State v. King, No. 12–0717.

• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Writing for the Court: DAVIS
• Citation: 740 S.E.2d 66,230 W.Va. 471
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. AMFM, LLC; Commercial Holdings, Inc., now known as Commercial Holdings, LLC; Integrated Commercial Enterprises, Inc.; Manzanita Holdings, LLC; Manzanita Management, Inc.; Lifetree, LLC; Wisteria, LLC; McDowell Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., doing business as McDowell Nursing & Rehabilitation Center; and Patty Lucas, Petitioners v. Honorable Charles E. KING, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County; and Lelia Gresham Baker, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Beulah Wyatt, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 24 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0717.

230 W.Va. 471
740 S.E.2d 66

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. AMFM, LLC; Commercial Holdings, Inc., now known as Commercial Holdings, LLC; Integrated Commercial Enterprises, Inc.; Manzanita Holdings, LLC; Manzanita Management, Inc.; Lifetree, LLC; Wisteria, LLC; McDowell Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., doing business as McDowell Nursing & Rehabilitation Center; and Patty Lucas, Petitioners
v.
Honorable Charles E. KING, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County; and Lelia Gresham Baker, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Beulah Wyatt, Respondents.

No. 12–0717.

Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 8, 2013.
Decided Jan. 24, 2013.

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Syllabus by the Court

1. “In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this

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Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.” Syllabus point 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).

2. “ ‘When a trial court is required to rule upon a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006), the authority of the trial court is limited to determining the threshold issues of (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties; and (2) whether the claims averred by the plaintiff fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration agreement.’ Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. Kaufman, 225 W.Va. 250, 692 S.E.2d 293 (2010).” Syllabus point 4, Ruckdeschel v. Falcon Drilling Co., L.L.C., 225 W.Va. 450, 693 S.E.2d 815 (2010).

3. “The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, is for courts to treat arbitration agreements like any other contract. The Act does not favor or elevate arbitration agreements to a level of importance above all other contracts; it simply ensures that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Syllabus point 7, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va. 646, 724 S.E.2d 250 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 182 L.Ed.2d 42 (2012) (per curiam).

4. “ ‘The fundamentals of a legal contract are competent parties, legal subject matter, valuable consideration and mutual assent. There can be no contract if there is one of these essential elements upon which the minds of the parties are not in agreement.’ Syllabus Point 5, Virginian Export Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co., 100 W.Va. 559, 131 S.E. 253 (1926).” Syllabus point 3, Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 230 W.Va. 281, 737 S.E.2d 550 (2012).

5. “Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syllabus point 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).

6. The West Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, W. Va.Code § 16–30–1 et seq., authorizes a health care surrogate to make health care decisions on behalf of the incapacitated person for whom the surrogate has been appointed.

7. The health care decisions that a health care surrogate is authorized to make on behalf of the incapacitated person for whom the surrogate has been appointed are “decision[s] to give, withhold or withdraw informed consent to any type of health care, including, but not limited to, medical and surgical treatments, including life-prolonging interventions, psychiatric treatment, nursing care, hospitalization, treatment in a nursing home or other facility, home health care and organ or tissue donation.” W. Va.Code § 16–30–3(i) (2002) (Repl.Vol.2011).

8. An agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration, which is optional and not required for the receipt of nursing home services, is not a health care decision under the West Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, W. Va.Code § 16–30–1 et seq.

Mark A. Robinson, Ryan A. Brown, Kace M. Legg, Flaherty Sensabaugh Bonasso PLLC, Charleston, WV, for the Petitioners.

James B. McHugh, Michael J. Fuller, Jr., D. Bryant Chaffin, McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, Hattiesburg, MS, for the Respondent, Lelia Gresham Baker.

