State v. Keller

• Decision Date: 15 December 1902
• Parties: STATE v. KELLER
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

70 P. 1051

8 Idaho 699

STATE v. KELLER

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 15, 1902

CRIMINAL LAW - PROOF-CORPUS DELICTI - EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS.-The fact that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the prisoner alone; there must be introduced some evidence, or corroborating circumstances, tending to show that the crime has been committed, in addition to such confessions or statements. Slight corroborating facts are sufficient.

ABSENCE OF WRONGFUL INTENT.-Wicked or willful intent to violate the criminal law is not an essential ingredient in every criminal offense. And that is so in statutory offenses when the statute does not make the intent with which an act is done an ingredient of the crime. The rule is that in acts mala in se the intent governs, and in acts mala prohibita, the intent does not govern, and the only inquiry is, "Has the law been violated?"

JURISDICTION-ORDERS AND PROCESS-NO PROTECTION.-Orders or process issued by the court in a matter in which such court had no jurisdiction are void, and are no protection to a person who acts under them.

INFORMATION-CHARGING OFFENSE-WRONGFUL INTENT.-An information charging an offense substantially in the language of the statute is sufficient and it is not necessary to aver criminal intent where the offense charged is a statutory one, and such intent is not made an ingredient of the crime.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court of Oneida County.

Affirmed. Costs awarded to the state.

Lindsay R. Rodgers and D. C. McDougall, for Appellant.

The errors upon which the appellant relies for a reversal of the judgment (to all of which it may be here stated, once for all, exceptions were duly taken at the trial), raise substantially three questions which this court is now called upon to decide: 1. Can a conviction be sustained when no proof of the corpus delicti is given, the state relying solely and exclusively for a conviction upon evidence of an extrajudicial confession made by the defendant? 2. Did the lower court commit an error affecting the substantial rights of the defendant when it rejected his offer to prove that he brought the sheep in question into Idaho solely by reason of the writ of injunction and the inspection had in pursuance thereof by Lowe and McBerney, the inspectors appointed by the circuit court, who found the sheep free from disease? 3. Can the conviction be sustained when the information upon which it is based fails to allege that the offense was committed knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, or with any wrongful intent? No proof is given outside of the defendant's own extrajudicial confession, that a crime was ever in fact committed. No testimony was introduced to the effect that these sheep were seen in Box Elder county, Utah, between March 9, 1901, and April 11, 1901. No testimony was introduced to the effect that these sheep were seen entering the county of Oneida from the county of Box Elder. In the absence of such testimony, in the absence of any proof whatever of the corpus delicti, can the defendant's conviction be sustained, supported alone by evidence of his extrajudicial confession? That it cannot be sustained, the authorities will abundantly demonstrate. (People v Jones, 31 Cal. 566; People v. Thrall, 50 Cal 415; People v. Simonsen, 107 Cal. 345, 40 P. 440; State v. Knowles, 48 Iowa 598; People v. Lane, 49 Mich. 340, 13 N.W. 622; United States v. Boese, 46 F. 917; United States v. Mayfield, 59 F. 118; South v. People, 98 Ill. 261; Jenkins v. State, 41 Miss. 582; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349, 72 Am. Dec. 49; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, secs. 632, 633, and cases there cited.) The next question is whether the court erred when it rejected defendant's offer to prove that he brought the sheep into Idaho in reliance on the writ of injunction and the inspection had in pursuance thereof. This evidence was offered for the purpose of showing the absence of any wrong intent on the defendant's part. By the offer thus made he asked leave of the court to show to the jury that he acted innocently and honestly, that he had no intention of violating any law of Idaho that he acted in reliance on the judgment of a federal court which, in issuing the writ of injunction, necessarily found that the law of Idaho was nugatory and void. (State v. Gardner, 5 Nev. 377; State v. Holmes, 17 Mo. 379, 57 Am. Dec. 269, and note; State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586; State v. Macomber 7 R. I. 349; Commonwealth v. Bradford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 268; State v. Crosset, 81 N.C. 579; State v. Smith, 18 N.H. 91; Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519.)

Frank Martin, attorney general, for Respondent.

