State v. Knudson

• Decision Date: 11 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. DA 06-0485.,DA 06-0485.
• Citation: 2007 MT 324,340 Mont. 167,174 P.3d 469
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Thomas Ronald KNUDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

174 P.3d 469

2007 MT 324

340 Mont. 167

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Thomas Ronald KNUDSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 06-0485.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 24, 2007.

Decided December 11, 2007.

For Appellant: Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Stephen A. Gannon, County Attorney, Fort Benton, Montana.

Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHARTdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Thomas Knudson, a registered sex offender, was charged with failing to report his change of address as required by § 46-23-505, MCA (2005). He moved to dismiss the charges against him. The District Court denied his motion; he now appeals. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 We restate the issue as follows:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in denying Thomas Knudson's motion to dismiss?

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Knudson pled guilty to a felony charge of sexual intercourse without consent and two misdemeanor charges of drug possession. He received a five-year sentence, with all but thirty days suspended. As a condition of his suspended sentence, the District Court ordered Knudson to register as a sexual offender in compliance with the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act ("the Act"), Title 46, Chapter 23, Part 5, MCA (2005), "and [to] give appropriate notice of any address change."

¶ 5 Following his release from custody in 2002, Knudson moved into his father's house in Fort Benton. All mail in Fort Benton is delivered to post office boxes. Knudson's street address is 1301 Front Street, but his official mailing address is P.O. Box 56. When Knudson first registered with the sheriff's department, as required by the Act, he gave P.O. Box 56 as his address.

¶ 6 The Act simply states that offenders must provide their "address," and fails to specify whether a mailing or residential address is required. The State did not inform Knudson that his registration was invalid nor ask him for a residential address.

¶ 7 In September 2005, Knudson began spending more time at his girlfriend's house. Kim Cooke, Knudson's girlfriend, resided at 905-1/2 Main Street in Fort Benton, about five blocks away from Knudson's father's house. Ken Knudson, Thomas's father, set up the utilities for the Main Street apartment in his name since neither Thomas nor Kim could open an account with Northwestern Energy. Northwestern's records show that Thomas paid the electric bill at 905-1/2 Main Street from September 2005 to March 2006.

¶ 8 Thomas moved a few of his personal effects, including a chair, a spare bed, and his pet ferret, from his father's house to Cooke's house. However, Thomas maintained a room at his father's house and occasionally slept there. Thomas did not change his mailing address and thus continued to receive mail at P.O. Box 56. At trial, Ken Knudson testified that he took calls for his son and that he saw Thomas once a day.

¶ 9 On December 2, 2005, the Chouteau County Attorney filed an Information charging Knudson with violating § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), for failing to "register in Chouteau County, Montana within ten days of changing his address in Chouteau County for the purposes of residing." The State claimed Knudson should have re-registered using Cooke's residential address. Knudson moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that since his mailing address did not change, his registration was still current under § 46-23-505, MCA (2005). He further argued that since the term "address" was not defined in the Act, § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to him.

¶ 10 The District Court denied Knudson's motion to dismiss. Knudson now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Pyette, 2007 MT 119, ¶ 11, 337 Mont. 265, ¶ 11, 159 P.3d 232, ¶ 11. We review a district court's conclusions of law for correctness. Pyette, ¶ 11.

¶ 12 Statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. Wing v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Transp., 2007 MT 72, ¶ 12, 336 Mont. 423, ¶ 12, 155 P.3d 1224, ¶ 12. The person challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Wing, ¶ 12. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 321, ¶ 14, 292 Mont. 192, ¶ 14, 974 P.2d 1132, ¶ 14. We review the district court's application of the Constitution to determine if it is correct. Stanko, ¶ 14. Our review of constitutional questions is plenary. Wing, ¶ 9.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Did the District Court err in denying Knudson's motion to dismiss, and in finding that § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), was not unconstitutionally vague?

¶ 14 Knudson argues that § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), is unconstitutionally vague on its face, and as applied to him, because the word "address" is ambiguous. Section 46-23-505, MCA (2005), provides in relevant part:

If an offender required to register under this part has a change of address, the offender shall within 10 days of the change give written notification of the new address to the agency with whom the offender last registered or, if the offender was initially registered under 46-23-504(1)(b), to the department and to the chief of police of the municipality or sheriff of the county from which the offender is moving.

Knudson maintains the term "address" has more than one generally accepted meaning: it could refer to either a mailing address or a residential address. Knudson argues that since the Act does not define "address," the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Knudson also asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, because the State did not inform him that the mailing address that he provided in 2002 did not satisfy the statutory requirements.

¶ 15 The State replies that when § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), is read as part of the Act as a whole, it is clear that the Legislature intended the word "address" to mean "residential address." Since the Act's purpose is to keep track of the whereabouts of sex offenders, the State argues, Knudson should have known he was required to provide a residential address. Thus, the State concludes, Knudson's as-applied challenge must fail. Further, the State argues, Knudson lacks standing to bring a facial challenge to the statute because § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), was reasonably clear in its application to Knudson's conduct. As such, the State asserts, we should decline to consider his facial challenge.

¶ 16 Vagueness challenges to statutes may take two different forms: (1) "facial," where the statute is so vague that it is void on its face, and (2) "as-applied," where the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a particular situation. Stanko, ¶ 17. As described above, Knudson raises both facial and as-applied challenges to § 46-23-505, MCA (2005). Because we conclude that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Knudson, we need not reach the question of whether the statute is facially invalid.

¶ 17 Is § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), vague as applied to Knudson?

¶ 18 A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if "a person is required to speculate as to whether his contemplated course of action may be subject to criminal penalties." State v. Mainwaring, 2007 MT 14, ¶ 18, 335 Mont. 322, ¶ 18, 151 P.3d 53, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). Both the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution protect against vague statutes which infringe upon a citizen's right to due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Mont. Const. art. II, § 17. The void for vagueness doctrine "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

¶ 19 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Kolender, we developed a two-part test to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular situation. State v. Dixon, 2000 MT 82, ¶ 27, 299 Mont. 165, ¶ 27, 998 P.2d 544, ¶ 27 (citations omitted). First, we consider whether actual notice was given to citizens. Dixon, ¶ 27. Second, we ask whether the statute contains minimal guidelines sufficient to govern law enforcement. Dixon, ¶ 27.

¶ 20 1. Does § 46-23-505, MCA (2005), provide Knudson with actual notice that his conduct was proscribed?

¶ 21 In the context of an as-applied challenge, we determine whether a statute provides constitutionally adequate notice by examining the statute "in light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged in order to determine whether the defendant could have reasonably understood that his conduct was proscribed." Dixon, ¶ 28. In the instant case, then, the question is whether Knudson could have reasonably understood that his conduct was proscribed.

¶ 22 Since the Act does not define the term "address," we look to the ordinary meaning of the word. Fandrich v. Capital Ford Lincoln Mercury, 272 Mont. 425, 430, 901 P.2d 112, 115 (relying on the ordinary definition of a word that was not specifically defined in a statute). As the District Court pointed out, the word "address" has multiple generally accepted meanings. Black's Law Dictionary notes the possible ambiguity in the term, defining address as the "[p]lace where mail or other communications will reach [a] person. . . . Generally a place of business or residence; though it need not be." Black's Law Dictionary 38 (6th ed., West 1990). For most Montanans, one's residential and mailing addresses are the same. However, when those two addresses differ, it is unclear from the face of the statute which of the two an offender should provide.

¶ 23 If the plain words of a statute are...