State v. Kirschenbaum

Decision Date10 July 1929
Citation109 Conn. 394,146 A. 837
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. KIRSCHENBAUM.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Edwin C. Dickenson Judge.

William Kirschenbaum was convicted of statutory arson, and he appeals. No error.

Information charging the accused with the crime of statutory arson brought to the superior court in Fairfield county and tried to the jury; verdict of guilty, which the trial court, upon the accused's motion, refused to set aside, and from this decision and the judgment upon the verdict the accused appealed. No error.

John Keogh and Brien McMahon, both of South Norwalk, and Lawrence S. Finkelstone, of Bridgeport, for appellant.

William H. Comley, State's Atty., and Lorin W. Willis, Asst State's Atty., both of Bridgeport, for the State.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The first ground of appeal which we shall consider is the trial court's denial of the motion of the accused to set aside the verdict as contrary to the evidence. The state offered evidence to prove and our examination of the evidence has satisfied us that the jury might reasonably have found these facts proven: On the 29th day of October, 1926, Reuben Segall, the father of Jack P. Segall, operated a business at Elizabeth, N. J., and on this day the property used in the business was damaged by fire. The accused acted as a public adjuster in behalf of the assured in adjusting and settling the claims against the insurance companies for the loss; this was completed in the middle of November, 1926. There remained certain of the damaged goods by way of salvage. The accused, on the night that the insurance companies agreed to settle this loss, proposed to Jack P. Segall that he take the salvage, which was worth $500, and turn it into $10,000 of real money by adding to it machinery and other merchandise and setting up a business for the manufacture of rubber goods, procure insurance upon the goods and machinery, burn the premises in which these were, and procure a large profit by way of insurance. Segall consented to this proposal. The accused later explained the proposition further, saying he would help to finance it, to get the location, to see that the machinery was installed without Segall paying anything, to see that the fire was set and the building burned, and that the insurance company paid the fake loss. The accused first suggested that the location be in Trenton. Segall hired a place there, but did not carry out his contract of hiring, and the accused then informed him a place had been picked out in Bridgeport and Shearer would go there in a day or two and hire the place. Shearer was selected by the accused to go to Bridgeport. Shearer and Segall went to Bridgeport about December 15, 1926, and by Shearer's direction they went to the building 1483 Main street and rented a loft therein. On the day after their return to New York, Segall met the accused and reported what they had done. The accused then said the loft was too large and expensive, but he would furnish enough machinery to make it A No. 1. In January, 1927, Shearer, at the instance of the accused and Segall, sent up about seventy secondhand sewing machines, and Shearer came to Bridgeport and installed them in this loft. Thereafter Segall proceeded to stock the loft with a large quantity of rubber goods, most of which were damaged and of little value. The machines for the most part were worthless, although a local mechanic succeeded in setting up four machines so that they would operate. Segall hired a number of girls, and there was carried on an ostensible business of cutting and sewing goods; the trade-name of the business being, the Reduso Rubber Products Company. Segall also purchased goods of considerable amounts which were never paid for.

Having set up this plant, Segall obtained insurance upon the merchandise and machinery in the loft to the amount of $28,500, all of which was in force on May 3, 1927. Segall had been in communication with the accused and informed him of the rental of this loft, the installation of the machinery and merchandise, and the procuring of the policies of insurance. One of these for $10,000 was delivered by Segall to the accused, and was in his possession at the time of the fire, on which he loaned Segall $1,000. Under his agreement with Segall, the accused was to get for financing the transaction $2 for every dollar he put in and 10 per cent. of the amount received from the adjustment of the fire loss. At 10:30 o'clock on the night of May 3, 1927, fire was discovered in this loft. The firemen arrived in about three minutes and found an intense fire raging. It was quickly subdued; it was of the kind known as a flash fire, and was of incendiary origin. On May 4th the accused came to Bridgeport, met Segall, visited the premises, and examined the policies of insurance. Thereafter he participated in making a count of the merchandise and machinery and in presenting proofs of loss to the companies, purporting to show damage to the amount of about $28,000. The accused lived in Newark, but, when he met on May 10th the representatives of the insurance companies for the purpose of beginning the preliminary work for the presentation of proofs of loss, he exhibited to them his own business cards, purporting to show that he was an insurance adjuster having an office and place of business in Bridgeport, Conn.; this was a fabrication. After starting this preliminary work, the accused, perceiving that the insurance companies suspected the fire was of incendiary origin, immediately left Connecticut, going to Newark, and from there continued to help Segall in the preparation of the proofs of loss.

