State v. Kittle.

• Citation: 87 W.Va. 526
• Decision Date: 25 January 1921
• Docket Number: No. 4138.,4138.
• Parties: State v. Samuel B. Kittle et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

87 W.Va. 526

State

v.Samuel B. Kittle et al.

No. 4138.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 18, 1921.

Decided January 25, 1921.

1. Constitutional Law Interpreting Constitutional Provisions, Previous Provisions and Legislation May be Considered in Pari Materia.

In the interpretation of a constitutional provision, it is permissible to resort to and consider previous legislation and constitutional provisions respecting the subject matter and Jan. 1921]

State v. Kittle et al.

52?

disclosing the character and development of the measures adopted for regulation thereof, under the rule of construction, authorizing resort to acts in pari materia for aid in interpretation, (p. 530).

2. Same In Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Rule of Practical Construction Applies.

Upon an inquiry as to the true meaning of a constitutional provision, the rule of practical construction also applies, and renders it proper to take into consideration contemporaneous legislation under the provision in question and long acquiescence therein, (p. 532).

3. Taxation Constitutional Provisions Authorizing Legislativ Exemption of Property Strictly Construed.

A constitutional provision authorizing legislative exemption of property from taxation is strictly construed and nothing can be exempted that does not fall within its terms; but rational construction within the terms used is required as well as permitted, (p. 529).

4. Same Parsonage May be Exempted by Legislature Under Constitution as "Property Used for Religious Purposes."

Under sec. 1 of Art. X of the Constitution of this state, authorizing legislative exemption from taxation, of "property used for * * * religious * * * purposes," the Legislature has power so to exempt parsonages, they being property used lor religious purposes and falling clearly within the terms of the exemption clause of said section, (p. 533).

5. Same Renting Parsonage to Persons Not Ministers Held Not to Destroy Exemption from Taxation.

A statute exempting parsonages by name, includes property acquired and for a time used as a parsonage, but which, on discontinuance of such use, is rented to persons not ministers of the church to which it belongs, pending disposition thereof, and the rentals from which are used exclusively for purposes of such church, (p. 533).

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ohio County.

Proceedings by the State against Samuel B. Kittle, Charles 0. Woods, and others, to forfeit title to certain property for non-payment of taxes. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants named appeal.

Reversed, and bill dismissed.

James W. Ewing, for appellants.

PoFFEN BARG i'M!, JUDGE:

The decree under review on this appeal adjudicates forfeiture of the title of a certain lot conveyed to trustees for parsonage purposes on which a parsonage building was erected, for non-entry of the lot for taxation and non-payment of taxes thereon, for a period of five years and more; and, havng thus settled the principles of the cause, continued it for the taking of proof of the value of the property, as the basis for ascertainment of the taxes due on it, and entry of a subsequent order of sale. The appellants are the two surviving trustees of those to whom the lot was so conveyed and the vendee of the property, said trustees having contracted a sale thereof.

By two deeds, one dated, March 29, 1904, and the other June 8, 1904, the latter being described, as a deed of correction, the lot in question was conveyed, by J. C. McCurdy and S. Nesbitt, Jr., to Charles C. Woods, George B. E. Gilchrist and S. C. Patterson, Trustees for St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Church of Elm Grove, West Virginia, for the use and benefit of said church, ''As a residence for its minister," and to be held by the trustees and their successors, in trust "for such purpose and no other, and according to the terms of and with all such powers in the trustees in relation thereto as are set forth in chapter 57 of the Code of West Virgina." Within a year after this conveyance, a parsonage building was erected on the lot, by the church, and the resident minister moved into it and. he and his successor occupied it for more than a year; but, since their vacation thereof, no minister of said church has occupied it. For about fourteen years, the trustees rented it to persons other than ministers of their church; but they used the income thereof for what they believed, to be church purposes, maintenance of the property and payment of the interest on a $2,500.00 debt incurred in the construction of the building and secured on the property by a lien and interest on another debt of the church amounting to $2,500.00.

