State v. Kissner

Decision Date15 April 1977
Docket NumberNo. 11928,11928
Citation252 N.W.2d 330
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Allen KISSNER, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Peter H. Lieberman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

John F. Cogley, of Morgan, Fuller, Theeler & Cogley, Mitchell, for defendant and appellant.

DUNN, Chief Justice (on reassignment).

Defendant appeals his conviction in the Ninth (now Third) Judicial Circuit Court of three counts of unlawful possession of controlled substances. He was found guilty following a trial to the court on March 10, 1976. We affirm.

On January 20, 1975, the Spink County sheriff presented twelve complaints to the local magistrate. All of these complaints concerned individuals who allegedly distributed controlled substances to Richard Carlson, a paid drug informant, sometime between September and November 1974. One of the complaints charged defendant with distribution of tetrahydrocannabinol. The magistrate inquired about the background of the complaints. The sheriff stated that Carlson had been hired by the county to purchase drugs, that he had worked similarly with other agencies, that he had at one time been connected with drugs, and that he had been "doing the job that he was hired to do" in Spink County. Arrest warrants were issued.

At about 10:30 a. m. on January 21, 1975, the sheriff, a Redfield police officer, and Jerry Lindberg, a South Dakota D.C.I. agent, went to defendant's trailer. Defendant, clad only in pants, answered the door. The sheriff grabbed his arm and placed him under arrest. The officers then entered the trailer while defendant dressed. When asked where his coat was, defendant indicated one lying on a chair. Lindberg helped defendant put on the coat. Another occupant of the trailer for whom a warrant had been issued was also arrested. Defendant was taken to the sheriff's office where a strip inventory search was conducted.

While inside the trailer, Lindberg noticed a scale, a razor blade, and what he thought were small white paper packets in plain view on a table near the door. He went to the state's attorney's office to draft an affidavit for a search warrant. The results of the strip search at the sheriff's office and the discovery of controlled substances in defendant's coat were relayed to Lindberg by phone and added to the affidavit. A warrant to search defendant's trailer was issued.

After obtaining the search warrant and before executing it, Lindberg returned to the sheriff's office and spoke with defendant in the "irrigation" room. Lindberg requested defendant's permission to search his trailer and van. He did not mention that a search warrant had been obtained. Defendant asked whether they would obtain a warrant if he did not consent. Lindberg responded that he would present the information he had, and that a judge would have to determine whether a warrant should be issued. Defendant granted the request to search the trailer and van, appearing primarily concerned that none of his property was damaged during the search. In the subsequent search, amphetamines and marijuana were found in the van and amphetamines, hashish, marijuana and cocaine were found in the trailer.

Defendant was bound over following preliminary hearings on the distribution charge On March 10, 1976, before trial on the possession charges, the state's attorney moved to dismiss the distribution charge. Carlson and another person present at the time of the alleged sale, Dan Herschman, were not competent to testify, both having been convicted of perjury in unrelated cases. SDCL 19-1-4.

and possession charges. He moved to quash the arrest warrant and the search warrant and to suppress the evidence seized. Hearings were held June 11, 1975, and July 24, 1975. On December 8, 1975, the court in a Memorandum Decision ruled that the arrest warrant was not supported by probable cause. A further hearing was held January 9, 1976, to determine whether the officers had probable cause for a warrantless arrest. The court held they did.

WARRANTLESS ARREST

Defendant claims his arrest violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under South Dakota Constitution, Article VI, § 11. Absent exigent circumstances, defendant contends, no warrantless arrest of a person within his residence should be permitted.

The recent United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Santana, 1976, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300, raises some question in our minds as to whether a person voluntarily answering his door remains in the privacy of his dwelling or has so exposed himself as to be in a "public" place. However, the Supreme Court did not specifically deal with this question, and we need not determine it here because we find the officers had no probable cause for a warrantless arrest of defendant.

Determining whether probable cause exists from the report of an informant requires utilizing the two-prong test set out in Aguilar v. Texas, 1964, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, and modified in Spinelli v. United States, 1969, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, and United States v. Harris, 1971, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723; see generally : Comment, An Informant's Tip as the Basis for Probable Cause: Modified Aguilar Standards, 20 S.D.L.Rev. 363.

