State v. King

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DAWSON, J.:
• Citation: State v. King, 111 Kan. 140, 206 P. 883 (Kan. 1922)
• Decision Date: 26 April 1922
• Docket Number: 23,373
• Parties: THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. RUFUS KING, Appellant

206 P. 883

111 Kan. 140

THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. RUFUS KING, Appellant

No. 23,373

Supreme Court of Kansas

April 26, 1922

Decided January, 1922

Appeal from Osage district court; ROBERT C. HEIZER, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. HOMICIDE--When Evidence Relating to Other Crimes is Admissible. In a trial for homicide, all pertinent facts which tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused are admissible; nor are such probative facts to be excluded merely because they may also prove or tend to prove that the accused has committed another crime or several crimes.

2. SAME--Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes Similar in Character. In a trial for murder, where the evidence tended to show that the victim had disappeared and was never afterwards seen alive and that the accused had possession of the victim's property and intimate personal effects at and after the time of the victim's disappearance and that the skeleton of the victim was found buried in a livery barn lot which had been occupied by the accused at the time of the victim's disappearance, evidence tending to show the commission of two other murders, committed in substantially the same manner--the sudden disappearance of the victims, the resultant possession of their property and personal effects by the accused, and the exhumation and discovery of their remains on premises which were or had been in his possession was admissible for the probative value of such facts in identifying the murderer of the victim in the case on trial.

3. SAME. Under the circumstances outlined in syllabus, paragraph 2, mere remoteness in time between the several homicides did not render the evidence pertaining thereto inadmissible.

4. SAME. Where the dominant facts pertaining to three homicides were so similar in character, in apparent motive, in common purpose, and in obvious results, as those outlined in syllabus, paragraph 2, and tended so convincingly to show that the victims must all have died through violence by a common hand, the facts pertaining to these homicides, whether committed before or after the one for which the accused was on trial, were admissible for their probative force in ascertaining the identity of the slayer in the case on trial.

5. SAME--Requested Instructions Relating to Corpus Delicti Properly Refused. In a homicide trial, no error was committed in refusing an instruction touching the significance to be attached to the unexplained absence of the victim without tidings from him for a long term of years, when no issue dependent upon such unexplained absence and want of tidings was involved, and where there was no reliance on a presumption of death to prove the corpus delicti or the defendant's guilt.

6. SAME--Corpus Delicti. The corpus delicti was well established by the evidence.

7. SAME--Admission of Gruesome and Shocking Evidence. The admission of competent evidence, no matter how gruesome and shocking it may be, does not deny to a defendant in a criminal case a fair trial as guaranteed by law.

J. J. Schenck, of Topeka, C. E. Carroll, of Alma, and A. B. Crum, of Lyndon, for the appellant.

Richard J. Hopkins, attorney-general, John E. Martin, county attorney, Otis E. Hungate, A. E. Crane, both of Topeka, C. G. Messerley, and John McLaughlin, both of Osage City, for the appellee.

OPINION

DAWSON, J.:

The defendant, Rufus King, was convicted of the murder of one John A. Woody, which crime occurred on or about the first of April, 1909. Woody was a young man who worked for King in the spring of that year. King then operated a livery barn at Maple Hill in Wabaunsee county. About the first of April, Woody disappeared and was never afterwards seen alive. In August, 1919, the skeleton of Woody was found buried face downward in the livery barn lot, under the manure pile or thereabout. The hyoid bone of the throat of the skeleton had been fractured, indicating that Woody's death had occurred by strangulation or similar violent means. Woody was last seen alive by King, and after Woody's disappearance in 1909 King had in his possession and exercised rights of ownership over Woody's two horses, buggy and harness, and even had such intimate personal effects of Woody's as his overcoat, his picture as a baby, his photograph as a young man, the photograph of Woody's school teacher, his shaving mug, and a conch shell. He also claimed the right to Woody's saddle, which was in the possession of Woody's father, but the latter declined to surrender it on King's demand. These and many other more or less significant incidents--some of which will need consideration later in this opinion -- constituted the evidence which made up the state's case of homicide against King, and his conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree followed.

