State v. Kinn

• Decision Date: 10 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 42388,42388
• Citation: State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 178 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1970)
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Richard E. KINN, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 888

178 N.W.2d 888

288 Minn. 31

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Richard E. KINN, Respondent.

No. 42388.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 10, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Appeals to this court, pursuant to Minn.St. 632.11, from pretrial orders of a lower court in criminal proceedings require a statement to the effect that the order renders the available proof with respect to the criminal charge so weak or insufficient as to prevent possibility of effective prosecution. The statute does not comprehend that the supreme court will review every order made in such proceedings. The statement required by § 632.11 must substantially show that there is a lack of other evidence which would permit a successful prosecution.

2. It is not necessary that a Miranda warning be given by police officers, upon arrival upon the scene of an investigation of a possible criminal offense, to everyone from whom they elicit information in the course of their investigative work. When an investigation reaches a point where a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe both that a crime has been committed and that the interviewee is the culprit, and it becomes his duty to take such person into custody, or, in other words, when the point is reached where the adversary system begins to operate, he is required to give the Miranda warning.

3. The trial court's order suppressing statements and admissions given to police officers, which order is unsupported by findings, is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and findings and an order which will clearly set forth the limits of admissibility of admissions and statements made by defendant.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Kyle, Sol. Gen., Daniel A. Klas, City Atty., Thomas Mooney and Joseph E. Cartwright, Asst. City Attys., St. Paul, for appellant.

Douglas W. Thomson and John R. Wylde, Jr., Jack S. Nordby, St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, WILLIAM P. MURPHY, OTIS, and JAMES F. MURPHY, JJ.

OPINION

WILLIAM P. MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the municipal court entered in response to a motion to suppress evidence. The state appeals pursuant to Minn.St. 632.11, 632.12, and 632.13. Defendant was charged with drunkenness under St. Paul Legislative Code, § 471.01, as well as driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages in violation of Minn.St. 169.121. Since Minn.St. 632.11 does not provide the right to appeal in ordinance prosecutions, we review the record only as it bears upon the statutory charge.

The issues, broadly presented, are whether the lower court properly suppressed admissions and statements given by defendant in an interview with investigating officers while he was still at liberty and whether he waived his constitutional rights against self-incrimination after the officers had allegedly complied with the warning requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974.

From the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress, it appears that two St. Paul policemen were called to the scene of an automobile accident at Cretin Avenue and Interstate Highway No. 94. They found the automobile entangled in the guardrail fence and a person, who later became the defendant, standing in the vicinity somewhere between 75 to 200 feet from the car. Defendant immediately approached the police officers and gave an account of what happened. According to the officers, he stated that he was driving the car too fast, missed a curve, and hit the fence. In another version, he said that an automobile had run him off the road and, as a consequence, his passenger, a pregnant girl, was injured. He stated that the men in the other car robbed him and drove the girl to a hospital. The officers noticed a partly-filled case of beer 'sitting right beside the car.' After observing the circumstances of the event and noting that defendant was talking incoherently and appeared to be drunk, they arrested him and placed him in the squad car, at which time he was given what the officers stated was a Miranda warning. One of the officers testified:

'I told him he had the right to remain silent, that anything he might say would be used against him, that he had the right to legal counsel in a lawyer, and also explained to him that he--if he can't afford a lawyer, that one would be appointed to him * * *.'

Defendant was taken into custody and transported to the police station. The officers testified that en route to the police station defendant repeated his previous statements with the exception that he did not admit that the accident happened because of excessive speed in driving the car. Another officer testified that the Miranda warning was given at the police station prior to an examination during which defendant admitted that he understood his rights. A breath test given to defendant at the police station confirmed the fact that he was intoxicated, and moving pictures were taken of his behavior.

After hearing the evidence on the motion to suppress, the trial court ordered that--

'* * * the statements by way of admissions and confessions made by Defendant Kinn at the scene of the accident and at the police station are hereby ordered suppressed and cannot be used in the trial of the matter.'

1. Preliminary to a discussion of the issues presented, it may be observed that there is some merit to defendant's contention that the appealability of the trial court's order is doubtful. Minn.St. 632.12 states that an appeal from an order of the trial court suppressing evidence must be accompanied by a signed statement that the evidence suppressed is vital to the state's case to the extent that the remaining proof available to the state is either insufficient or so weak as to effectively prevent a successful prosecution. The showing in support of this claim is of doubtful substance. Since this procedure is one that has been newly adopted, we nevertheless review the issues raised, with the admonition, however, that the future use of § 632.12 will require a stronger showing on the part of the prosecution--one which must have sufficient substance to indicate that the trial court's adverse order has effectively prevented...