Carlson reported the following information. Late in the evening of November 1, 1974, he was driving around in Redfield with three other young men in his car. They saw defendant driving his van. One of Carlson's passengers, Herschman, indicated that defendant probably had some drugs for sale. Carlson pulled alongside defendant, and Herschman asked defendant whether he had any marijuana to sell. Defendant replied that he had two bags. Carlson stated he would buy them. About fifteen minutes later, the two vehicles met at the Pavillion near Redfield where Carlson purchased one bag from defendant for twenty dollars. Later that night, Carlson gave the bag and the above report to a Spink County deputy sheriff.

The United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, supra, set out the facts or circumstances necessary to establish probable cause. Paraphrasing the Court's holding to correspond with the facts of this case: we must determine whether probable cause existed based upon (1) the officers' knowledge of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that defendant has committed a crime and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the officers concluded that the informant was credible or his information reliable. Here, clearly the first prong has been met. Carlson reported that he based his conclusion upon personal observation, in fact, personal participation. This is certainly an adequate basis of knowledge.

The second prong is not as clear. The state must show informant credibility or information reliability. Informant credibility can be established in at least two different ways. One method is the private citizen presumption which we recognized in State v. Gerber, 1976, S.D., 241 N.W.2d 720, wherein a person without any motive to falsify reports criminal activity. See also : State v. Chatmon, 1973, 9 Wash.App. 741, 515 P.2d 530. This method is, of course, not applicable here because Carlson was a paid An alternative method of establishing informant credibility is through the "track record" of the informant. However, here the officers dealt with an informant who had been conducting a series of drug buys which did not lead to any arrests until January 21, 1975, when Carlson surfaced. After each alleged buy, Carlson met with either the sheriff or a deputy, delivered the drugs, and stated where, when and from whom he obtained them. Lindberg did tell the sheriff that Carlson had worked elsewhere and had made five or six "good buys" for the Huron police department. If, in fact, these buys had led to arrests or arrests and convictions, this should have been presented at the suppression hearings. In Gerber, we expressed our skepticism about the effective use of paid informants. Without a "track record" of arrests and convictions, we cannot hold that Carlson was a credible informant.

informant. State v. Gerber, supra, 241 N.W.2d at 723.

The second prong of Aguilar can be satisfied by showing information reliability. An informant's report can be shown to be reliable even though he is not proven credible where independent police verification of suspicious conduct by an accused, Spinelli v. United States, supra; Sabbath v. United States, 1967, 9 Cir., 380 F.2d 108, reversed on other grounds, 391 U.S. 585, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828; United States v. Romero, 1972, D.C.N.Y., 343 F.Supp. 988; United States v. King, 1969, D.C.Miss., 305 F.Supp. 630; or an accused's reputation supported by other information, United States v. Harris, supra; United States v. Regan, 1975, 8 Cir., 525 F.2d 1151; corroborates the report. In the case at bar, the officers had more than two months to corroborate Carlson's report. The only corroboration made prior to defendant's arrest was the license number of a car which was going to be parked at defendant's trailer. This is the type of information that the Supreme Court in Spinelli termed "innocent-seeming activity." 393 U.S. at 414, 89 S.Ct. at 588, 21 L.Ed.2d at 642. Any corroboration after defendant's arrest cannot be used retroactively to justify that arrest. Costello v. United States, 1963, 9 Cir., 324 F.2d 260.

The sheriff testified that he did not seek to corroborate Carlson's reports because he feared exposing him. While we acknowledge the sheriff's dilemma, we cannot uphold uncorroborated tips from an untested paid informant, particularly where a substantial period of time (more than forty-five days) elapsed after Carlson left the Redfield area before defendant's arrest. We overturn...

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  • State v. Akuba
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 18, 2004
    ...determined, instead, to require the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence to show voluntary consent to search. State v. Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D.1977). We have continued to use the clear and convincing standard to all consent searches up to the present. State v. Cody, 293 N.W......
  • State v. Kennedy
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    • February 18, 1981
    ...862 (Fla. App. 1978); McShan v. State, 150 Ga.App. 232, 257 S.E.2d 202 (1979); State v. Zielman, 384 So.2d 359 (La. 1980); State v. Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D. 1977). See also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 649-55 (1978). In State v. Quinn, supra, this court applied the same analysis. In......
  • State v. Cody
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    • August 25, 1982
    ...had been given freely and voluntarily. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D.1977). Here, however, Cody contends that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when, subsequent to Miranda warnings and the advice o......
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    ...was the result of a free, intelligent, unequivocal and specific consent without any duress or coercion, actual or implied. State v. Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D.1977); Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis.2d 489, 190 N.W.2d 542 State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440, 450 (S.D.1980). Here, we find no credible ......
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