As to there being no evidence to prove the corpus delicti except the extrajudicial confessions of the defendant: The defendant was arrested for violating the said proclamation, and it was charged "that he did drive or cause to be driven from the county of Box Elder, state of Utah, into the county of Oneida, state of Idaho two thousand sheep, which sheep so driven had been held, ranged and herded in said Box Elder county, Utah, between the ninth day of March, 1901, and the eleventh day of April, 1901, etc." The date upon which he drove said sheep into the state of Idaho is alleged to be April 11, 1901. What was necessary for the state to prove in order to establish the corpus delicti? Merely that the defendant had driven or caused to be driven the sheep in question from Box Elder county, Utah, into Oneida county, Idaho. The corpus delicti may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. (State v. Williams, 7 Jones (N. C.) 446, 78 Am. Dec. 248, note on pp. 253-259; United States v. Williams, 1 Cliff. 21, F. Cas. No. 16,707; State v. Keeler 28 Iowa 551; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438; Carey v. State, 26 Tenn. 499; Brown v. State, 1 Tex. App. 154.) Such is the offense prohibited by the statute in question which makes any person, after the publication of the governor's proclamation, receiving in charge any sheep from any of the prohibited districts and transporting, conveying or driving the same within the limits of any of the counties of the state of Idaho guilty of a public offense. (Pen. Code, sec. 5063.) It will be seen that no evil intent is necessary in order to complete the offense provided in the above section. "As to acts which are not mala in se, but mala prohibita, it is the duty of a person to take care that he obeys the statute or ordinance lest he be punished, for the penalty is imposed if the act is done ever so innocently." (State v. Rechnitz, 20 Mont. 488, 52 P. 265; Leggatt v. Prideaux, 16 Mont. 205, 50 Am. St. Rep. 498, 40 P. 377.) It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense; and that where there is an absence of such intent there is no offense; especially so as to statutory offenses. (Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 251, 23 Am. St. Rep. 182, 21 A. 10; State v. Gould, 40 Iowa 374; Wharton's Criminal Law, 9th ed., secs. 84, 88; Fiedler v. Darrin, 50 N.Y. 443; Rex v. Ogden, 6 Car. & P. 611; People v. Monk, 8 Utah 35, 28 P. 1115.) Can the fact that a court without jurisdiction had issued an injunction to restrain the Idaho officials from preventing his bringing his sheep into the state, justify his act? It is a well-established principle of law that all orders, judgments, or other processes issued by a court in a matter in which the court was without jurisdiction, are void; and that such orders or other processes are no protection to a person who acts under them. (Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 P. 888, see p. 894; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 1046, 1057, and notes; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law; 2d ed., 751, and note; State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30; Wharton's Criminal Law, 9th ed., secs. 1704, 1725, 1726.) Appellant argues that the information does not state a public offense, for the reason that it fails to allege that the act charged therein was committed either willfully, unlawfully, knowingly or with any wrongful intent. It is a well-settled principle of law that an indictment charging an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient, and that is essentially true if the offense is a statutory one and one which does not require a criminal intent. (People v. Russell, 81 Cal. 617, 23 P. 418; State v. McGaffin, 36 Kan. 315, 13 P. 560; State v. Ellington, 4 Idaho 529, 43 P. 60; People v. Butler, 1 Idaho 231; People v. Marseiler, 70 Cal. 98, 11 P. 503; United States v. Mays, 1 Idaho 763; People v. Ah Woo. 28 Cal. 211.)

SULLIVAN, J. Quarles, C. J., and Stockslager, J. , concur.

OPINION

The facts are stated in the opinion.

SULLIVAN, J.

The appellant, who was the defendant in the trial court, was convicted on December 19, 1901, of the crime of driving about two thousand sheep from Box Elder county, state of Utah, into Oneida county, Idaho. The facts are substantially as follows Under the quarantine laws of this state (see Laws 1899, p 452) the governor of Idaho on March 19, 1901, issued a quarantine proclamation, the validity of which is not questioned here. The act under which said proclamation was issued was held to be not in contravention of section 8, article 1, or section 2, article 4, of the constitution of the United States, by this court, in State v. Rasmussen, 7 Idaho 1, 97 Am. St. Rep. 234, 59 P. 933, 52 L. R. A. 78, which decision was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States. (State v. Rasmussen, 181 U.S. 198, 21 S.Ct. 594, 45 L.Ed. 820.) In said proclamation it was declared that in certain localities (naming them), including Box Elder county, state of Utah, scab was epidemic among sheep, and prohibited sheep which had been held, herded, or ranged within or driven through...