State v. Kotowski

Decision Date15 May 2019
Docket NumberOpinion No. 5650,Appellate Case No. 2016-000842
Citation427 S.C. 119,828 S.E.2d 605
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
Parties The STATE, Respondent, v. Felix KOTOWSKI, Appellant.

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia, and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, all for Respondent.

KONDUROS, J.:

Felix Kotowski appeals his convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine, arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a "knock and talk," (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a protective sweep of a residence where Kotowski was an overnight guest, and (3) admitting National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) records into evidence. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 13, 2014, Sergeant Frank Thompson from the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office received an anonymous tip about the possibility of a drug house at 111 Marsh Point Road. Sergeant Thompson immediately checked NPLEx, which is a system that provides data used by pharmacies and law enforcement to track sales of pseudoephedrine. Sergeant Thompson's search revealed several pseudoephedrine purchases by Michelle Vining, the homeowner, as well as some by Brian Edwards. Sergeant Thompson set up an alert to be notified for any subsequent pseudoephedrine

purchases by these individuals.

Sergeant Thompson also began to conduct "spotty surveillance" of the residence, mainly consisting of drive-by viewings. From this surveillance, Sergeant Thompson confirmed Vining's vehicle was parked at the residence. On one occasion, Sergeant Thompson observed a vehicle belonging to William Cherry parked at the residence. Sergeant Thompson was familiar with Cherry because Cherry's father had been convicted of methamphetamine related offenses.

On October 29, 2014, Sergeant Thompson received three NPLEx notifications indicating Vining had attempted to purchase pseudoephedrine three separate times. Two of Vining's attempts were blocked because she would have exceeded the statutory threshold. Vining successfully purchased a smaller amount at a different store on her third attempt. Because of these three transactions, Sergeant Thompson decided to conduct a knock and talk at Vining's residence the following day.

Sergeant Thompson, along with Detectives Daniel Lundberg and Brandon Allen—all of the Dorchester County Metro Narcotics Unit—arrived at Vining's residence the following day wearing clothing indicating they were law enforcement. After knocking on the door, Sergeant Thompson saw someone looking through the blinds on the right side of the house. He requested the person come to the door to no response. After knocking a second time, Detective Lundberg observed an individual at a second story window on the right side. After a third knock, Sergeant Thompson spotted an individual at a second story window, this time on the left side. After the third knock, Kotowski opened the door, stepped outside, and closed the door behind him.

When Kotowski stepped outside, Sergeant Thompson was "immediately overwhelmed with the odor of ammonia" coming from Kotowski. When asked if he lived at the residence, Kotowski stated he did not and provided he was there with his girlfriend Lisa. Kotowski called for Lisa to come to the door and when she did not, went inside the house to retrieve her. Kotowski attempted to close the front door behind him when he re-entered the residence, but Sergeant Thompson held the door open with his foot.

When Lisa came to the door, Sergeant Thompson asked her if she knew the location of Michelle Vining, to which Lisa answered she did not. As the conversation progressed, Lisa admitted to being Michelle Vining. Sergeant Thompson explained the officers received a tip concerning methamphetamine manufacturing occurring at the residence. Sergeant Thompson asked her if she would consent to a search of the residence, and Vining declined. Sergeant Thompson then asked if anyone else lived at the residence. According to Sergeant Thompson, Vining "was pretty deceptive about her answer and kind of hem hawing."

Believing something to be amiss, Sergeant Thompson ordered Detective Allen and Detective Lundberg to conduct a protective sweep of the residence while he contacted another officer to obtain a search warrant for the residence. During the protective sweep, Detective Lundberg and Detective Allen encountered a "heavy haze or a gaseous atmosphere" emanating from an upstairs bathroom and upon opening the door, were confronted by an overwhelming smell of ammonia. Based on evidence in plain sight during the protective sweep, a search warrant was issued, and Kotowski and Vining were arrested.

