State v. Knox, WD

Decision Date23 July 1985
Docket NumberNo. WD,WD
Citation697 S.W.2d 261
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Jay KNOX, Respondent. 36497.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Albert A. Riederer, Pros. Atty., Robert Frager, Asst. Pros. Atty., Kansas City, for appellant.

Sean D. O'Brien, Public Defender, David S. Durbin, Asst. Public Defender, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before NUGENT, P.J., and PRITCHARD and CLARK, JJ.

CLARK, Judge.

Jay Knox was charged with the offenses of burglary and stealing alleged to have been committed November 6, 1983. He was arraigned January 19, 1984. By October, 1984, he had not been tried on the charges and he moved for dismissal. The motion was granted. The state appeals pursuant to § 547.200, RSMo.Supp.1984. Affirmed.

In seeking to overturn the dismissal, the state argues first that the court was not entitled to hold it to a time limit of 180 days in bringing Knox to trial because the statute imposing that limit, § 545.780.3(2) and (5), RSMo.1978 was repealed effective June 7, 1984 and was not the law when Knox was ordered discharged. Alternatively, the state contends, if § 545.780.3(2) and (5), RSMo.1978 were applicable to this case, less than 180 days for which the state was accountable had elapsed by the date the dismissal was ordered.

The disposition of the case by the trial court does not present for determination here the question of which statute applies. The order for discharge of Knox was not based on a finding, as appellant's first point assumes, that the speedy trial statute in effect after June 7, 1984 controlled the case. The judge expressly refrained from deciding that issue. Instead, he ruled that Knox's trial had been unreasonably delayed, which ever statute prevailed. It therefore follows, of necessity, that the order of dismissal is entitled to affirmance if, as the state contends, § 545.780, RSMo.Supp.1984 applied in the case, and if there was substantial evidence to support the trial judge's decision that trial was unreasonably delayed. If such be the case, as we hereafter find, the state's second point as to computation of the 180 day time limit is irrelevant.

At the time of commission of the alleged offense, by Knox, and thereafter, through arraignment and several trial settings, the existing statute was § 545.780, RSMo.1978. When Knox filed his motion for speedy trial and at the time the court ruled the motion for dismissal, the new statute, § 545.780, RSMo.Supp.1984, was in effect. The difference between the two is that the former law prescribed the standard of 180 days and laid down numerous conditions and imposed various duties for inquiry and determination. The present law requires only that the case be set for trial as soon as reasonably possible after a request therefor.

For purposes of disposition of this appeal, we assume the validity of the state's contention that the statute effective June 7, 1984 applies in Knox's case. In so doing, however, we do not decide that proposition. The question is not before us first, because the trial judge did not rule on the issue and we therefore have no decision to review. Second, the issue is not necessary to disposition of the case. The state makes no argument that under the facts, Knox's trial was set as soon as reasonably possible after the motion for a trial setting was filed. That being so, if the evidence supports the trial judge's finding of unreasonable delay, the assertion that the new statute controlled may be conceded and yet not require reversal.

Turning now to the facts of the case, the procedural history recounted in the legal file shows that after arraignment, the first trial setting was March 5, 1984. Knox thereafter sought and obtained two continuances, first to April 16 and next to May 14. Defense counsel was engaged in another trial on that date and the case was reset for July 9. The state obtained a continuance and on the following day, July 10, Knox filed his motion requesting a speedy trial. From this point forward, there is no record of any trial setting or request or order of continuance from the trial date of August 6, 1984. As the trial judge himself observed when he ruled on Knox's dismissal motion, "I would have to say that there would have to be an incredible set of circumstances to keep this case from getting tried from July 10 when the filing of the motion for speedy trial was made until today, October 22nd, and be right".

Counsel have not cited nor has independent research disclosed any reported case construing or applying the provisions of this new speedy trial statute, § 545.780, RSMo.Supp.1984. The statute itself is silent as to what sanction may follow upon a prosecution unreasonably delayed. So too does the statute fail to specify how a reasonable time period is to be assessed. We are therefore obligated to examine these components in order to determine whether, as the state contends, the case against Knox was erroneously dismissed.

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7 cases
  • State v. Honeycutt
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 16, 2002
    ...is minimal, but still affords a court the ability to call in the prosecutor, as here where the case has languished, State v. Knox, 697 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo. App. 1985), or just been forgotten. See State v. Barunsdorf, 297 N.W.2d 808 (Wis. 1980); City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 595 N.W.2d 635 (......
  • State v. Green
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 13, 2012
    ...sufficient evidence, ruling against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declaring or applying the law. Cf. State v. Knox, 697 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo.App. W.D.1985) (order dismissing for speedy trial violation under section 545.780 reviewable as lacking substantial evidence to support it......
  • State v. Galvan
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • September 11, 1990
    ...of this appeal cannot "result in double jeopardy for the defendant." Accordingly, we hold the state may appeal. See: State v. Knox, 697 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Mo.App.1985).3 The state, in a footnote in the argument portion of its brief, asserts defendant's request for disposition "was improper an......
  • State v. Loewe
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 21, 1988
    ...the delay and then determine whether the trial court could have reasonably decided the delay was or was not justified. State v. Knox, 697 S.W.2d 261, 263-264 (Mo.App.1985). Different weight is given to different A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should b......
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