State v. King, 2007-178-C.A.

Citation996 A.2d 613
Decision Date10 June 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2007-178-C.A.,2007-178-C.A.
PartiesSTATEv.Akeem KING.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Jane M. McSoley, Department of Attorney General, for Plaintiff.

Mark B. LaRoche, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON for the Court.

The defendant, Akeem King, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Providence County Superior Court of second-degree murder. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress a particular interview of his with the Providence police, which interview he contends was conducted after an unnecessary delay in his presentment before the District Court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I

Facts1 and Travel

AThe Trial

This case arises out of the tragic and senseless death of a toddler, Marquel Davis. On the morning of August 1, 2005, the body of two-year-old Marquel was found lifeless in the third floor apartment of one Troy Figgs on Erastus Street in Providence. On October 28, 2005, a Providence County grand jury indicted both Mr. Figgs and defendant for the murder of Marquel, in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11-23-1 and 11-23-2; they were also indicted for conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11-1-6, 11-23-1, and 11-23-2.2 Prior to trial, the case against Mr. Figgs was severed from the indictment against defendant.3 On September 28 and 29 and October 3, 2006, defendant was tried before a jury; at the conclusion of the trial, he was found guilty of second-degree murder.

Michelle, Marquel's mother, testified that, as of the time of her child's death, she had known both Mr. Figgs and defendant for six weeks. Michelle testified that, shortly after meeting the two men, she began to work as a prostitute in Boston (traveling from Providence to do so). In speaking of her activities as a prostitute, Michelle referred to Mr. Figgs as her “pimp.” She stated that she would give Mr. Figgs most of the money which she earned as a prostitute and that Mr. Figgs would in turn provide her with clothes and food; in addition, he permitted her to stay at his Erastus Street apartment. She testified that, while she was working as a prostitute, she initially left Marquel in the care of two of her sisters, who also resided in Providence; she went on to state that, after approximately three to four weeks of leaving Marquel in the care of her sisters, she began instead to leave Marquel with defendant and Mr. Figgs. Michelle estimated that Mr. Figgs and defendant had watched Marquel seven or eight times prior to August 1, 2005 (the date when Marquel was found dead); she added that she had had no indication that her son was being mistreated while in their care.

On the night of Saturday, July 30, 2005, both Michelle and Marquel stayed at the Erastus Street apartment of Mr. Figgs, where defendant also resided. The following day, Sunday, July 31, Michelle went to work as a prostitute in Boston, leaving Marquel in the care of defendant and Mr. Figgs. She testified that she returned to the apartment at approximately 11:00 p.m. and that she observed Marquel lying face down on the bed next to defendant. She further testified that, although she gave the child a kiss on the cheek, she did not try to awaken him. Michelle testified that, at that point in time, there did not appear to be anything wrong with Marquel. She stated that she then left the Erastus Street apartment and that later, at approximately 2:00 a.m., when she attempted to return to the apartment, she was unable to gain entry. She said that she therefore proceeded to her sisters' home instead. Michelle testified that, at approximately 9:00 a.m. on the morning of August 1, she went to Mr. Figgs's apartment in order to pick up Marquel; at that point, she was informed by the police at the scene that her son had died. She further testified that, two weeks prior to his death, Marquel had been to see a doctor for a checkup and was found to be healthy.

Tanishia, a neighbor of Mr. Figgs who lived downstairs in the building, testified that, on the morning of August 1, 2005, she answered her door at the behest of defendant and Mr. Figgs, both of whom she knew to be living in the third floor apartment. She testified that defendant told her that “the baby was choking;” she further testified that she knew that the baby to whom they were referring was “Michelle's son.”

Tanishia testified that, when she went upstairs and found Marquel, she noticed that he wasn't breathing, that he was cold;” she stated that she then dialed 911. Tanishia, while on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, attempted to give Marquel CPR, but he remained unresponsive; she described the child to the operator as having a “pallor” and as being “stiff” and “bluish-gray.” She further observed that there was “black stuff around [Marquel's] mouth,” which she thought was vomit. She further testified that, while she was on the phone with the 911 operator, Mr. Figgs and defendant were behind her, and she recalled saying to them: He's gone” or “The baby's gone.” Tanishia testified that, at some point after that, while she was still on the phone with the 911 operator, she looked up and realized that the two men were no longer there. She further testified that she did not see either defendant or Mr. Figgs at any time thereafter.

An assistant state medical examiner testified that she performed the autopsy of Marquel Davis. She described the injuries that she found as being consistent with “blunt-force trauma” to the victim's body. She further indicated that “multiple contusions” were found on “the decedent's head, torso and extremities * * *[, and] further injuries were found within the cranial cavity.” Specifically, the medical examiner testified that she found nine contusions on the child's head. Her examination also revealed a midline shift and swelling of the brain. The medical examiner testified that a number of the bruises found on Marquel went beyond the fat tissue into the skeletal muscle-which, she stated, is indicative of “greater force” having been applied to that area; she further stated that there had been “several points of impact.”

