State v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 12 August 1904
• Citation: 77 Conn. 266,58 A. 705
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. KELLY.

58 A. 705

77 Conn. 266

STATE

v. KELLY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Aug. 12, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Peter Kelly was convicted of murder, and. appeals. Affirmed.

Edwin F. Hall and Stiles Judson, Jr., for appellant.

Samuel Fessenden, State's Atty., for the State.

PRENTICE, J. The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree, in the killing of his wife by the administration of strychnine. In his defense he offered evidence to prove that, if the deceased came to her death by strychnine, it was self-administered for the purpose of committing suicide. In aid of this defense, evidence of her declarations of a purpose to take her own life was offered. To all such testimony the state objected as incompetent and too remote. This objection the court overruled in part, and admitted evidence of such alleged declarations made to one witness within a few days of the death of the deceased, and to the accused within about two months prior thereto. Evidence of other declarations claimed to have been made from eleven months to three or four years before Mrs. Kelly's death was excluded as too remote. It was claimed as tending to show the state and condition of mind of the deceased. The authorities differ as to the competency of such evidence. State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113; Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 32 N. E. 431; Commonwealth v. Feich, 132 Mass. 22; Jenkin v. Ins. Co., 131 Cal. 121, 63 Pac. 180; Boyd v. State, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 177; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285, 12 Sup. Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 706; Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. A. 235. The correct doctrine is, we think, stated in the case last cited, which discusses the subject exhaustively, and, overruling the former case of Commonwealth v. Felch in the same jurisdiction, supports the competency of such evidence under the circumstances existing in the present case, and for the purpose claimed. The threat of self-destruction under consideration in that case was one made the day before the death. The court, while supporting the competency, on principle, of evidence of the character under consideration, in the course of its opinion takes occasion to remark that such declarations might be so remote in point of time that the trial judge might properly and wisely reject them as Immaterial. The principle thus invoked is the salutary and familiar one embodied by Stephens in his rule that "the judge may exclude evidence of facts which, though relevant to the issue, appear to him too remote to be material." Stephens' Digest of the Law of Evidence, art. 2. This general principle finds its frequent expression in such statements as that matters likely to mislead a jury, or to be misused by it, or to unnecessarily complicate a case, or of slight, remote, or conjectural significance, ought not to be admitted. Thayer's Cases on Evidence, 229. "Remoteness," as applied to evidence, is a term which has regard for other factors than mere lapse of time, even where it is a factor, as it often is not The essence of remoteness is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in proof of the latter. Best on Evidence, § 252. Where lapse of time is a circumstance entering into an inquiry as to the remoteness of relevant testimony, its significance may be more or less; depending not only upon the length of time, but also upon all the circumstances. Its importance with respect to some matters would naturally be greater than with respect to others. In some situations it might well become a practically controlling feature, so that it might well be said that the remoteness of the evidence in point of time ought to exclude it. Such, apparently, was the view of the Massachusetts case with respect to declarations of a suicidal purpose under ordinary circumstances. But comparatively few generalizations based upon lapse of time alone can be safely made. Generally speaking, the question of remoteness, as Justifying the exclusion of evidence, must depend upon all the considerations, including time, the character of the evidence, and all the surrounding circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, ought to have a bearing upon its worthiness to be brought into the consideration and determination of the matter in contention. This right of discretionary control over the admission of testimony which necessarily rests with a presiding judge is one of frequent exercise. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233, 32 N. E. 6, 34 Am. St. Rep. 270; Hall v. State, 132 Ind. 317, 31 N. E. 536; Thistlewaite v. Thistlewaite, 132 Ind. 355, 31 N. E. 946. The discretion, however, is not an absolute one. It is subject to an abuse which would result in a new trial. It is quite apparent that the court in the present case was governed by the principles laid down in Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. A. 235. In order that it might exercise its discretion intelligently, a statement of what it was proposed to prove, together with the time when and circumstances under which the alleged declarations were uttered, was made by counsel for the accused to the court in the absence of the jury. With this information, and such other information derived in the progress of the trial as bore upon the materiality or remoteness of the proposed evidence, the court admitted certain of the declarations, and excluded others as too remote. While the circumstances of the trial called for a liberal exercise of judicial discretion in favor of the accused, whose life was at stake, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the record discloses any abuse of the discretion which the court was called upon to exercise.

Counsel for the accused attach especial importance to a declaration claimed to have been made by Mrs. Kelly the day after Thanksgiving Day, 1902, to the effect that "before another Thanksgiving came around she would have gotten through with life, or gotten rid of herself." It is urged that, because her death occurred before the time indicated by her as the limit she had fixed, it was error to exclude her threat. It is clear that time was not of the essence of the declaration. Nothing appears to give any peculiar pertinence to the next Thanksgiving Day. She was speaking from the point of view of the Thanksgiving season, and thus naturally made reference to its next recurring festival time. The court was fully justified in regarding the declaration as one having no other significance than any other expression of a purpose entertained to end her life, and in so passing upon its remoteness.

The accused sought to show by a witness that in the spring of 1903 Mrs. Kelly seemed despondent most of the time, and at that time said to her (the witness) that she had stomach trouble so that her stomach would not retain food, and that she had no desire to live. The court was plainly justified in excluding this testimony as too remote. If it could serve any useful purpose, it would be in creating an inference of the harboring of a purpose to take life to use in drawing another inference that she did so. Evidence for the purpose of creating an inference of a fact upon which to base an inference of another fact is generally inadmissible. It is too remote. Gillett on Indirect & Collateral Evidence, § 52; United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281, 23 L. Ed. 707; Manning v. Ins. Co., 100 U. S. 693, 25 L. Ed. 761; Hall v. State, 132 Ind. 317, 31 N. E. 536.

The refusal of the court to admit the evidence already considered in rebuttal of certain testimony of the state to the effect that Mrs. Kelly during the week prior to her death appeared to be in her usual health and good spirits, for the reason that none of it related even approximately to the period of time covered by the testimony of the state, was correct.

The accused offered to prove that, upon the Thanksgiving occasion referred to, Mrs. Kelly, in connection with her declaration of a purpose to end her life, said, "And I have...