State v. Knight

Decision Date14 November 1921
Citation115 A. 569
PartiesSTATE v. KNIGHT.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Error to Court of Oyer and Terminer, Middlesex County.

George Washington Knight was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he brings error. Affirmed.

William I. Garrison, of Atlantic City, for plaintiff in error.

Joseph E. Strieker, Prosecutor of the Pleas, and John E. Tcolan, Asst. Prosecutor of the Pleas, both of Perth Amboy, for the State.

GUMMERE, C. J. The defendant, having been convicted in the Middlesex oyer and terminer of murder in the first degree perpetrated by killing one Edith Wilson while robbing her and also attempting to commit a rape upon her, has brought up to this court the entire record of the proceedings had upon the trial, pursuant to the provision of section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1863).

The only ground upon which the defendant seeks to reverse the conviction is that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence, for the reason that it does not appear from the testimony that he committed the crime of murder, as charged in the indictment, but, on the contrary, it shows that, if any crime was committed by him, it was of a lower degree than that found by the jury. He bases his right to have this court sitting in review, determine whether the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, upon the act of April 12, 1921 (P. L. p. 951), entitled:

"Supplement to an act entitled 'An act relating to courts having criminal jurisdiction and regulating proceedings in criminal cases.'"

The statute appealed to enacts that:

"In all cases where the plaintiff in error shall elect to take up the entire record with his writ of error, as provided in the act to which this is a supplement, he may assign as error that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, whether any exception has been taken or not, or whether any motion to acquit has been made or not, and if it shall appear from a consideration of the entire evidence that such verdict was against the weight of the evidence the appellate court shall remedy such wrong by reversing such verdict and awarding a new trial."

The state concedes that, if this statute is a valid enactment, it justifies the assignment of error in the present case. It contends, however, that the act is unconstitutional, first, because it violates article 1, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the Constitution, which declare that "the right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate," and that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a * * * trial by an impartial jury"; and, second, because it violates article 6, section 1, paragraph 1, of that instrument, which declares that "the judicial power shall be vested in a Court of Errors and Appeals in the last resort in all causes as heretofore," and in certain specifically named courts which are inferior thereto.

This contention on the part of the state presents a preliminary question which we must determine; for, if it is sound, the assignment of error must fall, as the review of verdicts for the purpose of determining whether they are supported by the proofs in a case is no part of the common-law functions of this court. In taking up the consideration of the questions thus raised, we are met with the contention of the defendant that the matter is stare decisis; and he appeals to our decision in the case of Kohl v. State, 59 N. J. Law, 445, 36 Atl. 931, 37 Atl. 73, as authority for his position. In that case this court, under a statutory provision similar in its essence to that contained in the act of 1921 (but which was shortly afterward repealed), examined the testimony sent up with the writ to determine whether or not a conviction of murder in the first degree was justified, and, reaching the conclusion that upon it the guilt of the defendant was doubtful, reversed the conviction and sent the case back for a new trial. Counsel for the state argues that the matter is not foreclosed by that decision, for the reason that, so far as the opinion in the case discloses, the question of the constitutionality of the law was not considered, and that therefore it may fairly be concluded that it was not raised. Without determining whether the one contention or the other is sound, we have assumed, for the purposes of the decision, that the case of Kohl v. State is not controlling upon this point, and proceed to a consideration of the soundness of the proposition submitted by the prosecutor of the pleas.

Taking up the first point—that is, that the statute violates the provisions of the Constitution relative to trial by jury—the argument, as we understand it, is that in a criminal case the verdict of the jury on the question of the guilt or innocence of a defendant is final, and, in view of these provisions, cannot be nullified by judicial action. But this is not so. Mr. Justice Dixon, in his opinion in Kohl v. State, 59 N. J. Law, 446, 36 Atl. 931, 37 Atl. 73, points out that, although the jurors compose the appropriate tribunal for the determination of controverted questions of fact, they cannot justly find a verdict for the state in a criminal case upon evidence which, viewed in any rational aspect, must leave reasonable doubt of guilt in every considerate mind, and that against such a verdict the party aggrieved can, by the common law, appeal to the trial court for a new trial. The narrow question is whether the present statute, which merely substitutes this court in the place of the trial court, violates the constitutional interdict. To us it seems clear that this mere substitution does not lessen the constitutional protection which the provisions throw about a person charged with crime. But, if we are wrong, it does not follow that the statute is invalid. The purpose of the act is to increase that protection rather than diminish it. It does not vest in the state the power to submit to this court the question of the validity of a verdict, but only clothes the defendant himself with the right to have that verdict reviewed at his option; that is to say, he may rest upon the constitutional protection which that instrument gives him, and insist that the verdict of the jury be accepted as a finality, or he may elect to treat the verdict as not a final determination of the facts, and call upon this court to determine whether it is justified under the evidence.

