State v. King
| Decision Date | 06 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–0059.,14–0059. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia ex rel. THORNHILL GROUP, INC. and Wally L. Thornhill, Petitioners v. Charles E. KING, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County and George A. Roberts, Respondents. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. The holding in syllabus point three of Wetzel County Savings & Loan Co. v. Stern Bros., Inc., 156 W.Va. 693, 195 S.E.2d 732 (1973), and its progeny, which identifies the place where a cause of action arises in a breach of contract claim for purposes of venue selection based on the tripartite aspects of a contractual claim (formation, breach, and damages), was not impacted by the repeal of West Virginia Code § 56–1–2 in 1986.
2. “Courts of record can speak only by their records, and what does not so appear does not exist in law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Hudgins v. Crowder and Freeman, Inc., 156 W.Va. 111, 191 S.E.2d 443 (1972).Johnnie E. Brown, Esq., S. Andrew Stonestreet, Esq., Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Petitioners.
Harry F. Bell, Jr., Esq., Jonathan W. Price, Esq., The Bell Law Firm, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent Roberts.
Petitioners Thornhill Group, Inc. (“Thornhill Group”) and Wally L. Thornhill seek a writ of prohibition in connection with the December 16, 2013, ruling of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denying their motion to dismiss for improper venue. Given that the petitioners—defendants below—are either residents of or have their principal place of business in Logan County and all the relevant factual events alleged by respondent George A. Roberts in support of the underlying cause of action transpired in Logan County, the petitioners argue that the provisions of our general venue statute 1 dictate that venue is proper in Logan County. After a careful review of the applicable venue statute in conjunction with controlling case law, we conclude that the trial court committed error in ruling that venue lies properly in Kanawha County.2 Accordingly, we grant the requested writ of prohibition.
On or about December 11, 2006, Mr. Roberts began working as a general manager for the Thornhill Group at its automotive dealership in Logan County.3 In the Spring of 2011, Mr. Roberts learned of the Thornhill Group's alleged decision to replace him with a younger employee.4 Through a complaint filed on February 11, 2013, in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, Mr. Roberts asserted claims against the petitioners predicated on breach of contract, age discrimination, unlawful retaliation,5 and unpaid wages. The petitioners promptly filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Kanawha County is not the proper venue for the underlying cause of action based on the provisions of the general venue statute.6 Addressing Mr. Roberts' allegation that a Kanawha County venue is supported by case law which recognizes a three-pronged consideration for selection of venue in breach of contract cases, 7 the petitioners argued that not only was the alleged offer of employment accepted at the dealership located in Logan County, but all of the events related to an alleged breach of contract similarly took place in Logan County. The petitioners also question the validity of the decisional law relied upon by Mr. Roberts in light of the repeal of West Virginia Code § 56–1–2 in 1986.8 The petitioners assert that no fair or reasonable reading of the venue statute at issue would support venue existing in Kanawha County.
In denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss on improper venue grounds, the trial court ruled that venue was appropriate in Kanawha County based on the alleged acceptance by Mr. Roberts of an offer of employment from the Thornhill Group in Kanawha County.9 As an additional basis for its ruling,the trial court relied upon Mr. Roberts' Kanawha County residency at the time of the alleged breach of contract and the fact that “his damages would be most acutely felt there.” 10 With regard to the non-contractual claims,11 the trial court concluded that judicial economy dictated they be similarly heard in Kanawha County. It is from this ruling that the petitioners seek relief.
