State v. Knecht, 19685

• Decision Date: 27 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 19685,19685
• Citation: 563 N.W.2d 413,1997 SD 53
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gary KNECHT, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 413

563 N.W.2d 413

1997 SD 53

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gary KNECHT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 19685.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 25, 1997.

Decided May 14, 1997.

Rehearing Denied June 27, 1997.

Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Gary Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for Plaintiff and Appellee.

Gary G. Colbath, Jr., of Banks, Johnson, Colbath & Kerr, Rapid City, for Defendant and Appellant.

SABERS, Justice.

¶1 Gary Knecht appeals his conviction and 75-year sentence for first degree manslaughter in the shooting death of Jerry Marshall. He claims the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by 1) allowing the State to present irrelevant, cumulative, and prejudicial evidence, and 2) suppressing evidence relating to Marshall's arrest record and specific incidents which indicated Marshall's alleged propensity for violence. He also claims 3) the prosecution's failure to disclose or late disclosure of evidence constitutes misconduct, 4) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and 5) the sentence of 75 years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

FACTS

¶2 Knecht admits shooting and killing Marshall on December 15, 1995 in Martin, South Dakota. He claims he acted in self-defense after suffering a severe beating by Marshall. The initial altercation between the two men occurred in the bar area of the Martin Legion Club. Witnesses testified that Knecht stood up from the table at which he and Marshall sat and "sucker-punched" Marshall, who fell to the floor. There was conflicting testimony about whether Knecht scuffled with Marshall on the floor. The two were separated almost immediately. Marshall was heard to mutter "what did I do?" or "what was that about?" Knecht was quickly escorted to the door. Marshall was briefly detained before Legion employees asked him to leave; he left without an escort, caught up with Knecht outside and began to repeatedly punch and kick him. ¹

¶3 The State and Knecht disagree on what happened next. Knecht claims he and Marshall struggled as he attempted to get into his truck, and that he reached for a .22 semi-automatic rifle and fired at Marshall's legs "as he was coming back at me." Knecht states that Marshall began to walk away from him, but "something about the way he was moving made me think he was going to return." This, Knecht claims, prompted him to fire at the pavement to "make him continue moving away," and that none of these bullets hit Marshall.

¶4 The State claims that Marshall was retreating and Knecht did not fire any shots until Marshall was some distance away. Eyewitness testimony indicated that Marshall was moving away from Knecht and that he fell only a few steps after the shots began. An autopsy revealed that Marshall was hit by six different bullets, with the fatal shot striking him in the chest. This bullet broke a rib, perforated both lobes of his left lung, and hit his left pulmonary artery, causing three liters of blood to collect in his chest cavity, killing him.

¶5 Knecht left the scene, hid the gun, and was later arrested upon his arrival at his home. He was indicted by a Bennett County Grand Jury, which charged him with five alternate counts of homicide: First degree murder, second degree murder, and three alternate counts of first degree manslaughter. He pled not guilty and the case went to jury trial. Knecht's motion for a change of venue was unopposed by the State and the case was moved to Hughes County. Following jury selection, however, the remainder of the trial was conducted in Fort Pierre, at the Stanley County Courthouse. The jury convicted Knecht of one count of first degree manslaughter in violation of SDCL 22-16-15(2), which provides:

Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree when perpetrated:

. . . . .

(2) Without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner[.]

The trial court sentenced him to 75 years in the state penitentiary. He appeals.

¶6 1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED KNECHT OF A FAIR TRIAL BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT, CUMULATIVE, AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE.

¶7 SDCL 19-12-3 (FedREvid 403) permits the trial court to exclude evidence if, among other reasons, it is cumulative or prejudicial:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Our standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Cross, 390 N.W.2d 564, 566 (S.D.1986). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." SDCL 19-12-1 (FedREvid 401). "Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same character as evidence previously produced and which supports the same point." Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 824 (S.D.1991) (citations omitted).

¶8 Knecht argues that many of the photographs offered by the State showing Marshall's body shortly after the shooting and at his autopsy, his clothing, the hospital linens, and his wounds constituted cumulative evidence. He claims it was unnecessary to show so many pictures to demonstrate the magnitude of Marshall's blood loss because he admitted shooting Marshall and that he was found in the street sitting in a pool of blood. Similarly, he claims the use of a mannequin by the State to show the pattern of bullet wounds was unnecessary. Therefore, he asserts, the State did not introduce the photographs or use the mannequin to establish any facts which it needed to prove. "It is well settled the State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Admissions or stipulations to facts by the defendant do not relieve the State of its burden of proving the necessary elements of the offense. The State is not bound by a defendant's offer to stipulate to facts in an attempt to rob the evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight." State v. Eagle Star, 1996 SD 143, p 26, 558 N.W.2d 70, 75-76 (citations & internal quotations omitted).

¶9 The State's explanation for offering the photographs and other evidence of the amount of blood lost by Marshall is two-fold; first, according to the statute under which he was convicted, the jury had to find that the killing was perpetrated in a cruel and unusual manner. SDCL 22-16-15(2). We agree that the State had to prove more than just the fact a killing took place--the nature of the crime was also relevant. We have reviewed the photographs and find them not nearly as "grotesque" as those properly admitted in State v. Novaock, 414 N.W.2d 299, 302 (S.D.1987). Even defense counsel stated, "I also think that the jury ought to be told that all of the blood and gore, normal autopsy pictures have been removed so that no one is--should be shocked here." Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs or other evidence relating to the wounds and the magnitude of the blood loss.

¶10 Second, because Knecht claimed self-defense, the photographs were relevant to prove the State's opposing theory of the case. "When a defendant raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, it is incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was without authority of law." State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 7 (S.D.1992) (citations omitted). The great amount of blood on Marshall, his clothing, and the street where he fell, belied Knecht's claim he shot in self-defense at close proximity--there was no blood identified as Marshall's between where Knecht shot his gun and where Marshall fell, a distance of nearly ninety feet. See, e.g., Novaock, 414 N.W.2d at 301 (blood spatter testing done at the crime scene demonstrated an absence of blood in a place where there should have been blood). Additionally, this court has previously held that use of a mannequin to show the pattern of bullet wounds is permissible. See id. at 302; see also State v. Clothier, 381 N.W.2d 253, 259 (S.D.1986) (expert testimony concerning trajectory of bullets used to contradict the defendant's claim of accidental discharge). ²

¶11 Knecht also objects to the admission of evidence regarding collection of the shell casings and retrieval of the gun, which he hid by a telephone pole after the shooting. As for the shell casings, they were relevant and admissible to show the distance between Knecht and Marshall. It is hard to fathom how evidence of the crime scene could be characterized as irrelevant. See, e.g., Novaock, 414 N.W.2d at 302 (finding admissions of photographs and slides cumulative but properly admissible because they were necessary to aid the expert's presentation, prevent jury distraction, and aid the jury); State v. Lohnes, 432 N.W.2d 77, 87 (S.D.1988) (videotape of crime scene properly admitted). Testimony concerning the gun was also relevant. See State v. Stavig, 416 N.W.2d 39, 40 (S.D.1987) (stating when a weapon is tied to a crime, it is properly admissible, so long as there exists some direct connection between the weapon and the crime); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 901 (S.D.1993) (holding that the State must demonstrate with reasonable probability that no tampering or substitution has occurred in chain of custody evidence, and that the trial court has great discretion regarding its competency).

¶12 The trial court did the required balancing on the record as to all of this evidence and found it more probative than prejudicial. State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243, 246 (S.D.1993). Knecht has failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. His argument that this evidence "drowned the defense in a prejudicial quagmire from which it was unable to escape [because] the defense...