State v. Knaras

• Decision Date: 08 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140998–CA,20140998–CA
• Parties: State of Utah, Appellee, v. Jeffery Lynn Knaras, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

378 P.3d 125
2016 UT App 143

State of Utah, Appellee
v.
Jeffery Lynn Knaras, Appellant.

No. 20140998–CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 8, 2016

Samuel P. Newton, Attorney for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys for Appellee.

Senior Judge Judith M. Billings authored this Opinion, in which Judges Stephen L. Roth and Michele M. Christiansen concurred.¹

Opinion

BILLINGS, Senior Judge:

¶1 Jeffery Lynn Knaras appeals his conviction for one count of criminal nonsupport, a class-A misdemeanor. Knaras contends that the jury instructions related to his affirmative defense were erroneous. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Knaras with third-degree felony criminal nonsupport. It alleged that Knaras had failed to pay court-ordered child support for his three minor children between May 2010 and May 2012.

¶3 At trial, the State offered evidence that over the course of two years, Knaras fell short on his child support obligations by $19,181.02. The children's mother testified that she had custody of the three minor children during the relevant time period and that Knaras did not pay the child support he

378 P.3d 127

owed under the couple's divorce decree. In the absence of this support, the mother explained that she had relied on other sources to supply the children's needs. The mother further testified that Knaras never sought to modify the divorce decree.

¶4 Knaras did not dispute that he owed child support. Instead, he raised the affirmative defense that he lacked the ability to meet his child support obligations. In support of this theory, he presented his mother's testimony that he lived with her and that he did not make enough money to pay rent or for his transportation. Knaras contended that he had trouble finding jobs in his line of work during the economic downturn. He also argued that he did provide for the children when he had parent-time every other weekend.

¶5 The jury found Knaras guilty. However, the jury determined that the State failed to prove that Knaras had “committed the crime of Criminal Nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 24-month period.” As a consequence of this finding, Knaras was convicted of a class-A misdemeanor instead of a third-degree felony.² Knaras appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Knaras raises three challenges to the jury instructions given at his trial. We review challenges to jury instructions for correctness. State v. Kennedy , 2015 UT App 152, ¶ 17, 354 P.3d 775.

ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, Knaras asserts three errors in the jury instructions. First, he contends that the instructions did not accurately convey the State's burden of proof as to his affirmative defense. Second, he asserts that the instructions erroneously told the jury that his affirmative defense could not apply “even if he partially paid child support.” Third, he argues that the instructions “added four non-statutory reasons for rejecting [his] affirmative defense.”

¶8 When we analyze a purported error in jury instructions, “we must view it within the context of the jury instructions as a whole.” Id. ¶ 24. “If the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact that one of the instructions, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been does not amount to reversible error.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “ ‘[o]nly harmful and prejudicial errors constitute grounds for granting a new trial.’ ” State v. Karr , 2015 UT App 287, ¶ 15, 364 P.3d 49 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Young , 853 P.2d 327, 347 (Utah 1993) ). “For an error to be harmful, there must be a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Shepherd , 1999 UT App 305, ¶ 23, 989 P.2d 503 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

I. Instructions Stating the Burden of Proof

¶9 Knaras contends that the jury instructions should have specifically stated that “the State must disprove his affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” He also claims that the instructions should have told the jury that he had “no burden with respect to his affirmative defense” and that he “was entitled to be acquitted if there was any basis in the evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.”³

378 P.3d 128

¶10 When a criminal defendant raises an affirmative defense, the State bears “the burden ... to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lee , 2014 UT App 4, ¶ 27, 318 P.3d 1164 ; accord State v. Drej , 2010 UT 35, ¶¶ 15–16, 233 P.3d 476. Jury instructions with regard to affirmative defenses “must clearly communicate to the jury what the burden of proof is and who carries the burden.” Lee , 2014 UT App 4, ¶ 27, 318 P.3d 1164 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶11 Here, Knaras raised the affirmative defense that he was unable to provide support. See Utah Code Ann. § 76–7–201(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2012) (“In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport ..., it is an affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support.”). On appeal, Knaras asserts that the instructions should have stated that “the State must disprove his affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Knaras thus believes that the instructions should have included language casting the State's burden in negative terms, i.e., that the State had the burden to disprove an inability to pay. However, we conclude that this concept was adequately conveyed to the jury by the instructions given. Specifically, Instruction 16 informed the jury that “[i]n presenting an affirmative defense, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the Defendant. The State's burden is to prove all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the defense is a denial or an affirmative defense.” And Instruction 12, which set forth the elements of the offense, instructed the jury that it could convict Knaras only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he “was able to provide support.” Taken together, the instructions phrased the State's burden of proof in positive terms: the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Knaras had an ability to pay. Because the instructions accurately set forth the State's burden of proof, albeit in positive rather than negative terms, we conclude that the jury instructions were not erroneous in this regard.

¶12 Moreover, the instructions adequately conveyed the same concepts that Knaras contends should have been phrased differently. Knaras believes the instructions should have been written in terms of how he had “no burden with respect to his affirmative defense.” Instruction 11, however, explained that “[t]he burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” and that the “burden never shifts to a Defendant.” Similarly, Instruction 16 stated that “the burden of persuasion does not shift to the Defendant” when “presenting an affirmative defense.” Through this language, the jury was effectively instructed that Knaras had no burden with respect to his affirmative defense.

¶13 Knaras also argues that the instructions should have said that he “was entitled to be acquitted if there was any basis in the evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” Although not stated in this exact way, the instructions given explained the meaning of the reasonable doubt standard and told the jury that a reasonable doubt “must arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in the case.” The jury was further instructed that it should “carefully consider all the evidence” and that “if [the jury was] not convinced that one or more of the[ ] elements [had] been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then [it] must find the defendant NOT GUILTY.” These instructions adequately conveyed that Knaras should be acquitted if the evidence left a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. In short, Knaras has not shown that the jury instructions were erroneous.

II. Partial Failure to Provide Support

¶14 Knaras next challenges Instruction 14 as erroneously instructing “the jury that Mr. Knaras could not be excused even if he partially paid child support” and argues that “nothing in the statute contains that additional requirement.” He claims that Instruction 14 allowed the jury to convict “under the much lesser burden that his support was...