State v. King, 54682

Citation191 N.W.2d 650
Decision Date11 November 1971
Docket NumberNo. 54682,54682
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James D. KING, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

David P. Miller, Davenport, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Laughlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward N. Wehr, Scott County Atty. and A. Fred Berger, Jr., Asst. Scott County Atty., for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

James D. King was charged by county attorney's information with the crime of breaking and entering in violation of § 708.8, Code of Iowa. He pleaded not guilty and unsuccessfully sought to have certain evidence seized at the time of his arrest suppressed. A Scott County jury found him guilty of the crime charged. He appealed from the court's judgment sentencing him to imprisonment in the state penitentiary at Fort Madison for a term not to exceed ten years assigning three grounds for reversal. (1) The court erred in admitting into evidence certain exhibits discovered as a result of an illegal search and seizure. (2) Defendant was denied due process by the delay of his former counsel in filing a brief in support of the motion to suppress. (3) The trial court, by abusing its discretion in certain rulings, denied defendant a fair trial.

On October 9, 1969, Officer Davenport of the East Peoria Illinois police department was on routine patrol when he noticed defendant and three male companions as they were leaving the Holiday Inn. When the men saw his police car they stopped, turned around and went back into the building. His suspicions aroused, Davenport awaited until the men reappeared. He approached them, identified himself, and asked the men some questions. Defendant admitted to Davenport that he had 'done time' for armed robbery in Kentucky and stated that his home was in Middleton, Ohio.

Defendant and his companions then went back into the motel but came out again in a short time and drove off in a car with Kentucky plates. Davenport followed the car until it stopped and its passengers got out. He then returned to the Holiday Inn. A check at the registration desk revealed the defendant was in fact registered there as James D. King, but that the last four digits of the license number he had given when registering were different from those on the car he was driving.

Davenport testified he then went to the police station where he sent in a license check and a request on a possibly stolen automobile. He also contacted Middleton, Ohio, authorities who informed him defendant was part of an interstate burglary ring. The license plate check showed that the car was registered to someone who lived in Kentucky. Davenport went back to the Holiday Inn shortly after midnight to check on the names of alleged accomplices of the defendant supplied him by the Ohio authorities. He learned that a man registered under one of these names had made several calls to defendant's room through the motel switchboard.

The officer returned to police headquarters and placed a possible wanted on all the suspects and the vehicle with the Illinois state police who sent out a teletyped request to the National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.). At 5:00 a.m., October 10, the information came that none were wanted, and the surveillance at the motel was discontinued.

At 10:00 a.m. on the 11th, the state police received a call from Lynn, Massachusetts authorities advising that they had an arrest warrant for Jimmy King on the charge of receiving stolen property. On this same morning the East Peoria Police were notified by the Ohio authorities that they had bench warrants for defendant's three companions. By the time these two phone calls had been received, the suspects had checked out of the Holiday Inn.

The Massachusetts authorities were asked to verify the warrant for the arrest of James D. King. They were furnished defendant's description including his full name and other data including information he was a white male. A teletype message was received on October 12 stating they had a warrant for the arrest of 'Jimmy King'. It was not discovered that the Jimmy King, a black male, wanted in Massachusetts was not the same person as the James D. King under investigation by the Illinois authorities until several days after defendant's arrest.

At 9:30 a.m. on October 12, the motel manager relayed information to the police that the four suspects were currently at the motel. State and local police officers set up a surveillance. As the officers watched, the four suspects and a woman companion came out of the motel. One of defendant's companions had a gun in his hand partly concealed under a jacket or sweater draped over his arm. The barrel of the gun was visible to the officers as the suspect walked toward the car. After they were in the car and defendant had started it, the officers closed in with their guns drawn. The suspects were ordered from the car. Davenport observed the handle of a revolver hanging underneath the dash. Also in plain sight were four pair of gloves, flashlights, a long screwdriver, and a pry bar, items the arresting officers knew were commonly used as burglary tools. There was an open box of coins on the floor of the car. The arrests occurred about 1:20 p.m.

Officer Davenport testified defendant refused to explain his possession of the car. He related that he asked defendant for permission to search the car, and defendant replied, 'he could care less what we did as it wasn't his car'. Defendant denied anyone had ever asked him if it was his car and also denied he had given the police permission to search it. It was later learned the car did in fact belong to defendant.

According to Davenport's testimony, defendant said he did not have a key to the trunk. The officers pried the trunk lid open and discovered a quantity of merchandise. As the weather was rainy, the car was towed to the police garage for inventorying. Articles listed in the inventory taken the same day were ones that had been taken in various burglaries in the Davenport area. Among the items were letters with the addresses of the homes that had been burglarized. These items provided the first connection of defendant with the Davenport burglaries.

I. Defendant's primary contention is that his arrest without a warrant and the warrantless search of his car which followed were illegal and the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence found in the search.

A. We shall first consider the legality of the arrest. Defendant states his complaint is mainly based on the fact that he was not the person sought by the Massachusetts authorities and that his initial arrest, based on the Massachusetts warrant, was therefore illegal. We need not, and therefore do not decide whether the failure to make a reasonable effort to determine if the person to be arrested is the same person as the person sought under a valid warrant from another state renders a warrantless arrest of the wrong person illegal. See Hill v. California (1970), 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484. The facts and circumstances set forth above surrounding the arrest od defendant and his companions discloses that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest without a warrant.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 332:

"In dealing with probable cause, * * * as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. (160) at 175, 69 S.Ct. (1302) at page 1310. Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their (the arresting officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 (69 L.Ed. 543, 555, 39 A.L.R. 790).' See also: State v. Ricehill (Iowa, 1970), 178 N.W.2d 288, 291; State v. Vallier (Iowa, 1968), 159 N.W.2d 406, 408.

When Officer Davenport first encountered defendant, the defendant's actions were such that Davenport's suspicions were aroused. The defendant himself admitted to Davenport that he had a police record, and a check with the Middleton, Ohio, authorities revealed that defendant was known there as a 'working felon'. Davenport's investigation had disclosed that defendant had given a false license number when registering at the motel. It was learned that the car defendant was driving was registered to a person in Kentucky.

Moreover, at the time of the arrest it had been ascertained there were bench warrants in Ohio for the arrest of defendant's three companions. One of these men was carrying a revolver he was attempting to conceal as he left the motel. There was probable cause to arrest defendant even in the absence of the Massachusetts warrant.

We therefore conclude defendant was lawfully arrested without a warrant.

B. The limited right of search and seizure predicated on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been a troublesome problem for the United States Supreme Court and consequently for state and other federal courts. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 593; Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 755, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 689.

In Chimel v. California, supra, Mr. Justice Stewart strictly limited a warrantless search incident to arrest. We have considered the search and seizure problem many times. We need not repeat the discussions here, but believe it would be helpful to briefly summarize the principles which appear to have vitality at the present time.

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreasonable. Elkins v. United...

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