State v. Kreps

• Decision Date: 05 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0571.,01-0571.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Michael Scott KREPS, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

650 N.W.2d 636

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Michael Scott KREPS, Appellee.

No. 01-0571.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

September 5, 2002.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Denise Timmins, Assistant Attorneys General, Richard Crowl, County Attorney, and Christine Delorme, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellee.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The State sought discretionary review of a district court ruling sustaining the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The evidence was obtained by a police officer who stopped the defendant's vehicle when a passenger exited the vehicle while it was still moving.

We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted the State's application for further review. On that review, we now vacate the court of appeals' decision and reverse the district court judgment. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On December 28, 2000, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Craig Johnson of the Carter Lake Police Department observed a red Chevrolet Blazer traveling north on 13th Street. The vehicle turned west onto Cachelin Street. Because there was no traffic at that time of the night, the officer turned around and came back "to check the vehicle out." As the officer was catching up with the vehicle, it sped up and turned north on 11th Street. The vehicle sped up even more. Next, the vehicle turned onto "P" Street, went one block east, then turned back onto 13th street, thereby completing a circle. From 13th Street, the vehicle went one block and turned back onto Cachelin. The officer had difficulty catching up to the vehicle.

As the officer turned onto Cachelin, he saw an individual jump from the vehicle while it was still moving and run in between two houses. The vehicle continued for approximately fifty yards, then pulled over to the curb. At this point, the officer activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop.

The officer approached the vehicle and asked the driver, Michael Scott Kreps, for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. The officer smelled alcohol coming either from Kreps or inside the vehicle, so he asked Kreps to step out and perform some field sobriety tests. The tests indicated "definite signs of narcotic usage," so the officer arrested Kreps and charged him with operating while intoxicated. He asked Kreps to come to the police station for a urine test.

The State charged Kreps with driving while intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1999). Later, Kreps filed a motion to suppress, which the State resisted. In his motion to suppress, Kreps asked the court to suppress all statements and other evidence obtained following the stop because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and the comparable provision of the Iowa Constitution.

At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that as he caught up to the vehicle, it "sped up even more in [an] attempt to lose me, like a cat-and-mouse game." When asked why he stopped the vehicle, the officer explained it was due to "the evasive action and trying to lose me going around the block," combined with "seeing an individual exit the vehicle in a manner that is not consistent with normal people getting out of the vehicle, then [running] between two houses." When asked whether the passenger ran because he was under age and possibly consuming alcohol, the officer responded: "It could be. Carter Lake has a curfew, where individuals under the age of 18 cannot be out past 11."

On cross-examination, the officer added, "I couldn't get a radar lock on him because of the short distances from corner to corner."

On redirect, when asked if there were any additional details that resulted in his stopping the vehicle, the officer added, "[t]he speed that the vehicle was going ... turning the corners was relatively faster than normal traffic does. I felt like there was evasive manner here." The officer further testified that he "felt like there was something wrong" because of the passenger who jumped out of the vehicle and "took off running."

Kreps likewise testified. He described what happened just before the passenger jumped from the car: "And as I was driving, [the passenger] said that, you know, there is [a] cop behind us. Let me out of the car. Do this and that.... I turned right, back onto Cachelin.... [The passenger] jumped out of the car, and I was still driving[.] [D]oors swung open and everything."

At the end of the hearing, the district court ruled from the bench:

The officer testified that he thought the car was doing a cat-and-mouse evasive action, and although the officer testified that he thought the car was going faster than normal around corners or faster than normal drivers would go around corners, I think, when put to the true question, I don't think the officer could say that the car was exceeding the speed limit, or that he did not see a traffic violation that the driver committed.

So, really, the only thing that the officer has is this person getting out of the car and running through the houses, so I don't think that that leads to probable cause to stop the driver. I don't think that there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the driver because someone gets out of the car and runs through a yard, so I'm going to grant the motion.

We granted the State's application for discretionary review and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted the State's application for further review.

II. Issue.

We must determine whether the district court correctly ruled by granting Kreps' motion to suppress. In resolving this issue, we must determine whether the circumstances in this case provided the officer reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow an investigatory stop of Kreps' vehicle. In particular, we must determine whether the manner in which Kreps was driving, combined with the passenger's actions— jumping from the vehicle while it was still moving and running away—gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the driver, thereby justifying the officer's stop of the vehicle.

III. Scope of Review.

We review constitutional issues de novo, under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Iowa 1996); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750 (2002)

(standard for appellate review of reasonable-suspicion determinations is de novo). We give deference to the district court's findings of fact due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). However, we are not bound by those findings. Id.

IV. Applicable Law.

As he did in the district court, Kreps contends that all the statements and evidence obtained after the stop was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in violation of the comparable provision of the Iowa Constitution. The Federal Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961); State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000). The search and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution is substantially identical in language to the Fourth Amendment. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. We therefore usually deem the two provisions to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. State v. Scott, 409 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Iowa 1987). Evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is inadmissible, regardless of its relevancy or probative value. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 357.

The Fourth Amendment imposes a general reasonableness standard upon all searches and seizures. Scott, 409 N.W.2d at 467. Generally, to be reasonable, a search or seizure must be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997). Unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable. Id.

One exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). The purpose of an investigatory stop is to allow a police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable questioning. United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir.1975). Such a stop and a subsequent detention—even though temporary and for a limited purpose—is a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996); Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 357. Because the stop is a seizure, it is subject to the "constitutional imperative that it not be `unreasonable' under the circumstances." Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d at 95; Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 357.

To justify an investigatory stop, the officer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 357 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906). In determining the reasonableness of the particular search or seizure, the court judges the facts against an objective standard: "would the facts available to the officer at the...