A question somewhat similar to that now under consideration was presented to the Supreme Court in the case of Edwards v. State, 45 N. J. Law, 419. There the defendant was tried and convicted under a statute which permitted a person charged with crime to waive indictment and trial by jury and request a speedy trial before the court of special quarter sessions. A conviction having been had, he challenged its validity upon the ground that the Legislature by passing the act had contravened the provisions of the Constitution relating to trial by jury. Mr. Justice Depue, in dealing with this contention, pointed out that these provisions together with that which prohibits an alleged criminal from being tried upon a charge laid against him, except upon "a presentment or indictment by a grand jury," are a part of the Bill of Rights, like the right to enjoy religious freedom, the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, the right to enjoy freedom of speech, and security against unreasonable searches and seizures, designed for the security of the personal rights of the individual, and that they are expressly retained by the Constitution itself to the people from whom that instrument emanated, and then declared that these rights, thus retained, are subject to that fundamental rule of law that—

"A person may renounce a provision made for his benefit, and to that maxim, 'Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto,' which applies as well to constitutional law as to any other."

We concur in the view thus expressed, and conclude that the statute does not violate the provisions of the Constitution which we have been discussing.

We now take up the consideration of the second ground of attack upon this statute, namely, that it violates that part of section 1, article 6, of the Constitution, which declares that—

"The judicial power shall be vested in a Court of Errors and Appeals in the last resort in all causes, as heretofore."

A reading of the statute makes it apparent that it places an additional burden on this court, requiring it not only to pass upon alleged errors of law in criminal cases brought up for review, but also upon an alleged error of fact; that is, the mistake of a jury in basing its verdict upon insufficient evidence. But in doing that it does not curtail in any degree the constitutional powers vested in the court, but, on the contrary, increases them. We are to determine, therefore, whether the Legislature may vest in this court powers in addition to those exercised and enjoyed by it at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; and this question we think, is answered by the opinion of the late Chief Justice Beasley in Harris v. Vauderveer's Executor, 21 N. J. Eq. 424. He says:

"The essential qualities of all the constitutional courts are indestructible and unalterable by the Legislature. But an extension of the jurisdiction of a court, such extension being in harmony with its character, and not being a usurpation on the inherent powers of any other court, is not within the constitutional prevention. * * * In the judicial system of a state, few things can be imagined more obstructive of the progress of society than courts with jurisdictions absolutely fixed. * * * Such a contrivance is an anomaly nowhere to be found; it is certain it cannot be pretended to have ever existed in this state. Prom the earliest times, every session of the Legislature has added to the subjects of judicature, and the jurisdiction of our courts has been adjusted to this ever-varying condition of things."

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10 cases
  • Hager v. Weber
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 21 Mayo 1951
    ...v. Guggenheim Smelting Co., 63 N.J.L. 647, 44 A. 762 (E. & A.1899), are invoked; but there is no mention of State v. Knight, 96 N.J.L. 461, 115 A. 569, 19 A.L.R. 733 (E. & A.1921). Appellate review concerns the remedy. It is a remedial procedure secured against legislative interference by A......
  • Fisch v. Manger
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 1 Abril 1957
    ...questions of fact * * *.' Kohl v. State, 59 N.J.L. 445, 36 A. 931, 37 A. 73 (E. & A.1896). And see State v. Knight, 93 N.J.L. 461, 115 A. 569, 19 A.L.R. 733 (E. & A.1921). Trial by jury as the means of determining 'questions of fact' is of great antiquity, importing a jury of 12 men, impart......
  • State v. Menter
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • 30 Octubre 1995
    ...woman made for the purpose of carrying out the intent: and this intent may be formed at the very moment of the attack." State v. Knight, 96 N.J.L. 461, 470 (E. & A. 1921). An attempt to commit a crime has three elements: first, the intent; second, performance of some act towards commission ......
  • State ex rel. Kowats v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 9 Junio 1947
    ... ... 465, 166 N.E. 100, 64 A.L.R. 1006 ... (15) An extension of the jurisdiction of a court, such ... extension being in harmony with its character, and not being ... a usurpation of the inherent powers of any other court, is ... not within the constitutional prevention. State v ... Knight, 96 N.J.L. 461, 115 A. 569, 19 A.L.R. 733. (16) ... The rule is firmly established that in special statutory ... proceedings the Legislature may confer jurisdiction to ... determine the questions arising therein on any court that it ... may choose, to the exclusion of others, and if such acts ... ...
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