State v. Keirn

Decision Date06 May 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96-4001,96-4001
Citation720 So.2d 1085
Parties23 Fla. L. Weekly D1144 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael KEIRN, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Denise S. Calegan, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GROSS, Judge.

The central issue presented in this case is whether a conviction within the meaning of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), requires there to be an adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Based on a reading of the applicable statutes in light of their historical development, we hold that a conviction under section 322.34 occurs after a final disposition of a case, as a result of a trial or plea, without regard to the court's decision on adjudication of the defendant, unless the disposition is made pursuant to section 318.14(10), Florida Statutes (1995).

Appellee, Michael Keirn, was charged by information with possession of cannabis, driving under the influence, and felony driving while license suspended in violation of section 322.34(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). The information charged that Keirn had two prior convictions. Keirn moved to dismiss the driving while license suspended charge. Section 322.34(1) provides:

(1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:

(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial judge ruled that a withhold of adjudication was not a conviction. The judge expressed concern that if he did not adjudicate the defendant, then the charge would only be a misdemeanor because there would be no third conviction, and the circuit court would lose jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion to dismiss, basing his ruling on State v. Santiago, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 220 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 2, 1996).

Santiago held that section 322.34(1)(c) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary contrary to Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. 1 Santiago 's rationale is capsulized in the following paragraph:

Because [section 322.34(1)(c) ] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla. Stat., allows this Court to withhold adjudication of guilt, this Court has the unbridled discretion to make the Defendant's conduct a felony or a misdemeanor by simply exercising its discretion regarding the withholding of adjudication of guilt. The Legislature has the sole authority and responsibility to make the criminal laws, including classifying transgressions of the criminal law as either a felony or a misdemeanor. It is an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power to grant to [the circuit court] the power to make the Defendant's conduct punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor by this Court exercising its discretion to withhold adjudication of guilt.

Id. at 221.

One flaw in Santiago 's reasoning is its assumption that the term "conviction" as used in section 322.34 requires an adjudication of a defendant's guilt.

I

In Florida law, "conviction" is a chameleon-like term which draws meaning from its statutory context. The judicial search for the meaning of the term is not confined to modern times. Over 100 years ago, the Florida Supreme Court observed that in its "ordinary sense," the term "conviction" "means the ascertainment of the guilt of a party either by a plea of guilty, or by the verdict of a jury." State ex rel. Owens v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 So. 560, 561 (1888). The supreme court also recognized that "numerous authorities" held that a "judgment or sentence [was] a necessary component part of 'conviction.' " Id.

Over time, the most frequent construction of a statute's use of the term "conviction" has required a trial court's adjudication of the defendant's guilt after a plea or verdict. See State v. Snyder, 673 So.2d 9 (Fla.1996) (construing § 790.23, Fla. Stat. (1991)); Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So.2d 273 (Fla.1962) (construing § 323.31(3)(a) 2, Fla. Stat. ( Supp.1960)); Weathers v. State, 56 So.2d 536 (Fla.1952) (construing § 776.02, Fla. Stat. (1949)); State v. Smith, 160 Fla. 288, 34 So.2d 533 (1948) (construing § 775.09, Fla. Stat. (1941)); Timmons v. State, 97 Fla. 23, 119 So. 393 (1929) (construing section 5486, Rev. Gen. Stats., 7630 of Comp. Gen. Laws of 1927); Smith v. State, 75 Fla. 468, 78 So. 530 (1918) (construing §§ 3556, 3556a, General Statutes 1906, Florida Compiled Laws 1914); Childers v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 696 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (construing § 370.092(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995)); Castillo v. State, 590 So.2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (construing § 790.23, Fla. Stat. (1989)); Clinger v. State, 533 So.2d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (construing § 939.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1987)); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.670.

Where the statutory context requires it, the term "conviction" has been construed broadly to include dispositions where there has been no adjudication of guilt. Certain rules and statutes specifically include a withhold of adjudication within the statutory definition of a "conviction." See Jones v. State, 502 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); § 921.0011(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.703(d)(6).

Where there is no explicit definition, the wording of a particular statute can be crucial to discerning the meaning of "conviction." For example, in State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla.1971), the supreme court confronted section 775.14, which read:

Limitation on withheld sentences.--- Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sentenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence was originally withheld.

(Emphasis supplied). Section 775.14 used the term "conviction" in a way that plainly indicated that there could be a conviction when a sentence was withheld. For this reason, the supreme court construed the statute's use of "conviction" to mean the "determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty," with no requirement of "adjudication by the court." Id. at 243-44. Because the supreme court's construction of the term "conviction" in Gazda was so driven by its statutory context, that case is of limited precedential value for construing the term in differently worded statutes.

The supreme court has taken a practical approach in construing the word "convicted" in section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). That subsection describes an aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding as being that the "defendant was previously convicted of ... a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." In McCrae v. State, 395 So.2d 1145, 1153-54 (Fla.1980), the supreme court held that a defendant was "convicted" within the meaning of the statute if he had entered a guilty plea to a qualifying felony, but had not yet been sentenced. The court reasoned that prior criminal conduct should be taken into consideration at sentencing where a defendant's plea of guilty amounted to an "in-court confession." Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 360 (Fla.1988), refined the holding of McCrae to point out that it is a plea of guilty, and not a plea of nolo contendre, that "is an absolute condition precedent before the lack of adjudication can be considered a conviction."

The term "conviction" has been liberally construed in the context of a statute which defines a criminal defendant's rights in a later civil case arising out of the criminal conduct. In Smith v. Bartlett, 570 So.2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), the fifth district interpreted section 775.089(8), Florida Statutes (1989), which provided that [t]he conviction of a defendant for an offense involving the act giving rise to restitution ... shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent civil proceeding.

Smith held that "one who pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury has been 'convicted' under the provisions of section 775.089(8), even in the absence of an adjudication." Id. at 361. This holding implemented the statutory purpose to provide a broad, effective restitution remedy in a civil case to victims of crime.

In sum, proper construction of the term "conviction" requires a close examination of its statutory context and legislative history and development.

II

To properly determine the meaning of the term "conviction" in section 322.34, it is necessary to read that section in conjunction with other provisions of Chapter 322 and Chapter 318, Florida Statutes, entitled "Disposition of Traffic Infractions." Sections in each chapter cross-reference the other. The Chapters have been amended in the same session laws. Viewed together, Chapters 318 and 322 comprise the legislative scheme for regulating the privilege to drive a motor vehicle in Florida.

Section 322.263, Florida Statutes (1995), expressly declares the legislative intent underlying all of Chapter 322:

It is declared to be the legislative intent to:

(1) Provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of the state.

(2) Deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on public highways to...

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