King appeals. The principal error or series of errors upon which he relies for reversal relates to the admission in evidence of facts pertaining to two other murders which came to light about the time Woody's skeleton was found in the livery barn lot in 1919, and which in extenso were narrated to the jury. The facts involved in this evidence, the competency of which is strenuously challenged, tended to show that in 1906, while this same livery barn was in King's possession, one William T. Ringer, a Nebraska peddler, who wandered about the country attending public fairs and selling cheap jewelry, which he made of copper wire and small shells, came to King's livery barn and made it his headquarters for some time. Ringer disappeared. He was last seen alive by King. After his disappearance King had in his possession and exercised rights of ownership over all of Ringer's personal property--his deeds to properties in Nebraska, his spectacles, jewelry, and copper wire and shells for making jewelry, his collars, blankets, dog, horses and wagon. In August, 1919, Ringer's skeleton was found buried face downward in the lot of the livery barn near Woody's body, and the skull of Ringer's skeleton showed that it had been crushed by an axe or similar instrument.

The facts tending to show the third homicide, which were developed over defendant's objection, tended to show that in 1913 a young farmer named Reuben Gutschall residing a few miles from Maple Hill suddenly disappeared and was never afterwards seen alive, and all his property immediately came into the possession of King, and King exercised rights of ownership over it--Gutschall's chickens, hogs, household goods, horses, wagon, harness, hay and sorghum. King sold part of these effects, and hauled away the remainder. Gutschall's watch was found on the road over which King hauled Gutschall's goods. In August, 1919, the bones of Gutschall's skeleton, or most of them, were found in a sack in a shed in the possession of King in Maple Hill. During that month and for many months prior thereto King was absent from Maple Hill, in Colorado and elsewhere. These bones indicated that they had once been buried and had been disinterred, and there were indications that Gutschall's death had been caused by violent means.

It cannot be gainsaid that the evidence pertaining to the violent death of Woody was sufficient to establish the crime of homicide. So, too, did the facts pertaining to the deaths of Ringer and Gutschall. In Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 40 L.Ed. 1090, 16 S.Ct. 895, the evidence tended to show that the body of one Thatch had been found in a creek near which the defendant had camped. The defendant had in his possession five horses and a colt, a wagon, gun, bed clothing, and other property that had belonged to Thatch, and there was evidence that Thatch's death had been effected by violent means. The court said:

"Possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight unless explained by the circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence. 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th ed.) § 34. In Rickman's case 2 East P. C. 1035, cited, it was held that on an indictment for arson, proof that property was in the house at the time it was burned, and was soon afterwards found in the possession of the prisoner, raises a probable presumption that he was present and concerned in the offense; and in Rex v. Diggles, (Wills Cir. Ev. *53,) that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery. Proof that defendant had in his possession, soon after, articles apparently taken from the deceased at the time of his death is always admissible, and the fact, with its legitimate inference, is to be considered by the jury along with the other facts in the case in arriving at their verdict. Williams v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 102; Commonwealth v. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299; Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill. 241; State v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 762." (p. 619).

But what about the admissibility of the evidence concerning these crimes involved in the deaths of Ringer and Gutschall when King was being tried for the murder of Woody? The admissibility of evidence touching other crimes perpetrated by a defendant on trial for any specified offense has been the theme of much discussion by courts and text-writers. The ordinary rule, of course, is that evidence of extraneous crimes is not admissible. But to that rule there are many well-recognized exceptions which are as potent as the rule itself. Any pertinent fact which throws light upon the subject under judicial consideration--the accused's guilt or innocence of the crime for which he is charged and on trial, is admissible; nor is such probative fact to be excluded merely because it may also prove or tend to prove that the accused has...