State v. Knight
| Decision Date | 19 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 20670,20670 |
| Citation | 734 P.2d 913,53 Utah Adv.Rep. 13 |
| Parties | The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnnie Patrick KNIGHT, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Sandra L. Sjogren, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Johnnie Patrick Knight appeals from a jury conviction on a charge of aggravated robbery. Knight contends that during discovery, the prosecution assumed the obligation to provide defense counsel with certain requested information, including the correct addresses and telephone numbers of two potential witnesses and statements taken from those witnesses by an investigator. Knight complains that the prosecutor did not fulfill this obligation and that as a result, Knight's ability to defend was impaired because the two witnesses appeared at trial and gave unanticipated testimony. Knight further argues that the prejudice to his defense was not mitigated as it should have been because the trial court denied his motions for a continuance or a mistrial. We agree and reverse the conviction.
On February 2, 1984, the One Hour Martinizing Cleaners located at 1689 South West Temple Street in Salt Lake City was robbed of approximately $85.50. Two masked men carrying weapons entered the establishment through the employees' entrance, forced the manager to lie on the floor, and compelled an employee to open the cash register. After removing the money from the till, the men took the manager's checkbook and wallet, cut the telephone cord, and fled.
The manager and the employee were not able to describe the robbers' facial characteristics because the faces were almost entirely covered. However, the employee was able to describe to investigators a man who had entered the establishment shortly before the robbery. The man stayed for only a moment and glanced around the store while he asked for directions. Through a police photo lineup, the employee identified this man as Jeff Richens.
Immediately after the robbery, a motorist saw the robbers running out of the One Hour Martinizing Cleaners. The motorist followed in his car as the men ran down the middle of West Temple Street and then down an alley to a getaway car with a waiting driver. The motorist copied the license number of the car and noticed that the driver had long hair. The license number was turned over to police investigators who quickly located the car, which was parked on a roadside in West Valley City. The car was registered to Kim Richens, Jeff Richens' wife.
With Kim Richens' permission, investigators searched the car and found several items linking the car to the robbery. In the trunk of the car, they also found a wallet belonging to Johnnie Knight, along with some clothing, tools, and animal traps. When police investigators questioned Knight, he explained that he left his wallet in the trunk after a trapping excursion with Jeff Richens. Knight also stated that at the time of the robbery, he was with Georgia Moore, drinking coffee in her kitchen. Upon questioning, Georgia Moore corroborated Knight's story, and the wallet was returned to its owner.
Jeff Richens also was interviewed. Richens admitted involvement in the robbery and agreed to testify for the State. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempted robbery. Richens' story was that Johnnie Knight and Joseph Ridlon were the two masked robbers who carried weapons and that he was the driver of the car.
Knight and Ridlon were charged with aggravated robbery. At trial, they were co-defendants represented by separate counsel. Pursuant to Rule 16(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16(a)(5) (1982 ed.), counsel for Knight filed a written motion requesting that the trial court order the prosecution to disclose certain specified items and information, including the addresses and telephone numbers of the State's potential witnesses and any statements taken from them. A hearing on the motion was scheduled, but prior to the date of that hearing, the prosecutor agreed to comply voluntarily with the discovery request. The trial court cancelled the hearing and did not issue a discovery order.
In preparing to respond to the discovery request, the prosecutor assumed that all information pertaining to the case was located in his files. As a result, he did not check the files of other members of the prosecution team, and when providing the defense with the requested material, he did not indicate that he had not checked others' files.
The prosecutor's response listed Georgia Moore and her estranged husband, Walter Moore, among the witnesses the State intended to call. The prosecutor did not disclose that any statements had been taken from the Moores. He did list addresses and telephone numbers for the Moores, but they were not current. A few days before trial, defense counsel asked the prosecutor whether he had discovered the Moores' current addresses and telephone numbers. The prosecutor truthfully responded that his subpoenas had been returned unserved and that he had been unable to locate the Moores. However, within a day or two the prosecutor managed to contact the Moores (one of whom was living out of the state) and arranged for them to attend trial and testify. As a result of this contact, the prosecutor obtained correct addresses and telephone numbers for the Moores. These were not given to defense counsel prior to trial.
On the first day of the two-day trial, defense counsel learned that an investigator for the State, Sergeant Adamson, had taken statements from both of the Moores months before trial and that the statements had lain in Adamson's files ever since. That evening, defense counsel obtained copies of the statements. Their substance was as follows:
(i) According to the statement given to Adamson by Georgia Moore, Knight had asked her to be his alibi for a robbery he was accused of but did not commit, and she had agreed. However, at the time of the interview with Adamson, Georgia Moore said that she was tired of lying and that Knight was not in her kitchen at the time of the robbery.
(ii) According to Walter Moore's statement to Adamson, Knight telephoned him shortly after the time of the robbery and asked him to pick up Knight and a friend because they were having car trouble. Walter Moore picked up Knight and Richens and the three then drove past Richens' car (the getaway car), which was parked on a roadside in West Valley City.
At the opening of trial on the second day, defense counsel made appropriate objections to the Moores' testifying, moved for mistrial, requested a continuance, and attempted to withdraw as counsel. The trial court denied all motions. Both Georgia and Walter Moore were allowed to testify, and defense counsel was not given any additional time to meet the unanticipated testimony. Knight was convicted of aggravated robbery, while co-defendant Ridlon was acquitted.
This appeal presents two questions: first, whether the State's failure to disclose the Moores' statements, addresses, and telephone numbers was error; second, if error was committed, whether defendant suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal.
The starting place for analyzing the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct is defendant's motion to discover. That motion sought, inter alia, the following:
A. A list of all the witnesses that the State intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter, their addresses and telephone numbers;
B. Any recordings, reports, transcripts, or reports about statements in possession of any member, or group involved in the prosecution or the investigation of the above-entitled case taken from the witnesses listed in point [A] above.
The prosecutor's obligation to comply with this request for discovery must be evaluated under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16 (1982 ed.) (emphasis added).
Where, as here, the requested material is not covered by the detailed descriptions in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4), which mandate disclosure upon request, subsection (a)(5), the catch-all provision, applies. It requires disclosure of the material sought only to the extent ordered by the trial court. 1 However, when the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5) without requiring the defense to obtain a court order, considerations of fairness require that the prosecution respond to the request in a manner that will not be misleading. Therefore, we articulate two requirements that the prosecution must meet when it responds voluntarily to a request for discovery. First, the prosecution either must produce all of the material requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the request with respect to which no responsive material will be provided. Second, when the prosecution agrees to produce any of the material requested, it must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis to the defense. Therefore, if the prosecution agrees to produce certain specified material and it later comes into possession of additional material that falls...
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