State v. King
| Decision Date | 01 April 1902 |
| Citation | 51 A. 1102,95 Md. 125 |
| Parties | STATE v. KING. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court, Frederick county; John C. Motter, Judge.
James King was indicted for larceny. From a judgment for defendant on sustaining a demurrer to the indictment, the state appeals. Reversed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PAGE PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, and JONES, JJ.
Atty Gen. Rayner and Glenn H. Worthington, for the State.
Edw. S Eichelberger, for appellee.
The appellee in this appeal was indicted in the circuit court for Frederick county for larceny. The indictment is as follows: To this indictment the appellee demurred. The demurrer was sustained by the court, and judgment was entered for the appellee on the demurrer. From this judgment the state has appealed.
The ground of the demurrer was that the indictment does not make a sufficient allegation of ownership of the subject of the larceny, because it appears that the subject of the larceny charged was money, and in the clause alleging ownership it is improperly described as "goods and chattels," which terms do not include or describe money. In the case of Kearney v. State, 48 Md. 16, it was said by this court, "It has always been held that it is an essential requisite in every indictment that it should allege all matters material to constitute the particular crime charged with such positiveness and directness as not to need the aid of intendment or implication." We may supplement this here by saying it is also held by all the authorities that among the "essential requisites" of an indictment for larceny is a sufficient allegation of ownership. 1 Whart.Cr.Law, § 979; State v. Blizzard, 70 Md. 385, 17 A. 270, 14 Am.St.Rep. 366; State v. Tracey, 73 Md. 447, 21 A. 366. The reason of the rule requiring the allegation of ownership in indictments for this crime is that the court must be able to determine judicially that the property alleged to have been stolen was the property of another, and not the property of the accused, and it is therefore essentially descriptive of the crime charged. A further reason is that the accused is entitled to be informed of the exact accusation against him. Now, does the indictment in the case at bar so contravene the rules of pleading just adverted to as to make it fatally defective? It is now provided by statute (Acts 1898, c. 120; Supp.Code, art. 27, § 291a) that "in every indictment for robbery, larceny, or embezzlement of any kind, when the offense shall relate to money, *** and in every other indictment, whenever it shall become necessary to make any averment as to money, it shall be sufficient to describe said money as so much current money, or so many dollars, or dollars and cents, current money, without specifying any particular coins, or notes, or certificates circulating as money, or other species of money," etc. In the case at bar the subject of the larceny alleged is money, and the description given in the indictment of this subject seems to be all that the statute requires. There is no uncertainty, therefore, or want of definiteness, legally speaking, in this part of the indictment. In respect to the allegation of ownership, it would seem to be impossible to read the indictment without perceiving that the pleader meant that the money alleged to have been stolen was the money of John Lipscomb, and this without supplying anything by intendment, or at least without supplying anything more by intendment than if money was embraced within the terms "goods and chattels," or than if money had been again used, in making the allegation, in conjunction with "goods and chattels." The "goods and chattels" of John Lipscomb signifies goods and chattels belonging to or owned by John Lipscomb, which signification is given by the preposition "of," used before the name John Lipscomb. Among the definitions of this preposition, as given by Webster's International Dictionary, is "belonging to"; and another is "denoting possession or ownership." Then, if we disregard the words "goods and chattels," as being an erroneous description of the subject of the larceny alleged, inserted after the subject bad been properly described in the former part of the indictment, the reading of the clause in question would then be "twenty-six dollars and fifty cents, current money *** of one John Lipscomb." This would not change the signification of the preposition "of," as used before the name John Lipscomb; and the meaning of the allegation in question, so read, would be that the money alleged to have been stolen was owned by or belonged to John Lipscomb at the time of the theft. The word "current," as employed in the indictment, can have no such effect upon the signification which would thus be given to the clause in question in the indictment by omitting the expression, "of the goods and chattels," occurring therein, as suggested in appellee's brief, it may have, because that word is merely descriptive of the money, the subject of the larceny alleged. It has no relation whatever to that part of the indictment meant to aver ownership. It is descriptive of the money in the same sense as if the money had been alleged as silver money or as paper money "of John Lipscomb." It follows from the foregoing considerations that the unmistakable meaning of the indictment in the case at bar, as it relates to the ownership of the subject of the larceny charged therein, is that at the time the alleged larceny was committed the...
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