A grand jury indicted Kotowski on March 16, 2015, for manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. Prior to trial, Kotowski moved to suppress the evidence seized in the house. The trial court denied Kotowski's motion. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Kotowski guilty of both counts. The trial court sentenced Kotowski to concurrent terms of seven years' imprisonment for manufacturing and three years' imprisonment for possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v. Baccus , 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Gaster , 349 S.C. 545, 557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." Clark v. Cantrell , 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000). "On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, this [c]ourt applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." State v. Counts , 413 S.C. 153, 160, 776 S.E.2d 59, 63 (2015) (quoting Robinson v. State , 407 S.C. 169, 180-81, 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014) ).

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Knock and Talk

Kotowski argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found following the knock and talk and subsequent protective sweep of the house. He maintains the law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a knock and talk and therefore violated his right to privacy under Article I, Section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have a warrant in order to conduct a search." Counts , 413 S.C. at 163, 776 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting Robinson v. State , 407 S.C. 169, 185, 754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014) ). "In parallel with the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the South Carolina Constitution also provides a safeguard against unlawful searches and seizures." Id. at 164, 776 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting State v. Forrester , 343 S.C. 637, 643, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001) ). "The relationship between the two constitutions is significant because [s]tate courts may afford more expansive rights under state constitutional provisions than the rights which are conferred by the Federal Constitution.’ " Id. (quoting Forrester , 343 S.C. at 643, 541 S.E.2d at 840 ). "Evidence seized in violation of the warrant requirement must be excluded from trial." Id. at 163, 776 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting Robinson , 407 S.C. at 185, 754 S.E.2d at 870 ). "However, a warrantless search may nonetheless be proper under the Fourth Amendment if it falls within one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement." Id. (quoting Robinson , 407 S.C. at 185, 754 S.E.2d at 870 ).

The Counts court looked to other jurisdictions to determine what sort of procedure should be necessary to protect citizen's right to privacy. Specifically, the court analyzed "whether law enforcement needs to: (1) have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to approach the private residence; or (2) inform the citizen of his or her right to refuse consent to search."

Id. at 171, 776 S.E.2d at 69. The court concluded, "rather than enunciating an unyielding rule or eliminating the ‘knock and talk’ technique in its entirety, we hold that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity at a targeted residence prior to approaching the residence and knocking on the door." Id. at 172, 776 S.E.2d at 70.

Reasonable suspicion consists of " ‘a particularized and objective basis’ that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity." State v. Lesley , 326 S.C. 641, 644, 486 S.E.2d 276, 277 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). "Reasonable suspicion is more than a general hunch but less than what is required for probable cause."

State v. Willard , 374 S.C. 129, 134, 647 S.E.2d 252, 255 (Ct. App. 2007). "An additional factor to consider when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists is the officer's experience and intuition." State v. Taylor , 388 S.C. 101, 116, 694 S.E.2d 60, 68 (Ct. App. 2010), rev'd on other grounds , 401 S.C. 104, 736 S.E.2d 663 (2013). "Nevertheless, ‘a wealth of experience will [not] overcome a complete absence of articulable facts.’ " Id. (quoting United States v. McCoy , 513 F.3d 405, 415 (4th Cir. 2008) ). "Furthermore, an officer's impression that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, without confirmation, does not amount to reasonable suspicion." Id.

The trial court did not err in denying Kotowski's motion to suppress the evidence seized by law...

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6 cases
  • State v. Boston
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 10, 2021
    ...residence and conduct the "knock and talk." Id.This court recently addressed the legality of a knock and talk in State v. Kotowski , 427 S.C. 119, 828 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 2019), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds , 430 S.C. 318, 844 S.E.2d 650 (2020) (per curiam). In Kotowski ......
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    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 15, 2019
  • State v. Ferguson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 1, 2022
    ...of ‘a particularized and objective basis’ that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity." State v. Kotowski , 427 S.C. 119, 128, 828 S.E.2d 605, 610 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting State v. Lesley , 326 S.C. 641, 644, 486 S.E.2d 276, 277 (Ct. App. 1997) ), aff'd in part, vacated in p......
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    ...Id. "Nevertheless, 'a wealth of experience will [not] overcome a complete absence of articulable facts.'" Id. (quoting Kotowski, 427 S.C. at 129, 828 S.E.2d at 610). "Furthermore, an officer's impression that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, without confirmation, does not amou......
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