State v. Knowlton
| Decision Date | 10 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 19658,19658 |
| Citation | 123 Idaho 916,854 P.2d 259 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steven KNOWLTON, Defendant-Appellant. Boise, February 1993 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Larry EchoHawk, Idaho Atty. Gen., Michael Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. Michael A. Henderson argued.
Steven Knowlton appeals from an order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve an indeterminate ten-year sentence for the rape of his fourteen-year old daughter. On appeal, Knowlton contends the trial judge was biased and should have been disqualified as a result of the judge's participation in the Governor's Task Force for Children at Risk, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at the probation revocation hearing and the trial court abused its discretion in orally denying a motion for a reduction in sentence.
In 1984, Knowlton pleaded guilty to raping his fourteen-year old daughter. The district judge, Roger Williams, granted Knowlton a withheld judgment and placed him on probation for five years. The terms of the probation included a one-year jail sentence with work release, treatment in a sex abuse program and no contact with his children or step-daughter without the permission of his probation officer. The probation order further provided that Knowlton "shall not marry or have sexual relations with his step-daughter...."
Knowlton was thereafter summoned before the trial court on a series of probation On December 30, 1986, Knowlton filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (Rule 35 motion). On January 15, 1987, the trial court temporarily suspended its judgment of conviction and scheduled a hearing for March 6, 1987. At the hearing, Judge Goff denied Knowlton's Rule 35 motion but reinstated Knowlton's probation for a period of ten years. The terms of the probation forbid Knowlton from having any contact with his minor children without the permission of his probation officer and sexual abuse treatment provider.
[123 Idaho 918] violation proceedings. The first probation violation occurred approximately three months after sentencing and involved Knowlton's contact with his step-daughter. A second probation violation proceeding was instigated in 1986 and a hearing was held on September 16, 1986, before district judge, Dennis Goff. At this hearing, Knowlton admitted several violations including contacting his daughters without authorization, repeatedly lying to his probation officer, failing to maintain a job and not participating in group treatment. Judge Goff revoked Knowlton's probation, imposed a judgment of conviction and sentenced Knowlton to an indeterminate ten-year term. The trial court also retained jurisdiction for 120 days.
A third probation violation proceeding was commenced in 1987 but later dismissed. In 1991, the probation violation proceeding which is the subject of this appeal occurred. At this proceeding, Knowlton admitted having intercourse with his youngest daughter on two occasions. On the basis of Knowlton's admitted probation violation, Judge Goff revoked Knowlton's probation and ordered him to serve the indeterminate ten-year sentence previously imposed.
On appeal, Knowlton contends: (1) Judge Goff was biased and should have been disqualified because of his participation in the Governor's Task Force for Children at Risk; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation; (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at the probation revocation hearing which requires reversal of the order revoking probation; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by orally denying a motion for a reduction of sentence without allowing Knowlton to present any information or argument.
Knowlton argues, for the first time on appeal, that he was prejudiced by Judge Goff's participation in the Governor's Task Force for Children at Risk. Knowlton did not learn of Judge Goff's appointment to the task force until after the probation revocation hearing. He now contends that Judge Goff's membership on the task force rendered it impossible for him to function in an impartial fashion. Knowlton also directs us to portions of the record which purportedly indicate Judge Goff's bias or prejudice against him.
The longstanding general rule of this Court, as recently noted in Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991), is that we will not consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeal. However, in the case of fundamental error in a criminal case, this Court will consider an alleged error raised on appeal even though no objection was made at trial. State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989). Thus we first must assess whether the error would be fundamental if there were error. We have adopted the following definition of fundamental error:
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits. Out of the facts in each case will arise the law.
Id., citing Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 475 n. 13, 491 P.2d 733, 739 n. 13 (1971).
In State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596-97, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (1992), we refused to consider the defendant's contention "that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because the magistrate judge was biased or prejudiced against him" when this issue was not raised in the trial court below. This Court refused to consider the issue as fundamental error since, even assuming the defendant had requested the magistrate judge disqualify himself and the magistrate had denied that request, any error in so doing would not go to the very foundation of the case or defendant's rights, or take from the defendant a right essential to his defense.
Kenner is controlling in the present case to the extent Knowlton is contending the trial judge was actually biased or prejudiced against him. In Kenner, the magistrate judge presided over a trial in which the jury found the defendant guilty of two of three pending misdemeanor charges. Id. at 595-96, 826 P.2d at 1307-08. We refused to consider, for the first time on appeal, the defendant's contention that the magistrate judge was biased or prejudiced against him. Id. at 597, 826 P.2d at 1309. A criminal defendant seeking to disqualify a trial judge for cause must bring a motion to disqualify pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(3) and I.C.R. 25(b). See State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 699-700, 747 P.2d 710, 721-22 (1987), vacated on other grounds, Lankford v. Idaho, 486 U.S. 1051, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988). We will not consider Knowlton's contention that the trial judge was biased or prejudiced against him in the absence of a timely motion to disqualify. 1
Left unresolved by Kenner is whether Judge Goff had an affirmative duty to recuse himself from the instant case because as Knowlton contends, Judge Goff's membership on the task force rendered it impossible for him to function in an impartial fashion. The Code of Judicial Conduct, originally adopted by this Court on September 27, 1976, provides that: "Judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned or where personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts might reasonably affect their impartiality in the proceeding." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1). Interposed in the above requirement is Canon 4 which provides: "Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice if in doing so the judges do not cast doubt on their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before them."
In the present case, Judge Goff served on the Governor's Task Force for Children at Risk at the request of the governor. Executive Order 88-20, establishing the task force, provides for the appointment of a district court judge, a magistrate judge, a prosecuting attorney, a public defender, a pediatrician, a parent or parent group representative, a mental health counselor and a representative of the Department of Corrections' Probation and Parole Division, among others, to the task force. The task force's responsibilities, as set forth in the executive order, include:
1. To work in cooperation with appropriate state and local entities to establish the statewide coordination of an effective, multiagency system of investigation of all reports of child abuse and neglect, including the creation of a written system of protocol for all such investigations conducted in the state;
2. To work toward the goal of criminal prosecution of all substantiated cases of criminal abuse and/or neglect;
3. To monitor the disposition of all criminal cases of child abuse and neglect filed throughout the State of Idaho;
4. To work toward the goal of ensuring necessary and effective psychological 5. To be informed about effective programs and systems in place throughout the country in order that Idaho may be among the nation's leaders in the field of child protection;
[123 Idaho 920] treatment for all abused and neglected children;
6. To provide an advocacy function in promoting legislation pertaining to services and laws affecting abused and neglected children; and
7. To report to the Governor on June 30 of each year, or at any other time deemed necessary by either the governor or the Task Force, and to provide to the Governor a written report on June 30 of each year on the Task Force's work...
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