State v. Kessler
Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Writing for the Court | Before DENECKE; LENT |
Citation | 614 P.2d 94,289 Or. 359 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Randy KESSLER, Petitioner. TC DA 160004-7811; CA 14296 and SC 26705. |
Decision Date | 15 July 1980 |
David L. Slader, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief, for petitioner.
W. Benny Won, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause, for respondent. With him on the brief was James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., and Walter L. Barrie, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before DENECKE, C. J., and TONGUE, HOWELL, LENT and PETERSON, JJ. LENT, Justice.
The defendant in this case was convicted of "possession of a slugging weapon," ORS 166.510(1). 1 We allowed review to consider his claim that the legislative prohibition of the possession of a "billy" 2 in ORS 166.510(1) violates Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution. That provision states:
"The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence (sic) of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power."
The language of this provision raises several questions in this case, including:
(a) To whom does the right belong?
(b) What is the meaning of "defense of themselves"?
(c) What is the meaning of "arms," and what, if any, weapons of current usage are included in this term?
The scope of Article I, section 27, has not previously been analyzed by Oregon courts. 3 The decisions construing the second amendment to the United States Constitution are not particularly helpful because the wording of the second amendment differs substantially from our state provision. The second amendment has not yet been held to apply to state limitations on the bearing of arms. 4 The wording of Oregon's right to bear arms provision also differs from many other state constitutional provisions. 5
Despite the many variations in wording, the states' constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms share a common historical background. We begin first with an examination of this historical background and then with an examination of the meaning and purpose of the particular words chosen by the Oregon drafters. We are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the wisdom of a right to bear arms, and that the original motivations for such a provision might not seem compelling if debated as a new issue. Our task, however, in construing a constitutional provision is to respect the principles given the status of constitutional guarantees and limitations by the drafters; it is not to abandon these principles when this fits the needs of the moment.
The first article of Oregon's constitution of 1859 contains the state's bill of rights. Article I, section 27, regarding the right to bear arms was taken verbatim from sections 32 and 33 of the Indiana Constitution of 1851. C. Carey, A History of the Oregon Constitution 469 (1926); Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 Or.L.Rev. 200, 202 (1926).
The original Indiana constitution was adopted in 1816 at Indiana's first statehood convention. Indiana's constitution was revised in 1851, but the 1816 version of the right to bear arms provision remained unchanged. See W. Swindler, Sources and Documents of U.S. Constitutions, Vol. 3, p. 345-400 (1974).
The drafters of Indiana's bill of rights of 1816 borrowed freely from the wording of other state constitutions, most notably the constitutions of Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania. Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 Ind.L.J. 211, 212-213 (1945). These state constitutions were drafted between 1776 and 1802. Oregon's right to bear arms provision therefore can be traced to state provisions drafted in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary war era.
The constitutions adopted by the original colonies generally included a bill or declaration of rights. Many of the declarations of rights were patterned largely upon the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 6 The background of the English Bill of Rights sheds some light upon the meaning of the right to bear arms provisions in the colonial constitutions.
James II, a Catholic king, ascended the English throne in 1685 amidst domestic religious controversy between the Catholics and Protestants. James II established a strong standing army which he quartered in private homes. He sought to repeal certain laws of Parliament which barred Catholics from public offices. The Protestants revolted in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 and succeeded in deposing James II and bringing to power the king's Protestant daughter, Mary, and her husband, William of Orange. William and Mary were offered the crown in 1689 on condition that they sign the Declaration of Rights. The Declaration was later enacted as a statute, which was divided into two parts, first listing the allegedly illegal actions of James II, then declaring the rights of the people. The first part stated that James II:
The parallel provisions of the declaration of rights provided:
Historians have noted that the early colonial legislatures perceived themselves as descendants of the House of Commons who shared many of the same political experiences of their 17th century English counterparts. See B. Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind 15, 31-32 (1977). The French and Indian War ending in 1763 brought large numbers of British soldiers to the colonies. King George III maintained and increased these standing armies following that war, and ordered the troops to be quartered in private homes. The colonists who were accustomed to relying on their own citizen militias viewed the standing armies as an unlawful instrument of oppression. See Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 Hastings Const.L.Q. 961, 975-978 (1975). The state constitutions drafted in the revolutionary war era therefore included provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms and prohibiting standing armies in time of peace. The relevant provisions of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 provided a useful model for the colonial drafters.
We have noted that Oregon's constitutional right to bear arms provision, Or.Const. Art. I, § 27, was taken verbatim from the Indiana constitutional provision drafted in 1816. The phrase "for defense of themselves and the state" in Indiana's provision was most likely taken from the Kentucky provision in its 1799 constitution, or the Ohio provision in its 1802 constitution. 8 The phrase "for defense of themselves and the state" appears in the present day constitutions of Oregon, Indiana, and six other states. 9 The language is subject to varying interpretations. It has been suggested that the language includes three separate justifications for a state constitutional right to bear arms: (a) The preference for a militia over a standing army; (b) the deterrence of governmental oppression; and (c) the right of personal defense. 10
The language "the right to bear arms * * * for defense of * * * the state" more likely refers to the historical preference for a citizen militia rather than a standing army as outlined above. 11 See People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (1931):
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, Vol. 3, p. 746 (1833). Cf., Carlton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486, 488 (1912) ( ).
"Defense of themselves" has also been said to include an individual's right to bear arms to protect his person and home. Schubert v. DeBard, Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (1980) ( ). Self-defense has been recognized as a privilege in both civil and criminal law since about 1400 in England and at all times in the United States. 13 Although the right to bear arms for self protection does not appear to have been an important development in England, the justification for a right to bear arms in defense of person and home...
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