State v. King

• Decision Date: 24 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 03-468.,03-468.
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Mark KING.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 543

897 A.2d 543

2006 VT 18

STATE of Vermont v. Mark KING.

No. 03-468.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

February 24, 2006.

Motion for Reargument Denied April 4, 2006.

Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present: REIBER, C.J., JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ., and ZIMMERMAN, D.J., and ALLEN, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

¶ 1. JOHNSON, J.

In this appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in sentencing him to twenty-seven to thirty years in prison after he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and first-degree aggravated domestic assault. He contends that the court's decision is not supported by the evidence. We affirm.

¶ 2. Defendant was charged with second-degree murder in April 1998 for causing the death of his girlfriend, Caroline Critchfield, by throttling her and striking her in the head. The victim, who was eight inches shorter than defendant and fifty pounds lighter, suffered extensive physical injuries; she ultimately died from numerous blows to the head. Defendant maintained that the victim had provoked him by pretending to kiss him and then biting down on his lip.

¶ 3. In January 2003, the parties entered into a plea agreement. The State amended the information from second-degree murder to two counts: voluntary manslaughter and first-degree aggravated assault. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to these charges, and the State agreed that at the sentencing hearing it would be capped at arguing for an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven to thirty years to serve. Defendant was free to argue for less. The agreement provided:

The Defendant understands that the State will argue at sentencing that the Defendant's conduct constituted 2d Degree Murder in that he acted with wanton disregard for the likelihood that his conduct would naturally cause the death of Caroline Critchfield. Defendant understands further that if the Court accepts the State's argument, Defendant may receive a minimum sentence warranted for 2d degree murder (up to 27 years).

The State understands that the Defendant intends to argue at sentencing that his conduct constituted manslaughter. The State understands further that if the Court accepts the Defendant's argument, Defendant may receive a sentence warranted for manslaughter.

In a separate pleading, defendant recognized that the State would seek a twenty-seven to thirty-year aggregate sentence at sentencing, which the State contended was consistent with a sentence for second-degree murder. Defendant also acknowledged that if the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a sentence consistent with second-degree murder was warranted, the court could impose such a sentence.

¶ 4. The State indicated that it entered into the plea agreement because it was concerned that a jury might compromise on a verdict and credit defendant's claims of provocation. If defendant was found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder, the maximum sentence that he could receive would be fifteen years. Under the plea agreement, and because defendant pled guilty to two offenses, the State was entitled to argue for twenty-seven to thirty years to serve, which in effect gave it the right to argue for a second-degree murder sentence. The State, in turn, gave up its right to argue for a much lengthier sentence if defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant indicated a similar understanding of the plea agreement, and he also recognized that, to his benefit, he could no longer be sentenced to life in prison for causing the victim's death.

¶ 5. Defendant did not testify at the sentencing hearing, and both parties relied on statements that defendant made to emergency room personnel and police shortly after the killing. The trial court found that defendant had given varying versions of what had occurred, and his story changed as he was confronted with additional physical evidence of the victim's injuries. In his first statement, which he made to an emergency room physician, defendant indicated that the victim had fallen asleep on the couch after they had returned home from a bar. Defendant said that when he went to check on her, she leaned forward and bit him; he hit her once in response. When defendant checked on her again later, he could not wake her up. He brought the victim to the emergency room, indicating that she had overdosed on drugs.

¶ 6. In his second statement, given to police shortly after he brought the victim to the emergency room, defendant described the victim storming around the apartment. He stated that when he went into the living room, the victim approached him as if to give him a hug, and then she moved forward and bit him on the lip and would not let go. Defendant stated that he hit her once in the face, and the punch occurred in a doorway between the living room and the bedroom. When police asked defendant about bruising on the side of the victim's head, defendant stated that he was certain that he struck the victim only once. He insisted that he did not grab the victim's throat but instead pushed her one time. When police asked defendant why the victim's apparent injuries exceeded the scenario that he described, defendant stated that he had nothing whatsoever to add.

¶ 7. Defendant was then advised that he was under arrest for second-degree murder, and he declared that he "sincerely" and "honestly" hadn't done anything and he hadn't beaten the victim. When he was informed that the victim had also been choked, defendant stated he hadn't choked her, and that "honestly," all he had done was push her away. Defendant then said that he might have pushed the victim away by pushing on her shoulders but not her neck; he later stated that it was possible that he had pushed her on the neck.

¶ 8. Later that day, defendant gave a third statement to police, which he initiated. He stated that the victim rose up and bit him on the lip and that he "pushed, I hit, no, I didn't choke her. No I didn't." He added that his arm was around her neck as he pushed her away, and the victim was clawing at him. He stated that he punched the victim in the nose, and he then fell backwards into the bedroom. The victim got up first and came toward him, clawing at him. Defendant thought that he then grabbed her around the neck. He spun her around and he came down on top of her. He stated that her head hit the floor, probably on her side, and he indicated that he was defending himself. Defendant told police that he assumed that everything was fine and the victim had then gone to the couch. When he found her later that night, he thought that she had overdosed and choked on her own vomit.

¶ 9. The trial court found defendant's version of events incredible and grossly inconsistent with the victim's injuries. The court explained that, in addition to the strangulation trauma to Ms. Critchfield's neck and throat, she suffered some thirty traumas to her arms, back, forehead, back of her head, eyes, nose, mouth, and jaw. These included: nine impact injuries on her arms; three impacts on her head and forehead from her head being pushed into a rug; three major impacts to the back of her head; two black eyes; a split eyelid, which was not caused by her face hitting the rug; a cut nose-bridge; two major impacts to her mouth; and at least two major impacts to her jaw. The court found that these injuries did not result from a single blow to the nose, a push, a head-lock, and a fall on her head. Even assuming secondary impacts from being pushed down once and falling down once, defendant's story fell far short of explaining the totality of the victim's injuries. The court also found defendant's version of where the incident occurred inconsistent with the State's evidence that the victim's blood, torn clothing, and necklace were found in various rooms throughout the apartment.

¶ 10. The court found that defendant had obviously and repeatedly lied in his statements to emergency room personnel and police, and it found defendant's assertion that he had been provoked by the victim no less self-serving and exculpatory than any of his other demonstrated falsehoods about what happened that night. The court thus concluded that a preponderance of the evidence showed that defendant's claim of being bitten first was a lie and the logical inference was that defendant had not been provoked to beat the victim as the result of a first bite. Consequently, for purposes of the plea agreement, defendant's intentional killing of Ms. Critchfield was not mitigated by actual provocation and it constituted second-degree murder. The court considered the sentencing factors set forth in the second-degree murder statute and concluded that the murder was particularly severe, brutal, and cruel. It further concluded that, under the sentencing structure of 13 V.S.A. § 2303, this major aggravating factor, with no substantial mitigation, would support an increase in the twenty-year minimum prescribed for second-degree murder. It thus found that the State's request for a twenty-seven to thirty-year aggregate sentence was justified. Accordingly, it sentenced defendant to fourteen to fifteen years for voluntary manslaughter, and thirteen to fifteen years for first-degree aggravated domestic assault, to be served consecutively. Defendant appealed.

¶ 11. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he committed second-degree murder rather than manslaughter. We note, however, that defendant was not sentenced for second-degree murder under 13 V.S.A. § 2303(b). Instead, he received a sentence that was consistent with the statutory penalties for the two crimes that he admitted committing—first-degree aggravated domestic assault and voluntary manslaughter. The first-degree aggravated domestic assault...