DAVIS, Justice:

The petitioners herein, McDowell Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, et al. (hereinafter

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“McDowell Nursing”),¹ request this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Kanawha County from enforcing its March 28, 2012, order. By that order, the circuit court denied McDowell Nursing's motion to dismiss and refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement signed by Nancy Belcher (hereinafter “Ms. Belcher”), who was the designated health care surrogate of the respondents' decedent, Beulah Wyatt (hereinafter “Ms. Wyatt”); the Arbitration Agreement had been presented to Ms. Belcher in conjunction with Ms. Wyatt's admission to McDowell Nursing's facility. In short, the circuit court concluded that because Ms. Belcher was Ms. Wyatt's health care surrogate, her authority was limited to making health care decisions on behalf of Ms. Wyatt and did not extend to the subject Arbitration Agreement. Before this Court, McDowell Nursing requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order and further requests this Court to uphold said Arbitration Agreement. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the appendix record, and the pertinent authorities, we deny the requested writ of prohibition. In summary, Ms. Belcher's authority as Ms. Wyatt's health care surrogate permitted her to make only health care decisions for Ms. Wyatt; Ms. Belcher, as a health care surrogate, did not have the authority to enter the subject Arbitration Agreement because it was not a health care decision and was not required for Ms. Wyatt's receipt of nursing home services from McDowell Nursing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of the instant proceeding are straightforward and not disputed by the parties. On September 7, 2009, Ms. Wyatt's physician determined her to be indefinitely incapacitated and incapable of making her own medical decisions; ² therefore, Ms. Wyatt's physician selected Ms. Wyatt's daughter, Ms. Belcher, to serve as her health care surrogate.³ At the end of the “Checklist for Surrogate Selection” completed by Ms. Wyatt's physician, Ms. Belcher consented to the “Acceptance of Surrogate Selection” portion of the document, which stated “I accept the appointment as surrogate for Beulah Wyatt and understand I have the authority to make all medical decisions for Beulah Wyatt.” ⁴

Thereafter, on September 10, 2009, Ms. Wyatt was admitted to McDowell Nursing to receive nursing home care. During the course of the admissions process, Ms. Belcher completed and signed numerous documents, including a “Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement” (hereinafter “Arbitration Agreement”), which required that “any legal dispute, controversy, demand or claim ... that arises out of or relates to the Resident Admission Agreement or any service or health care provided by the Facility [McDowell Nursing] to the Resident [Ms. Wyatt] shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration.” The Arbitration Agreement further provided that “THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT BY ENTERING THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT THEY ARE GIVING UP AND WAIVING THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE ANY CLAIM DECIDED IN A COURT OF LAW BEFORE A JUDGE AND A JURY.” (Emphasis in original). Finally, the Arbitration Agreement indicated that acquiescence thereto was not a precondition of Ms. Wyatt's admission to

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McDowell Nursing or her receipt of services therefrom and that she could rescind the Arbitration Agreement within thirty days of its signing.⁵

For the next ten months, Ms. Wyatt resided at McDowell Nursing. During the course of her residency there, she allegedly sustained pressure sores, infections, dehydration, malnutrition, and other injuries which the respondent herein, Lelia Gresham Baker (hereinafter “Ms. Baker”), another of Ms. Wyatt's daughters and the personal representative of her estate, claims contributed to Ms. Wyatt's death on July 31, 2010.

On December 1, 2011, Ms. Baker filed a wrongful death suit against McDowell Nursing alleging, among other things, that its negligent care of Ms. Wyatt caused and/or contributed to her death. McDowell Nursing then filed a motion to dismiss the suit and to enforce the Arbitration Agreement that was signed by Ms. Belcher upon Ms. Wyatt's admission to its facility. By order entered March 28, 2012, the circuit court denied McDowell Nursing's motion and concluded that the subject Arbitration Agreement was unenforceable. In rendering its ruling, the circuit court concluded that

Nancy Belcher had the authority to act on the behalf of Beulah Wyatt pursuant to the Health Care Decisions Act, codified at W. Va.Code § 16–30–1, et seq. Pursuant to § 16–30–8, a “surrogate is authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the incapacitated person....”

The Health Care Decision[s] Act specifically defines what a “health care decision” includes and...