State v. Krieger
Decision Date | 25 April 2018 |
Docket Number | A156969 |
Citation | 422 P.3d 300,291 Or.App. 450 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Douglas George KRIEGER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Kenneth A. Kreuscher argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Michael S. Shin, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General.
Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Judge, and James, Judge.*
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427. The charges were based on allegations that defendant sexually abused his wife's two grandsons. Defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling that excluded the potential testimony of defendant's wife that her daughter—the mother of the two victims—had been sexually abused by another man. The trial court excluded the testimony of defendant's wife on grounds that her testimony about the sexual abuse of her daughter would have been improper "bolstering" and, alternatively, was unduly prejudicial under OEC 403. We conclude that the judgment must be affirmed because defendant did not make an offer of proof sufficient to permit us to determine whether any error in excluding the testimony was prejudicial.1
We recount only those facts necessary to frame the trial court's ruling. Defendant married his wife, Patricia, when her daughter KF was about eleven or twelve years old.2 Some years later, in 2001 and 2005, KF had two sons, J and W. From the time of their birth, defendant acted as their grandfather. In December 2011, KF and her husband parked their fifth-wheel trailer, in which the family lived, on the property at the home of defendant and Patricia. The boys J and W frequently slept in the front room in the grandparents' home. Sometime after Christmas or in early January 2012, W, then age six, told his mother, KF, that he had a nightmare and had crawled into bed with his grandparents. W said that defendant put his hand inside W's pajamas and rubbed his genitals. When KF asked J, then age 10, if defendant had done anything to J, J recounted that, when he had been sleeping on a couch, someone had taken J's hand and held it to another's pubic hair and privates. J said that, when he opened his eyes, he saw defendant moving away.
KF immediately told her mother Patricia, who came to hear the boys repeat the disclosures to her. The next day, the boys repeated their disclosures to their father. Later that month, both boys gave videotaped statements to a forensic interviewer at Juliette's House. The state charged defendant with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427, and three counts of harassment involving a sexual or intimate part, ORS 166.065(4)(a).
Before trial, the state moved to exclude, among other things, any evidence of sexual abuse of the boys' mother, KF. Defense counsel responded that, having already conferred with defendant, he did not intend "to raise those issues in [defendant's] case." The trial court approved, indicating "So ordered." Just before Patricia testified, the state asked the court to remind her of the several matters subject to the motion in limine , including the sexual abuse of KF. Defense counsel again responded that defendant did not want to ask Patricia about the sexual abuse of KF, but defense counsel said:
The prosecution responded, allowing that some testimony might be permissible other than that about KF's abuse:
(Emphases added.) Defense counsel argued that evidence of KF's abuse could become permissible and would lend credibility to Patricia's testimony:
The trial court tentatively excluded the line of questioning but left open the possibility that the state could "open the door" to such testimony:
(Emphasis added.) Despite the court's invitation, defendant made no formal or informal offer of proof, then or later, as to what Patricia would testify about the sexual abuse of KF, Patricia's experience at the time of KF's abuse, or the resulting nature of Patricia's enhanced sensitivity to the potential for sexual abuse of other children.
When Patricia took the stand, the court reminded her, outside the presence of the jury, that she should say "nothing about sex abuse" of KF. On direct examination by the state, Patricia described the family, the home, and the boys' disclosures. The state did not ask if she witnessed inappropriate contact, if she saw signs of sexual abuse, or if she would pay special attention to the prospect of sexual abuse.
On cross-examination by the defense, Patricia testified that she had never seen defendant act sexually inappropriate with W or with J. Defense counsel inquired whether she had noticed any change in the boys' behavior toward her or defendant in the last two or three weeks before the disclosures, while staying at the house. She replied that the boys acted as they always did. Similarly, on cross-examination by the defense, Police Chief Graven recounted that Patricia had told him that she had not noticed a change in the behavior of the boys, after the abuse but before their disclosure. She had told him that the boys had been watching television with defendant.
At trial, the state presented, among other evidence, the testimony of W and J themselves; the videotaped interviews of W and J conducted by the forensic interviewer at the Juliette House, recounting the touching; the testimony of KF and the boys' father, recounting the boys' disclosures; the testimony of T, a friend of J's, recounting J's disclosure of touching; the testimony of Chief Graven and a detective, Arguello, regarding recorded statements of defendant. In those statements and at trial, defendant denied sexual contact and explained that he had moved W in bed and tucked J's arm under his covers. The jury found defendant guilty on two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, one regarding W and one regarding J.3
On appeal, defendant assigns error asserting that the "trial court erred by excluding evidence of the prior sexual abuse of [KF]." Defendant argues that the evidence of sexual abuse of KF would have explained potential testimony that Patricia "had a heightened vigilance regarding child abuse." The state responds that defendant's argument in the trial court, without a further offer of proof, was insufficient to show reversible error in this case. On the merits, the state offers to concede error insofar as the trial court excluded Patricia's testimony on the basis of "bolstering," but the state argues that the trial court properly excluded the testimony as unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred, we agree with the state's initial argument that defendant failed to make a record to provide this court with the ability to determine whether any error was reversible error. In order to explain that conclusion, we address both the role of an offer of proof and the requirement of prejudicial error.
Ordinarily, when the trial court has excluded testimony, the proponent of the disputed evidence must make an offer of proof. State v. Affeld , 307 Or. 125, 128, 764 P.2d 220 (1988). The offer of proof serves several purposes. It permits the trial court to reconsider its ruling in view of the actual...
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