State v. King

Decision Date25 October 2017
Docket NumberOpinion No. 27744,Appellate Case No. 2015-001278
Citation422 S.C. 47,810 S.E.2d 18
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
Parties The STATE, Petitioner/Respondent, v. Raheem D. KING, Respondent/Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, both of Columbia; Solicitor Scarlett A. Wilson, of Charleston, all for Petitioner/Respondent.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Respondent/Petitioner.

CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY :

A jury convicted Raheem D. King of the attempted murder1 and armed robbery of a Charleston cab driver and the related charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced King to an aggregate term of thirty-five years' imprisonment for armed robbery and the weapon charge, and a concurrent term of ten years' imprisonment for attempted murder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed King's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, but reversed and remanded King's conviction for attempted murder. State v. King , 412 S.C. 403, 772 S.E.2d 189 (Ct. App. 2015). In so ruling, the Court of Appeals found the trial judge: (1) erred in charging the jury that "[a] specific intent to kill is not an element of attempted murder but it must be a general intent to commit serious bodily harm"; (2) erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of an investigating officer; (3) correctly charged the jury the permissive inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon; and (4) did not abuse his discretion in allowing the State to publish to the jury a recording of a phone call made by King while he was incarcerated. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial judge's errors warranted reversal of King's conviction for attempted murder, but found no prejudice as to his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

After the Court of Appeals denied the parties' petitions for rehearing, this Court granted their cross-petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the rulings of the Court of Appeals as outlined above. For reasons that will be discussed, we affirm as modified.

I. Factual / Procedural History

On November 26, 2010, at 4:06 a.m. a customer, who identified himself as "Kevin," called Yellow Cab requesting to be picked up at 1808 Carlton Street in North Charleston. The operator recorded the customer's telephone number from Yellow Cab's caller identification, but noted that the number did not match the telephone number verbally identified by the customer. At 4:11 a.m., Dario Brown was dispatched to the address. Brown was familiar with the Carlton Street area because he had lived on the street for several years and his aunt had lived at 1809 Carlton Street, which was located directly across the street from 1808 Carlton Street. Brown expected his cousin to be the customer since he lived in the area and Brown, in the past, had picked up his cousin at the same location and time of night.

When he arrived at the pick-up location, Brown saw a man crossing the yard of 1809 Carlton Street, the location of his aunt's home which was abandoned at that time. As the man got into the backseat of the cab, which was illuminated by the dome light, Brown noticed the man was not his cousin. Brown then turned around, looked at the man directly in his face, and asked why he came from the abandoned house. The man replied that it was his yard. The two men argued as Brown continued to question the customer about whether he lived at 1809 Carlton Street.

As Brown began to drive toward the dead-end of Carlton Street to make a U-Turn, he heard the man "cocking a pistol." Brown testified that when he turned around the man had raised the gun to his face and demanded money. Brown stated that he gave the man his "give away" money, which is a stack of small bills cab drivers keep readily available in the event they are robbed, then placed his hands in the air. Brown testified the man demanded more money and pointed the gun at the back of Brown's head. At that point, with his hands in the air, Brown attempted to move the gun with his elbow and forearm. According to Brown, he tried to reason with the man, stating "[you] [don't] have to do this." Brown testified the man ignored his pleas and demanded more money.

Brown then opened his cab door and attempted to flee but was too scared to move because the gun was still placed at the back of his neck. When Brown looked into the man's eyes, he believed the man was going to shoot him. As Brown tried again to move the gun away from his face, the man shot Brown in the elbow. The shot entered Brown's elbow and exited through his forearm.

After being shot, Brown jumped out of the cab and ran toward the dead-end of Carlton Street. Brown testified, at one point, he looked behind him and the man was "two steps behind [him]." Brown then ran toward a yard and attempted to jump over the fence, but ended up flipping over the fence due to his injured arm. When he fell over the fence, he landed on his back fracturing a vertebra in the process.

According to Brown, the man reached over the fence with a gun and shot at Brown "maybe six or seven" times. Brown testified that none of the bullets hit him and he was able to crawl behind a nearby van at which point he used his cellphone to call police.

At 4:20 a.m., Officer Jennifer Butler with the North Charleston Police Department was dispatched to 1808 Carlton Street and arrived within one minute of the call. When she arrived, Officer Butler saw an empty cab with the engine still running "that had run into a pole on the side of the road." Officer Butler then saw Brown and called EMS. During that time, several other officers and a canine unit responded to the scene.

As part of their investigation, Officer Butler and a detective canvassed the surrounding neighborhood. As a result of this "knock-and-talk," Officer Butler testified, over defense counsel's objection, that she talked to two people and learned that there were "[a]pproximately three or four shots" fired that night. Despite a two-hour search of the area, the officers did not find the suspect and only recovered one bullet casing inside the cab.

Three days later, officers showed Brown a six-person photographic lineup that did not include a photograph of King. Brown, however, did not identify anyone from the lineup. Officers then contacted the cellphone company, Cricket Wireless, to determine who subscribed to the cellphone number used to contact the cab company on the night of the robbery. Cricket Wireless informed investigators that the phone number was registered to "Kevin King" with a 1991 date of birth and address listed as 3440 Elliott Street. By cross-referencing DMV records, investigators located Raheem King, who had the same date of birth and a similar residence address as the Cricket Wireless subscriber.

Based on this information, the police compiled a second photographic lineup that contained King's photograph. When Brown viewed this lineup, he immediately identified King and expressed that he was "100 percent sure" of his identification. The next day, King was arrested and charged with attempted murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

From the detention center, King made sixty-three calls in one month to the cellphone number used to call the cab company on the night of crime. During the first phone call, which was made immediately following his arrest, King provided an unidentified person with a pin number to the cellphone. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial judge permitted the State to publish to the jury the entire fifteen-minute recording.

As part of the instructions to the jury, the trial judge explained the offenses of armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, attempted murder, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature ("ABHAN"), assault and battery in the first-degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

With respect to attempted armed robbery, the judge instructed, in part, that:

An attempt is an effort to accomplish a crime which does not succeed. An attempt includes a specific intent to do a particular criminal act along with that act falling short of the act intended. The State must show more than mere preparation and intent. It must be some overt act committed and the effort to commit the crime. Intent means intending the results which actually occurred not accidentally or involuntarily. Intent may be shown by acts and conduct of the defendant in other circumstances from which you may naturally and reasonably infer intent.

The judge then instructed that a person commits the offense of attempted murder if the "person with the intent to kill attempts to kill another person with Malice Aforethought either expressed or implied." As part of his instruction, the judge charged that "[m]alice may be inferred from conduct showing a total disregard for human life." Further, over the objection of defense counsel, the judge charged that: (1) "[i]nferred malice may also arise when the deed is done with a deadly weapon"; and (2) "[a] specific intent to kill is not an element of Attempted Murder but it must be a general intent to commit serious bodily harm."

During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge expressing confusion over the difference between the definition of attempted murder and ABHAN. In response, the judge gave a supplemental instruction indicating that ABHAN does not require malice. Ultimately, the jury found King guilty of attempted murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed King's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, but reversed and remanded King's conviction for...

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  • State v. Sanders
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 9, 2019
    ...343 N.E.2d 903, 910 (1975) ). An attempt, by nature, is a failure to accomplish what one intended to do."); see also State v. King , 422 S.C. 47, 810 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2017) (stating that "[w]hile it may seem counterintuitive for the attempt of a crime to require a higher level of mens rea tha......
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