keenan's home. It determined...

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