The accused was arrested in New Jersey on a warrant from Connecticut charging him with a conspiracy with Segall and others to burn a building known as 1483 Main street, Bridgeport, with intent to defraud insurance companies; the charge was based on section 6231 of the General Statutes 1918. He was extradited on that warrant. The accused was placed on trial September 19, 1928, on an information charging him with the crime of arson in accordance with section 6231 of the General Statutes, 1918, found guilty, and sentenced on September 29, 1928.

We summarize the facts which the accused claimed to have proved. The accused offered evidence to prove that he had been for many years a public insurance adjuster in Newark and had not for more than six years prior to May 3, 1927, been in Bridgeport. On May 4, 1927, in response to a message from Segall, he came to Bridgeport and contracted with Segall for the adjustment of the loss from this fire. He left his son in Bridgeport for several days while the insurance adjusters were examining and appraising the merchandise, and returned to New York, and in the following few weeks he visited Bridgeport at convenient times to note the progress of the investigation into the loss. After the accused learned that the insurance companies suspected the fire was of incendiary origin, he returned to New Jersey and abandoned his contract with Segall. Prior to the fire, the accused had no knowledge of the extent of the insurance on the property of Segall, and did not have any communication with any agent or representative of the insurance companies regarding this insurance. He did not know of Segall's purpose to burn his own property. He had nothing to do with hiring the premises, arranging the merchandise, or setting fire to the same. At no time between the early part of January, 1927, and May 4, 1927, did he have any conversation or meeting with Segall or any communication with him concerning the establishment of the factory in Bridgeport. His only connection with this was that arising from his contract of May 4th to adjust the loss. He was not present when the proofs of loss were completed, signed, or forwarded to the companies, he did not cause or arrange for or advise any one to set the fire nor furnish the data from which the proofs of loss were prepared, nor did he have any connection with the plan to set the fire or to defraud any of the insurance companies. He had the cards printed in expectation of opening a business in Bridgeport.

The state's case depended upon the credit to be given to the testimony of Segall, who had been found guilty of the offense for which the accused was on trial, and at the time of the present trial was in the state prison, in execution of his sentence. The jury were correctly charged as to the weight to give to the testimony of an accomplice. Segall's story of this crime was corroborated at a number of points. The accused's presentation of his business card, upon which he represented himself as engaged in business in Bridgeport was manifestly intended to deceive the insurance companies. His explanation of this was not credible. We cite this as not only an instance where the integrity of the accused's testimony was impeached, but as one of the instances corroborating Segall's story. The jury would have been justified in finding the accused's testimony far from convincing and filled with contradictions, inconsistencies, evasions, and manifest untruths. His counsel attack in their brief both court and state's attorney--the first for his solicitude for Segall " even at the expense of counsel" ; the second for attempting to show connection of the accused with the adjustment of a fire loss in New Jersey in the effort to prejudice the jury against the accused. The record disproves each charge. The same tactics were indulged in by counsel for the accused in the trial court; the result indicates, as it customarily does, that, as a rule, success in the courtroom does not follow professional methods of this character. ...

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7 cases
  • State v. Evans
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1973
    ...or at the close of the argument constituted a waiver of the right of the defendants to press this claim of error. State. v. Kirschenbaum, 109 Conn. 394, 409, 146 A. 837; Kurland v. Massachusetts Amusement Corporation, 307 Mass. 131, 140, 29 N.E.2d 749. In the absence of such an exception by......
  • State v. Malley
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • December 17, 1974
    ...of the right of the accused to now press this assignment of error. State v. Frost, 105 Conn. 326, 338, 135 A. 446.' State v. Kirschenbaum, 109 Conn. 394, 409, 146 A. 837, 842. As we observed in State v. Evans, supra, 165 Conn. 70, 327 A.2d 581: 'There appear, then, to exist only two situati......
  • Montgomery v. Town of Branford
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1929
    ... ... and sub-lessees in possession as the record owners of such ... property during the continuance of such leases." The ... statute law of this state provides that " any interest ... in real estate listed for taxation shall be set by the ... assessors in the list of the party in whose name the ... ...
  • State v. Leopold
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 25, 1929
    ...and certainly was not of such a character as to warrant a new trial, in the absence of an exception taken at the time. State v. Kirschenbaum, 109 Conn. 394, 146 A. 837. accused also assigns as error the failure of the court to grant motions for a mistrial, made by him on different occasions......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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