State v. Kelly
| Decision Date | 10 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 100,006.,100,006. |
| Citation | 244 P.3d 639 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Terrance KELLY, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, giving effect to the pleading's content rather than the labels and forms used to articulate the arguments. A defendant's failure to cite the correct statutory grounds for his or her claim is immaterial.
2. Whether the district court correctly construed a pro se pleading is a question of law subject to unlimited review.
3. Under K.S.A. 22-3210(d), a court may set aside a conviction and allow a defendant to withdraw his or her plea after sentencing to correct manifest injustice.
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Steven M. Howe, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
Terrance Kelly appeals the district court's denial of his pro se motion titled "Motion to Withdraw Plea and to Correct Illegal Sentence and to Vacate Sentence." The district court construed the motion as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under K.S.A. 60-1507 and denied it as untimely. On appeal, Kelly argues the district court should have treated his motion as a motion to withdraw his plea. This court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (). Because the district court should have construed Kelly's motion as a motion to withdraw his plea, we reverse and remand for reconsideration.
In 1994, Kelly killed a liquor store clerk during a robbery. Kelly was 14 years old. He was charged with first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction, certifying Kelly for adult prosecution. While represented by counsel, Kelly pleaded guilty to both charges. Pursuant to his plea negotiations, the State and Kelly jointly recommended the district court enter a downward durational departure sentence on the aggravated robbery charge based on the defendant's age as a mitigating factor. They also recommended the sentences run consecutively. The district court imposed the presumptive sentence instead of the recommended departure, resulting in a life sentence for the felony-murder charge and a consecutive 172-month sentence for the aggravated robbery charge.
On August 30, 2007, almost 12 years after sentencing, Kelly filed a pro se motion titled "Motion to Withdraw Plea and to Correct Illegal Sentence and to Vacate Sentence" and an 11-page memorandum of law supporting that motion. Most of Kelly's arguments claimed his sentence was illegal because he should have been prosecuted as a juvenile. But he also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Kelly pursued this claim in a section of his memorandum titled "Defendant was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel," in which he alleged the following: (1) Counsel prevented him from making an informed plea decision because he was not fully apprised of the sentencing ranges and jurisdiction; (2) counsel failed to keep him informed regarding the plea negotiations; (3) counsel failed to investigate or advise Kelly of any defenses or trial strategies available if he did not enter a guilty plea; and (4) counsel failed to advise Kelly of the rights he would be waiving by entering a plea. It also recited the three-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The district court denied Kelly's motion without holding a hearing. It construed the motion as raising two claims: (1) Kelly'ssentence was illegal because he was tried as an adult; and (2) Kelly received ineffective assistance of counsel. As to the latter, the district court characterized it as "a claim generally raised under K.S.A. 60-1507." Ultimately, the district court held the Kansas Juvenile Code allows juveniles to be tried as adults and that adult certification was proper in this case. Kelly does not challenge this finding on appeal. Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are the focus in this appeal, the district court held they "should have been made" in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and the 1-year limitations period on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion had expired several years earlier. Finally, the district court held "there is no manifest injustice supporting an extension of time." (Emphasis added.) Kelly timely appealed.
Kelly argues the district court should have treated his pro se pleading as a motion to withdraw his plea under K.S.A. 22-3210(d). He argues remand is necessary for the district court to consider whether his plea should be withdrawn to correct manifest injustice. Because Kelly claims his counsel was ineffective and his counsel's failures infected his plea negotiations, we agree the district court should have construed Kelly's pleading as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, giving effect to the pleading's content rather than the labels and forms used to articulate the defendant's arguments. A defendant's failure to cite the correct statutory grounds for his or her claim is immaterial. See Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 605, 88 P.3d 214 (2004) (). Whether the district court correctly construed a pro se pleading is a question of law subject to unlimited review. Cf. Estate of Draper v. Bank of America, 288 Kan. 510, 517, 205 P.3d 698 (2009) ().
At the time Kelly filed this motion, K.S.A. 22-3210(d) governed the decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. It states:
K.S.A. 22-3210(d).
It should be noted that K.S.A. 22-3210 was amended in 2009. L.2009, ch. 61, sec. 1. The amended statute imposes a 1-year time limitation on motions to withdraw a plea...
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