State v. King
| Decision Date | 07 January 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 1884-C,1884-C |
| Citation | 313 A.2d 640,112 R.I. 581 |
| Parties | STATE v. David Francis KING, Jr. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
On June 5, 1967, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with manslaughter. After trial in Superior Court, a jury on May 29, 1969, returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged. On June 3, 1969, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which motion was granted on July 1, 1969. The defendant was continued on bail.
On July 3, 1969, the state filed notice of its intention to prosecute a bill of exception to the granting of the motion for a new trial. The trial justice set September 2, 1969 as the time within which the state had to file its bill of exception and transcript of evidence. The transcript was delivered to the state in the spring of 1970. No requests for extensions of time to file the bill and transcript were ever made.
On November 24, 1971, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the state's notice of intention to prosecute a bill of exception on the ground that the state had failed to act, and a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had not been afforded his right to a speedy trial guaranteed to him by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. I, sec. 10 of the state constitution.
On January 10, 1972, after hearing, the trial justice granted defendant's motions. At the same time, the state's bill of exception to the granting of the motion for a new trial and the transcript of the proceedings were filed and allowed out of time.
On March 1, 1972, this court entered an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the state's appeal from the decision granting a new trial without prejudice to the right of the state to prosecute an appeal from the dismissal of the indictment. State v. King, 109 R.I. 950, 287 A.2d 641 (1972).
On September 12, 1972, a bill of exception 1 to the dismissal of the indictment and the transcript were filed and allowed. The issue before us is whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. In deciding this issue, we are guided by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 296 A.2d 19 (1972).
In Barker, Mr. Justice Powell observed that the right to a speedy trial is a relative one and the determination of the time within which trial must be had to satisfy the guarantee to defendant is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case with due consideration given to the following four elements:
1. Length of delay
2. Reason for the delay
3. Assertion of one's Sixth Amendment right
4. Prejudice to the accused.
See also Tate v. Howard, supra, at 648, 296 A.2d at 23-24.
There was a delay of two years, four months, and twenty-four days between the granting of defendant's motion for a new trial and the filing of defendant's motions to dismiss the state's bill of exception and the indictment. This delay was unreasonably long, particularly because defendant had already been convicted once of a serious crime and was awaiting a new trial.
The reason for the delay was the state's negligence in prosecuting its bill of exception to the trial justice's granting of the motion for a new trial. After the state filed its notice of intention to file a bill of exception on July 3, 1969, it ordered the transcript of the trial which was delivered in the spring of 1970. Yet, no bill of exception was filed until the initial hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the notice of intent to file a bill of exception and the indictment on December 10, 1971, more than one and a half years later.
The defendant made no motion for a speedy trial from the time his motion for a new trial was granted on July 1, 1969 until November 24, 1971. There is nothing in the record to indicate any reasons why no motion for a speedy trial was made until that time. In his brief, defendant submits that no motion was filed because the state's appeal would have made it futile. The state claims that defendant was content to let the matter lie.
The defendant was prejudiced by the delay in that he was forced to live under a cloud of anxiety and suspicion and his defense was impaired. In Barker, the Court recognized that an accused out on bail pending trial is disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility. There is no doubt that this disadvantage is compounded when an accused is out on bail pending a new trial after he has been convicted of the same crime, as is the case here. The Court also recognized in Barker that prejudice exists if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. This 'effect' or 'prejudice' is also compounded when defense witnesses have...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Newman
...by our court. State v. Rollins, 113 R.I. 280, 320 A.2d 103 (1974); State v. Crapo, 112 R.I. 729, 315 A.2d 437 (1974); State v. King, 113 R.I. 581, 313 A.2d 640 (1974); Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 296 A.2d 19 (1972). The factors to be balanced are: 1) length of delay; 2) reason for delay; ......
-
State v. Crescenzo
...A.2d 41 (1975); State v. Rollins, 113 R.I. 280, 320 A.2d 103 (1974); State v. Crapo, 112 R.I. 729, 315 A.2d 437 (1974); State v. King, 112 R.I. 581, 313 A.2d 640 (1974); Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 296 A.2d 19 (1972). Such an examination is to be made with an eye to balancing the four fac......
-
State v. McDonough
...our decisions in State v. Rollins, 113 R.I. 280, 320 A.2d 103 (1974); State v. Crapo, 112 R.I. 729, 315 A.2d 437 (1974); State v. King, 112 R.I. 581, 313 A.2d 640 (1974); and Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 296 A.2d 19 (1972). In all of those cases we were guided by, and, indeed, applied the ......
-
State v. Rollins
...trial were established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and followed by this court in State v. King, R.I., 313 A.2d 640 (1974), and Tate v. Howard, In Barker, Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that the right to a speedy trial is a relative one and that th......