State v. Klamar, No. A12–1196.

• Decision Date: 10 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. A12–1196.
• Citation: 823 N.W.2d 687
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Julie Ann KLAMAR, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

823 N.W.2d 687

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Julie Ann KLAMAR, Respondent.

No. A12–1196.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Dec. 10, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

An officer may order a driver to exit his or her vehicle for investigative purposes, without violating the protections of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, when the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the person was driving while impaired.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Jennifer Saunders, Zenaida Chico, Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Mark D. Nyvold, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN; and Joel N. Heiligman, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge; LARKIN, Judge; and KLAPHAKE, Judge.^*

OPINION

LARKIN, Judge.

In this pretrial appeal, the state challenges the district court's order granting respondent's motion to dismiss a charge of driving while impaired. The state argues that the district court erred in concluding that a law-enforcement officer violated the constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure when the officer ordered respondent out of a vehicle to investigate whether respondent had been driving while impaired. Because the investigative seizure was reasonable at its inception and in its scope, we reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

On December 1, 2011, a state trooper was on duty and driving on Interstate 94 near Lowry Avenue in Minneapolis at approximately 1:00 a.m. The trooper observed a vehicle stopped on the right shoulder of the freeway. The trooper activated the emergency lights on his vehicle and pulled up behind the stopped vehicle to conduct a welfare check. As he did so, he observed the passenger door open and the passenger vomiting. The trooper approached the passenger side of the vehicle and noticed a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. Respondent Julie Ann Klamar was seated in the driver's seat. From the passenger side of the vehicle, the trooper asked Klamar what the problem was. Klamar replied that her friend, the passenger, was not feeling well and was getting sick. The trooper later testified that during the exchange, he observed that Klamar's eyes were bloodshot and watery. While standing near the passenger door, the trooper asked Klamar for her driver's license and whether she had had anything to drink. Klamar replied that she had “one drink.” The trooper asked Klamar to step out of the vehicle and approach the trooper's vehicle.

Klamar got out and walked toward the back of her vehicle. The trooper also walked toward the back of the vehicle, where he met Klamar. The trooper later testified that he then noticed an odor of alcohol emanating from Klamar and that Klamar's eyes were bloodshot and watery. The trooper asked Klamar to perform field sobriety tests. Klamar agreed to do so, and she performed poorly. Next, the trooper conducted a preliminary breath test, which indicated that Klamar had an alcohol concentration of .122. The trooper arrested Klamar, and appellant State of Minnesota subsequently charged her with driving while impaired.

Klamar moved to dismiss the charge under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, arguing that the trooper did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support expansion of the initial welfare inquiry. The district court dismissed the charge, reasoning that “the trooper prematurely ordered [Klamar] to step out of the vehicle to perform field-sobriety tests, prior to establishing facts to support an ‘objective and particularized basis' for his suspicion of illegal activity.” The district court concluded that “[o]nce the trooper ordered [Klamar] out of the vehicle with his squad car directly behind [Klamar's] vehicle, [Klamar's] compliance with the trooper's request was compelled. Accordingly, ... a seizure occurred at that point and ... the [s]tate failed to show an articulable and reasonable suspicion for the state trooper to expand the scope of the initial welfare check.” This pretrial appeal by the state follows.

ISSUE

When a law-enforcement officer approaches a vehicle that is stopped on the side of an interstate at an early morning hour, to check on the welfare of its occupants, encounters a driver and one passenger in the vehicle, smells a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle, and is informed by the driver that she has had one drink, may the officer order the driver to exit her vehicle for investigative purposes without violating the protections of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions?

ANALYSIS

When the state appeals a pretrial suppression order,¹ “the state must clearly and unequivocally show both that the trial court's order will have a critical impact on the state's ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error.” State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.1998) (quotations omitted). Because the district court dismissed the charge against Klamar as the result of its suppression order, the critical-impact standard is satisfied. See State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.2008) (stating that critical impact is present when suppression of evidence leads to the dismissal of charges).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn.1999). We review the district court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, but we review its legal determinations de novo. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn.2006). Deference must be given to the district court's credibility determinations. See State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.1989) (stating that “[t]he weight and credibility of the testimony of individual witnesses” is for the fact-finder to determine).

I.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable search and seizure by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A police officer may, however, initiate a limited investigative seizure without a warrant if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Whether the police have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a showing that the seizure was not “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” In re Welfare of M.D.R., 693 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Minn.App.2005) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 28, 2005). The factual basis required to justify an investigative seizure is minimal. Magnuson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn.App.2005). The court may consider the officer's experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and anything else that is relevant. Appelgate v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn.1987).

The analysis of an investigative seizure involves a dual inquiry. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn.2004). First, we ask “whether the [seizure] was justified at its inception.” See id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). Second, we ask “whether the actions of the police during the [seizure] were reasonably related to and justifiedby the circumstances that gave rise to the [seizure] in the first place.” See id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). The second prong of the inquiry “constrains the scope and methods of a search or seizure.” Id. A seizure that is initially valid “may become invalid if it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’ ” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17–18, 88 S.Ct. at 1878). “[E]ach incremental intrusion during a [seizure] must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered [the initiation of the [seizure]] permissible.’ ” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1878) (other quotation omitted). With these constitutional principles in mind, we analyze the constitutionality of Klamar's seizure.

The Initial Seizure

We must first determine when Klamar was seized for constitutional purposes. Not every interaction between the police and a citizen amounts to a seizure. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Minn.1995). Rather, a seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Id. at 391 (quotations omitted). “Under the Minnesota Constitution, a person has been seized if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98 (quotation omitted).

Minnesota has adopted the Mendenhall–Royer standard for judging the totality of the circumstances. See In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781–82 (Minn.1993) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). “Under that standard, some of the circumstances that might indicate a seizure has taken place include: the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.” Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98 (quotations omitted). “In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a...