The medical examiner testified that the symptoms associated with the injuries which she found in the child's brain “can vary * * * from [the person] being groggy, drowsy, losing consciousness, possibly having seizures or being very rapidly unresponsive.” She further testified that the head injuries that she found “would be consistent within this case of Marquel Davis [being] tossed from one person to the next” and would “be consistent with the child being struck with an object and then propelled either backward or forward.” She stated that she also found evidence of vomit, which she said resembled the child's stomach contents; she further stated that “subarachnoid hemorrhage and injury of the brain are known to produce, in addition to pain, also nausea and vomiting.” The medical examiner testified that the subdural hemorrhage that she found was acute and that, therefore, the injuries had occurred at a point in time just “several hours prior to the time of death.” The medical examiner stated that, in her opinion, the death of Marquel Davis was caused by “acute subdural hemorrhage and brain injury due to blunt force trauma.” She further found the manner of death to have been “homicide.” She additionally testified that the toxicology reports did not indicate the presence of either alcohol or “street drugs” in the child.

Detective Robert Fitzpatrick of the Providence Police Department testified that, on August 1, 2005, he and several other detectives responded to the Erastus Street apartment, where the deceased child had been found. Detective Fitzpatrick testified that, during the course of the investigation, defendant and Mr. Figgs were identified as the last persons to have been with the child prior to his death; he added, however, that neither Mr. Figgs nor defendant was present at the scene when the police arrived.

Detective Fitzpatrick testified that, later on August 1 (at approximately 4:00 p.m.) after he had returned to the police station, he was informed that both defendant and Mr. Figgs had arrived at the station. He further testified that the two men had come voluntarily to the police station and had not been brought in by police officers. Detective Fitzpatrick testified that he, along with other detectives, proceeded to conduct six interviews with defendant-the first five of which were conducted on August 1, while the sixth was conducted on August 2. The detective testified that defendant was arrested at the end of the fifth interview (very late on August 1). Detective Fitzpatrick indicated that he had recorded the interviews using a digital audio recorder. In the course of Detective Fitzpatrick's testimony at trial, all six recorded interviews were played for the members of the jury, who were also provided with transcripts of the recorded interviews.

In the first two interviews, defendant described how he had been awakened on the morning of August 1 by Mr. Figgs, who told him that “the little man was stiffed.” The defendant asserted that, on the previous night, he and Mr. Figgs had been in Boston and had returned to the Erastus Street apartment at approximately 3:30 that morning. He stated that, when they arrived back at the apartment, the child was asleep in his bed. The defendant further described how Marquel was often left at the apartment sleeping; he stated that often no one watched the child. The defendant denied seeing anyone hitting or “getting physical with” the child; he also stated that he did not observe any bruises on the child.

In the third interview, defendant admitted that the last time he had seen Michelle was at the Erastus Street apartment in Providence at 10:00 p.m. on the previous night (July 31), when she had left her child with Mr. Figgs. (By...

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    ...to bail before a judge of the District Court or an officer authorized to bail persons * * *.”In our recent opinion in State v. King, 996 A.2d 613 (R.I.2010), we stated that Rule 5(a) is “not a constitutional command to be found within the text of our Federal or State Constitutions, and its ......
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4 books & journal articles
  • Other grounds for suppressing confessions
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Suppressing Criminal Evidence Confessions and other statements
    • April 1, 2022
    ...was unnecessary, and (2) that such delay was ‘causative’ with respect to” the making of the inculpatory statement. State v. King , 996 A.2d 613 at 622 (R.I. 2010). In Wisconsin, a delay in presentment may give rise to suppression when police are delaying in order to obtain what the courts c......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2020 Contents
    • July 31, 2020
    ...was unnecessary, and (2) that such delay was ‘causative’ with respect to” the making of the inculpatory statement. State v. King , 996 A.2d 613 at 622 (R.I. 2010). In Wisconsin, a delay in presentment may give rise to suppression when police are delaying in order to obtain what the courts c......
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    • August 4, 2016
    ...was unnecessary, and (2) that such delay was ‘causative’ with respect to” the making of the inculpatory statement. State v. King , 996 A.2d 613 at 622 (R.I. 2010). In Wisconsin, a delay in presentment may give rise to suppression when police are delaying in order to obtain what the courts c......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2017 Contents
    • August 4, 2017
    ...was unnecessary, and (2) that such delay was ‘causative’ with respect to” the making of the inculpatory statement. State v. King , 996 A.2d 613 at 622 (R.I. 2010). In Wisconsin, a delay in presentment may give rise to suppression when police are delaying in order to obtain what the courts c......

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