The decree seems to proceed upon the theory of constitutional infirmity in the statute, sec. 57 of ch. 29, of the Code, as amended and re-enacted by chapter (i.2 of the Acts of 1917, expressly exempting parsonages by name, from taxation. The consti- Jan. 1921]

State v. Kittle et al. tutional provision under which the act was passed is, however, very general in its terms. It authorizes the legislature to exempt "property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious and charitable purposes" as well as cemeteries and public property. Sec. 1, Art. X, Con. If its terms, "Used * * * for religious * * * purposes," are not to be restrained in their scope, meaning and operation, by construction based upon some rule of interpretation, a parsonage in actual use and occupation as such obviously falls within them. It is legally defined as a house set apart for the minister's residence. Under the common law, it was a portion of the land and tithes established by law for the maintenance of a minister. Bouv. Law Diet. Title "Parsonage." Besides, it occupies the same status in common knowledge, wherefore the courts can take judicial notice thereof.

In view of the connection in which they are found as well as upon general principles, provisions in constitutions and statutes, exempting property from taxation, are always strictly construed. They constitute exceptions from the operation of more general provisions requiring, ordinarily, equality and uniformity in taxation, so as to place the public burdens, as nearly as may be, upon all property and citizens alike. Considered independently of any adopted principle, equal and uniform taxation must be regarded as being equitable, fair and just. In as much as all exemptions evade the operation of this principle or encroach upon it, they ought to be strictly construed and the courts uniformly hold that they must be. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Supervisors, 3 W. Va. 319; Baltimore & Ohio B. Co. v. Wheeling, 3 W. Va. 372; Cincinnati College v. Stale, 19 Ohio 110; Stahl v. Association, 54 Kan. 542; Church of Beatrice v. City of Beatrice, 39 Neb. 432; Academy v. Trey, 51 Neb. 755; Washburn College v. Commissioners, 8 Kan. 344; Young Mens Christian Association v. Douglass County, (Neb.) 83 N. W. 924; Copley on Taxation 357.

The only arbitrary requirement of the rule of strict construction, however, is that its subject matter must be within the terms, as well as the spirit, of the provision under construction. It does not require assignment to terms actually used, of the most restricted meaning of which they are suscep- tible, nor any particular meaning. So long as the court stays within the terms used, it may give effect to the spirit, purpose and intent of the makers of the instrument. The rule permits, and other law requires, rational interpretation within the terms actually used. Reeves v. Ross, 61 W. Va. 7; Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 IT. S. 262; State v. Small, 29 Minn. 216; Lewis' Suth. Stat. Con., 2nd Ed., Sec. 530. Under these limitations and restrictions of its operation, a court is obviously at liberty to inquire, by all legitimate means, whether the words "Used for * * * religious * * * purposes," found in Sec. 1 of Art. X of the Constitution, warrant legislative exemption of property not used as a place of actual worship, but used in furtherance of the general purposes of the church by which it is owned and used.

Upon this inquiry, a great many decisions involving the construction of constitutional provisions authorizing the exemption of property used "exclusively" for certain purposes, may consistently be denied conclusive effect, if not wholly disregarded, oji account of the dissimilarity in terms used in those provisions. In them, the arbitrary requirement of adherence to terms, the letter of the provision, necessitated inclusion therein of the subjects sought to be exempted. Here, as has already been pointed out, there is no such embarrassment. Any and all of the general rides devised for ascertainment of the intention of the trainers of the constitution, falling within the liberal terms used in that instrument, may be invoked.

No reason is perceived why the history and development of the organic provision, in question' as disclosed by previous legislation in Virginia, the parent state, and provisions of its constitutions, may not be considered upon this inquiry. In seeking the meaning of a statute, resort may be had to all acts in pari materia, ads dealing with the same subject...