State v. Kramer

• Citation: 569 A.2d 674,318 Md. 576
• Decision Date: 01 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 73,73
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Michael James KRAMER. ,
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Page 576

318 Md. 576

569 A.2d 674

STATE of Maryland v. Michael James KRAMER.

No. 73, Sept. Term, 1989.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 13, 1990.

Diane E. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ., HOWARD S. CHASANOW, Judge ^* Specially Assigned and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned, JJ.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned.

The life of Sue Wharton Miller was snuffed out in an automobile accident on a rural road in Cecil County, Maryland, shortly before midnight on December 5, 1987. The accident was investigated by the Maryland State Police. The investigation led to a criminal information which presented that Michael James Kramer committed the crime of manslaughter of Mrs. Miller by automobile (first count), three traffic violations related thereto (counts two, three, and four--reckless driving, negligent driving, and passing in a no-passing zone), and the offense of driving a motor vehicle not covered by required security (fifth count). The pretrial maneuvering focused on a motion by Kramer to sever the fifth count (the "insurance charge") from the other four counts. The motion was denied by the judge presiding at the hearing on the motion in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. The trial proceeded before a jury on all five counts. In his instructions, the trial judge told the jury: "If the verdict is guilty as to Count 1, then you would ignore Counts 2, 3 and 4 because they would be included in it. Just go to Count 5, which is the insurance one." The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter by motor vehicle as to count one and the judge told the court clerk: "Go right to Count 5." The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to "Count 5, driving a motor vehicle without security insurance...." Sentences were imposed. Kramer appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgments and remanded the case for new trials. Kramer v. State, No. 945, September Term, 1988, filed 26 April 1989, unreported. The court concluded that Kramer "suffered significant prejudice when the [trial] court refused to sever the two charges against him." Slip opinion at 2. Although we disagree in part with the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, we agree with its conclusion regarding prejudicial joinder. In reaching that conclusion, however, we travel a different path than that followed by the Court of Special Appeals.

I

Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Title 17 of the Transportation Article (TR) concerns "required security." Subsection (a) of TR § 17-107 provided that

[a] person who has knowledge that a motor vehicle is not covered by the required security may not:

(1) Drive the vehicle.... ¹ Section 17-101 states that " 'required security' means security in the form and providing for the minimum benefits required under this subtitle [Subtitle I. General Security Provisions] or any other provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law." Section 17-103 prescribes, subject to two limited exceptions set out in § 17-102, the form and minimum benefits of security. Section 17-104 declares:

(a) In general.--The [Motor Vehicle] Administration may not issue or transfer the registration of a motor vehicle unless the owner or prospective owner of the vehicle furnishes evidence satisfactory to the Administration that the required security is in effect.

(b) Owner to maintain required security.--The owner of a motor vehicle that is required to be registered in this State shall maintain the required security for the vehicle during the registration period. [Emphasis added.]

It is perfectly clear that the "required security" prescribed by Title 17 must be maintained only on "a motor vehicle that is required to be registered in [Maryland]." Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 135-136, 550 A.2d 69 (1988). Were it otherwise, for example, the operator of a motor vehicle registered in a sister state which did not require compulsory insurance, or which required less security than Maryland, would have to stop at the Maryland border and obtain the "required security" before entering Maryland. If he proceeded into Maryland without the "required security," he would be a misdemeanant subject to punishment.

Section 13-402.1 of the Transportation Article concerns "vehicles of non-residents not subject to registration." It reads:

(a) In general.--A nonresident may drive or permit the driving of a foreign vehicle in this State, without registering the vehicle in this State, if:

(1) At all times while driven in this State, the vehicle:

(i) Is registered in and displays current registration plates issued for it in the owner's place of residence; and

(ii) Carries as provided in § 13-409(a) of this subtitle, ² a current registration card issued for it in the owner's place of residence; and

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section ..., the vehicle is not:

(i) Used for transporting persons for hire, compensation, or profit;

(ii) Regularly operated in carrying on business in this State;

(iii) Designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property; or

(iv) In the custody of any resident for more than 30 days during any registration year.

The fifth count of the information was drawn under TR § 17-107(a). It presented that Kramer

unlawfully did drive a vehicle which was not covered by required security while having knowledge that said vehicle was not covered by required security.

At the time the information was filed, the authorities knew that Kramer was a resident of Pennsylvania, that the automobile which was the subject of the insurance charge was owned by Kramer, that it was registered in Pennsylvania, that it displayed current Pennsylvania license plates and that it was not within the restrictions set out in TR § 13-402.1(a)(2). There is no suggestion that Kramer did not carry a current registration card in the vehicle to which the card referred which was issued in Kramer's place of residence; he was not charged with a violation of TR § 13-409(a). See note 2, supra. At the time the automobile was registered and the license plates issued, the Pennsylvania licensing authority was obviously satisfied that the security required in that state had been met. Neither Kramer's operator's license nor the registration of the vehicle had been revoked and the license tags had not been recalled. ³ Kramer was in compliance with the Maryland law granting him, as a nonresident, the privilege to drive his vehicle in Maryland. Therefore, at the time of the accident, he was not committing an offense criminally proscribed by Maryland law when he drove his automobile in Maryland. In short, the charge in the fifth count of the information did not constitute a crime; the "required security" did not apply to Kramer or to his vehicle.

"Basic to our theory of justice is the principle that there can be no punishment for harmful conduct unless it was so provided by some law in existence at the time." Clark & Marshall, A treatise on the Law of Crimes 11 (7th ed. 1967). This is expressed in the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment without law). W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 8 (1986). "[T]he maxim cuts deeply into the judicial process...." R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law § 106 (3d ed. 1982). See Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 648, 566 A.2d 103, 106 (1989). So, the charge in the fifth count, not being a crime in this State at the time Kramer drove his vehicle in Maryland, should never have been submitted to the jury. The question is what was the effect of permitting the noncrime to go before the jury.

Trooper First Class Ralph G. Pierce of the Maryland State Police learned that the Pennsylvania license tags on Kramer's automobile had been issued by Pat's Auto Tags, a Pennsylvania licensing authority in Philadelphia. He procured a copy of the form completed by Kramer which was necessary to obtain the tags. It stated that the vehicle was insured by the Erie Insurance Group and gave the policy number. Pierce contacted Michael Gannon, an investigator for Erie whose duties were to investigate "suspicious insurance claims." Pierce asked Gannon to ascertain if Michael Kramer or Robert Kramer (Michael's father) was or had been insured by Erie. Gannon determined that

there was no insurance by either individual at any time and also the number supplied me was not an insurance policy number.... It was not a correct number.

"These individuals are not and have never been policy holders with the Erie Insurance Company." Gannon so testified and a letter to this effect from Gannon to the Maryland State Police was admitted in evidence. Subsequently, in a statement Kramer gave Pierce, Kramer said that he had found an insurance certificate in an automobile in a junk yard. It was the name of the insurance company and policy number on that certificate that he gave the licensing authority to obtain the registration and license tags. All of this was admitted in evidence.

Potential prejudice is the overbearing concern of the law of this State with respect to the question of joint or separate trials of a defendant charged with criminal offenses. We have observed that joinder may be prejudicial to a defendant in three important aspects First, he may be embarrassed, or confounded in presenting separate defenses.... Secondly, the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if the offenses were considered separately, it would not do so. At the very least, the joinder of offenses may produce a latent hostility, which by itself may cause prejudice to the defendant's case. Thirdly, the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes...