State v. Kilday
| Decision Date | 02 November 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 9973,9973 |
| Citation | 90 R.I. 91,155 A.2d 336 |
| Parties | STATE v. Thomas J. KILDAY. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
J. Joseph Nugent, Jr., Atty. Gen., Alfred E. Motta, Special Counsel, Providence, for the State.
Aram K. Berberian, Providence, for defendant.
This is a criminal complaint charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle on August 6, 1958, upon a public highway of this state, in the city of Warwick, at an unreasonable speed. After the state's demurrer to the defendant's plea in abatement was sustained, the case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury. The defendant was found guilty and thereafter prosecuted the instant bill of exceptions. The case is here solely on his exception to the ruling of the trial justice sustaining the state's demurrer. No transcript of evidence has been filed in this court, and the only record before us is the pleadings.
In the first count of his plea, defendant contends in substance that the police officers of Warwick are without authority to arrest persons unlawfully operating motor vehicles on state highways within the territorial limits of the city. He has cited certain statutes dealing with the construction and maintenance of state highways. He has also cited other statutes which regulate the power of municipalities with relation to traffic control. But no statute has been cited by him which takes away from municipalities the power to police highways within their territorial limits. Nor has he cited any statute whereby the state has preempted such power with respect to state highways within the territorial limits of municipalities. It would be unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended, by the incorporation of certain highways into the state highway system, to divest municipal police of the power to enforce state laws on such highways within their territorial limits.
In the second count defendant alleges that on August 7, 1958, he voluntarily went to the Warwick police station to assist the police in a criminal investigation; that he arrived there at 2:15 p. m.; that ten minutes later an officer of the department imprisoned him in a cell without any cause whatsoever; and that he was kept in a cell until 9 o'clock on the following morning when he was arraigned in the fourth judicial district court on a charge of operating a vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed.
There is no merit in defendant's contention that such detention was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of sec. 14 of article I of the state constitution. Nor is there any merit in his contention that the provisions of General Laws 1956, §§ 12-7-11 and 12-7-12, are mandatory.
Section 12-7-11 provides that 'In any case in which a peace officer is authorized to arrest without a warrant a person for a misdemeanor, he may instead issue to him a summons * * *' substantially in the form prescribed in that section.
Section 12-7-12 provides: 'The officer in charge of any police station may release any person in his station who has been arrested without a warrant: (a) Without requiring such person to appear in court, when he is satisfied that there is no ground for making a criminal complaint against such person or when such person has been arrested for drunkenness but in the judgment of the officer need not be brought before a magistrate; or (b) If the arrest is for a misdemeanor, upon that person signing an agreement to appear in court at a time designated.'
The word 'may' as used in §§ 12-7-11 and 12-7-12 is directory and not mandatory. Under these sections peace officers and officers in charge of police stations are vested with discretionary power. In the instant case the police in the exercise of such discretion saw fit not to issue a summons or to release the defendant. Instead the officer in charge of the station...
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Hanley v. Langlois
...that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. In State v. Kilday, R. I., 155 A.2d 336, this court in effect held that an accused was not entitled to communicate with counsel before his arraignment. However, the right of......
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Kavanagh v. Stenhouse
...where the detaining officer may have had reason to suspect that the person detained was guilty of wrongdoing. Although in State v. Kilday, R.I., 155 A.2d 336, we had occasion to consider the act in question and indicated that the detaining period was not unreasonable, we did not specificall......
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State v. Perry
...to give the misdemeanant a summons rather than subject him to full custody arrest is discretionary and not mandatory. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I. 91, 155 A.2d 336 (1959). Equally obviously, the Legislature, when it entrusted peace officers with that discretion, intended to provide them with a ......