State v. Kornstett
| Decision Date | 07 July 1900 |
| Docket Number | 11,748 |
| Citation | 62 Kan. 221,61 P. 805 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF KANSAS v. JOHN KORNSTETT |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided July, 1900.
Appeal from Harper district court; P. B. GILLETT, judge.
Judgment affirmed.
A. A Godard, attorney-general, R. P. McCulloch, county attorney and J. S. West, for The State.
Geo. E McMahon, and John. Baily, for appellant.
John Kornstett was charged with and convicted of the murder of his cousin, Nora Kornstett, and the severest penalty of the law was adjudged against him. In substance, the information charged the appellant with having attempted to ravish his cousin, and that then, with deliberation and premeditation, he choked and beat her and struck her head against a tree with great violence, and that afterward he threw her body into a well about twenty feet deep, all with intent to kill and murder her, and that the wounds and injuries so purposely and feloniously inflicted caused her death. When taken before a magistrate for preliminary examination, he entered a plea of guilty, and subsequently, when the information was filed and he was arraigned before the court, he again entered a plea of guilty of the charge alleged. Subsequently he was brought before the court and was fully informed of the penalty for the crime charged against him, and was asked whether he desired to change his plea of guilty which had previously been entered, and in response to the inquiry he insisted that the plea of guilty stand. About a week after that time, an application was made to withdraw the plea of guilty, which was granted by the court; and later, when arraigned again, he stood mute and refused to plead, and upon the order of the court a plea of not guilty was entered for him.
On this appeal the first contention is that he had no preliminary examination, and that his plea in abatement should have been sustained. The docket entries of the magistrate recite that he was afforded an opportunity for a preliminary examination, when he entered a plea of guilty and was bound over for trial in the district court. In the plea which was filed he admitted that he was taken into a room, and that there were present officers and other persons, whom he did not know; that papers were read to him and proceedings were had which he did not understand, and which he did not fully remember. Other matters were alleged as to the locking of the doors and the fear of mob violence, and that he did not know that what he said or did there would be construed as a waiver of his right to a preliminary examination; but, upon the whole, we think that the defendant was offered a preliminary examination, and that reasonable notice was given to him in regard to the nature and character of the offense charged against him. "For the purpose of authorizing a final trial and requiring the defendant should plead to the merits of the action, all that is necessary is that the defendant should be given a fair opportunity to know by a proffered preliminary examination the general character and outlines of the offense charged against him." (The State v. Bailey, 32 Kan. 83, 3 P. 769.)
The second error assigned is that the information charged murder in the first degree in two different forms, and on that ground a motion to quash was made. In the first part of the information an attempt to ravish is alleged, but it is not stated that the attempt to ravish caused her death. All the facts and circumstances from the first assault and attempt to ravish to the throwing of the body into the well are set out at considerable length in the single count of the information. It appears to have been a single and continuous transaction, and although murder had been charged in briefer and general terms, proof of all that occurred there was competent and must necessarily have been brought out upon the trial. The defendant was not prejudiced by the fullness of the averments, and we think there was no such duplicity in the information as to make it obnoxious to the motion to quash.
The showing made upon an application for a change of venue did not warrant the court in granting it, and the fact that some of the persons who were drawn as jurors were served with process on Sunday, and that they were excluded from the court-room while others were being examined as to their qualifications to sit as jurors, did not disqualify them for jury service, nor in any way prejudice the rights of the defendant.
It is next contended that incompetent jurors served upon the jury after having been challenged for cause by the defendant. The one who approached most closely to the line of incompetency was J. W. Means. He had read newspaper accounts of the killing of the girl and of the charge that the defendant had killed her. He testified, among other things, that at the time he had accepted and assumed the statements which he read and heard to be true. However, upon final examination, he stated that he had not formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and had then no definite opinion on the question; that what he had read and heard had created no more than an impression -- such an impression as one gets from reading a newspaper statement. Fixed and positive opinions disqualify (The State v. Start, 60 Kan. 256, 56 P. 15), and not mere impressions obtained from newspaper reports, slight and fugitive in character, which do not indicate a condition of mind that precludes a fair and impartial examination of the facts as presented in the testimony. (The State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257.) We cannot expect to find intelligent jurors who have not heard or read of such an offense when committed in the community in which they live; men who are wholly void of information and entirely unimpressed by a report of the tragedy. A fair-minded person who, from rumors and newspaper reports, has gained only light impressions from what he has heard and read, and which will not weigh in the consideration of the testimony, is not within the prohibition of the statute excluding those who have formed or expressed an opinion on the issue or material facts to be tried. (Gen. Stat. 1897, ch. 102, § 203; Gen. Stat. 1899, § 5455.) When the oral argument was concluded we had grave doubts as to the competency of this juror, but a reading of the whole examination satisfies us that his condition of mind was such that he would fairly consider the case, and that when the statutory tests were applied he was not disqualified.
Proof of confessions made by the defendant was received in evidence over his objections, and upon these rulings error is assigned. About the time of his arrest he was closely questioned by the sheriff, who believed the defendant was connected with the commission of the offense, and before admitting his guilt he was told that some of his prior...
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State v. Ackward, No. 91,755.
...sentence and a small sentence." Defendant cites State v. Newfield, 229 Kan. 347, 359, 623 P.2d 1349 (1981) (quoting State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 227, 61 P. 805 [1900]): "`It is well settled that an extrajudicial confession will not be received in evidence unless it has been freely and v......
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State v. Ninci, 74725
... ... However, the advice or admonition to the defendant to speak the truth, which does not import either a threat or benefit, will not make a following confession incompetent.' " State v. Newfield, 229 Kan. 347, 359, 623 P.2d 1349 (1981) (quoting State v ... Page 1379 ... Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 227, 61 P. 805 [1900] ) ... Ninci contends that, even after having been read the Miranda warnings, his confession in the last 2 1/2 hours of the interview was not voluntary because his waiver of the Miranda rights was not voluntary and because his confession was ... ...
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State v. Jackson
...the murder rap by myself and in order for me to clear myself, that I—that I have to tell them the truth. . . ." In State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 61 Pac. 805 (1900), the police told the defendant that he would feel better if he told the truth. This court stated that "mere advice or admoni......
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State v. Wakefield
...not isolated from the outside world. Regarding the officers' fairness in misrepresenting their motivations and the In State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 61 P. 805 (1900), a sheriff told the suspect he believed the suspect knew who had committed the murder and would feel better if he told the ......