State v. Korn, 34965.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
| Citation | 224 P.3d 480 |
| Docket Number | No. 34965.,34965. |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerome L. KORN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 24 December 2009 |
v.
Jerome L. KORN, Defendant-Appellant.
[224 P.3d 481]
Kelly Whiting, Fruitland, for appellant.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica Lorello argued.
HORTON, Justice.
This case arises from Jerome L. Korn's conviction for misdemeanor offenses of possession of wild or exotic animals and possession of deleterious exotic animals without a permit. Before trial, Korn moved to dismiss the charge of possession of exotic animals contending that Payette County's (the County's) ordinance prohibiting the possession of exotic animals violated the contract clauses of the United States and Idaho constitutions. The magistrate judge denied the motion. At trial, the magistrate judge refused to admit uncertified copies of orders from Korn's bankruptcy case. Korn appeals the district court's decision affirming the denial of his motion to dismiss and the exclusion of the uncertified copies of the bankruptcy court orders. We affirm.
In 2004, Korn lived in Nampa, Idaho, where he operated a zoo. In late 2004, he filed for bankruptcy protection. In March or April of 2005, the bankruptcy court ordered Korn to sell his zoo property in Nampa. In late April of 2005, Korn looked at property in the County, and upon learning that exotic animals were not mentioned in the County's ordinances, entered into an agreement with his mother to buy the property. The property was to serve both as a residence for Korn and as a place to build a new facility to house Korn's zoo animals. Korn's mother put up $30,000 in order to commence construction on the new zoo building on May 5, 2005. A corporation known as Diversified Developmental Resources (DDR) agreed to purchase Korn's Nampa property in May or June of 2005, and in addition DDR committed $50,000 towards removing the animals from the zoo so that it could more quickly take possession of the Nampa property. DDR took over construction of the new facility in August, 2005, and eventually contributed approximately $600,000 towards the project.
On May 16, 2005, and again on May 23, 2005, the County passed an ordinance that prohibits the possession of certain exotic animals. The County published the ordinance, and it became effective on June 1, 2005.
On February 23, 2006, the Idaho Department of Agriculture denied Korn's application for a permit to possess deleterious exotic animals. On March 13, 2006, the County served Korn with a notice that he was in violation of its ordinance prohibiting possession of certain exotic animals and requested that he abate and remove his exotic animals from the new facility. On April 19, 2006, the State of Idaho (the State) filed a criminal complaint against Korn alleging in Count I that Korn possessed exotic animals in violation of the County's ordinance and in Count II that he was in violation of I.C. § 25-3905 and Idaho Administrative Code § 02.04.27.111 for possessing deleterious exotic animals without a permit. On June 12, 2006, Korn filed a motion to dismiss Count I of the complaint, alleging that the County's ordinance violated the contract clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The magistrate court denied Korn's motion on August 4, 2006.
During the jury trial, in an effort to prove the defense of necessity, Korn attempted to admit copies of two orders from the bankruptcy court. The State objected on the grounds that the copies were not certified, and the magistrate judge sustained the State's objections. The jury found Korn guilty of both charges. Korn appealed the magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss and its exclusion of the bankruptcy orders to the district court, and the district court affirmed. Korn timely appealed.
On review of a decision rendered by a district court sitting in its intermediate, appellate capacity, this Court has stated that
the appropriate standard of review at the Supreme Court level [is]: The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008) (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981)).1
We first consider whether the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's denial of Korn's motion to dismiss. We then turn to whether the district court was correct to affirm the magistrate court's exclusion of the bankruptcy court orders.
A. The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate judge's denial of Korn's motion to dismiss.
Korn moved to dismiss the first count of the complaint against him, which alleged that he violated the County's ordinance prohibiting the possession of certain exotic animals. Korn argues that the County's passage of the ordinance substantially impaired contracts with his mother and with DDR regarding the construction of the facility in the County in violation of the contract clauses found in the Idaho and U.S. constitutions.
Both the magistrate and district courts assumed that contracts existed between Korn and his mother and Korn and DDR at the time the County passed the ordinance. There is, however, no substantial, competent evidence that Korn had a contract with either his mother or DDR at the time the ordinance took effect. Aside from Korn's testimony that his mother "put up $30,000," the following exchange is the only evidence relating to any form of agreement between Korn and his mother:
A: ... My mother stepped forward and said, "Look, Ill take care of it." And so she bought the property.
Q: Okay. Did you have an agreement with your mom about what the property would be used for?
A: The property was to be used for the— for me to live in and it was also to be used for the home for the animals.
This is not enough evidence to show that a contract ever existed. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 19 (2d ed.2009) (stating that the basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by all the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and explicitly enough to show what the parties have agreed). Further, while it was not admitted into the record, it appears from the alleged bankruptcy order approving the sales agreement between Korn and DDR that their agreement was not executed until June 15, 2005, which was nearly two weeks after the ordinance became effective. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the contract was formed sooner. This is significant because "[t]he ... contracts clause protects only those contractual obligations already in
existence at the time the disputed law is enacted." Allied...
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