That the issue of venue may properly be addressed through a writ of prohibition is well-settled. In State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson, 195 W.Va. 121, 464 S.E.2d 763 (1995), we explained our preference for “resolving this issue [venue] in an original action” given the “inadequacy of the relief permitted by appeal.” Id. at 124, 464 S.E.2d at 766;accord State ex rel. Huffman v. Stephens, 206 W.Va. 501, 503, 526 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1999) (). In deciding whether to grant a writ of prohibition in cases where the lower court is acting within its jurisdiction but alleged to have exceeded its authority, we rely upon those now axiomatic factors set forth in syllabus point four of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).12 We proceed to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
The parties agree that the singular issue of venue before us is controlled by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 56–1–1 (2012). Under that statute, which is referred to as the general venue statute, venue is determined by examining the following factors pertinent to this case:
(a) Any civil action or other proceeding, except where it is otherwise specially provided, may hereafter be brought in the circuit court of any county:
(1) Wherein any of the defendants may reside or the cause of action arose, ...; or
(2) If a corporation be a defendant, wherein its principal office is or wherein its mayor, president or other chief officer resides....
Id. (emphasis supplied).
According to the petitioners, the residency factors set forth in subsections (a)(1) and (2) of our general venue statute require the conclusion that Logan County is the proper county in which to resolve the underlying action. SeeW.Va.Code § 56–1–1(a)(1), (2). As both the individual and corporate defendant have their residences, for purposes of the general venue statute, in Logan County, the petitioners maintain that venue does not lie in Kanawha County. Looking to the alternate statutory basis for venue, the place where the cause of action arose, the petitioners contend that all the facts upon which Mr. Roberts relies in support of his cause of action occurred in Logan County at the dealership where he was employed. As a result, the petitioners insist that the clear and unambiguous language of West Virginia Code § 56–1–1(a) compels the conclusion that venue properly lies in Logan County, and not in Kanawha County.
Eschewing any discussion of the defendants' residency, Mr. Roberts relies instead on his residency in Kanawha County combined with his alleged acceptance of an offer of employment from the Thornhill Group in Kanawha County.13 Adopting the circuit court's reasoning in its order denying the motion to dismiss, Mr. Roberts suggests that the damages incurred from the breach of contract “would be most acutely felt in the county in which he makes his home.” In response to the petitioners' contention that the case law he relied upon to assert venue, Wetzel County Savings & Loan, is no longer valid, Mr. Roberts cites to multiple decisions of this Court which continue to view the holding of that decision as authoritative. See, e.g., State ex rel. Galloway Group v. McGraw, 227 W.Va. 435, 711 S.E.2d 257 (2011) (); 14McGuire v. Fitzsimmons, 197 W.Va. 132, 136–37, 475 S.E.2d 132, 136–37 (1996) (); Banner Printing Co. v. Bykota Corp., 182 W.Va. 488, 491–92, 388 S.E.2d 844, 847–48 (1989) ().
Turning to the residency requirements set forth in the general venue statute, it is clear that venue lies in Logan County. SeeW.Va.Code § 56–1–1(a)(1), (2). The individual defendant in this case, Wally Thornhill, resides in Logan County. Mr. Thornhill serves as the president and chief officer of the Thornhill Group and the principal office of the Thornhill Group is in Logan County. Although the residency of the defendants clearly points to Logan County for venue purposes, the general venue statute provides an alternate basis for determining venue that must be considered: where the cause of action arose. W.Va.Code § 56–1–1(a)(1).
As part of our consideration of where Mr. Roberts' cause of action arose, we find it necessary to address the petitioners' contention that the trial court relied on case law that is no longer valid. In making its ruling in this case, the circuit court considered whether the repeal of West Virginia Code § 56–1–2 in 1986 compels the conclusion that the legal principles announced in Wetzel County Savings & Loan, a case applying that statute, had been rendered nugatory.15 In rejecting the postulate that this Court's recognition of multiple venues for a breach of contract case was effectively abrogated by the statutory repeal, the trial court reasoned:
the West Virginia Supreme Court has applied the same reasoning subsequent to repeal of that statute, recognizing that the divisible and transitory nature of contracts means that venue may be appropriate in more than one county. McGuire v. Fitzsimmons, 197 W.Va. 132, 136–37, 475 S.E.2d 132, 136–137 (1996);
6. Further, the McGuire court observed that “[t]he plain language of W.Va.Code, 56–1–1(a)(1) [1986] does not limit the venue to one county, but provides at least two possible justifications...
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