State v. Kuhn

• Decision Date: 20 April 1900
• Citation: 154 Ind. 450,57 N.E. 106
• Parties: STATE v. KUHN.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

154 Ind. 450

57 N.E. 106

STATE

v.KUHN.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 20, 1900.

Appeal from circuit court, Decatur county; John D. Miller, Judge.

Maggie Kuhn, indicted for murder, petitioned for her discharge for want of prosecution. From a judgment discharging her, the state appeals. Affirmed.

E. E. Roland, Adams & Carter, and Wm. A. Ketcham, Atty. Gen., for the State. Love & Morrison and Duncan, Smith & Hornbrook, for appellee.

HADLEY, C. J.

This is an appeal from the order and judgment of the circuit court of Decatur county discharging the appellee from an indictment theretofore pending against her in said court for the murder of Edward Kuhn, as well, also, as from the recognizance under which she was then held to appear in said court. This judgment was entered upon the petition of the appellee for her discharge because of the failure of the state to bring the cause on for trial within the time prescribed by section 1852, Burns' Rev. St. 1894 (section 1783, Rev. St. 1881; section 1783, Horner's Rev. St. 1897). The petition for discharge, filed February 10, 1896, shows that on the 20th day of January, 1895, an indictment was returned against the petitioner, by the grand jury of Shelby county, charging her with murder in the first degree; that thereupon the petitioner was arrested and imprisoned in the jail of said county; that thereafter the venue of said cause was changed to the Decatur circuit court, and the appellee was transferred to the jail of the last-named county; that at the February term, 1895, she was put upon her trial, which trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury; that thereafter, at the same term of court, she was admitted to bail, and that said recognizance was yet in force; that three full terms of court had passed since said February term, 1895, namely, April, September, and November, 1895; that at all times since her being so admitted to bail she had been ready and willing to go to trial upon said indictment, but no continuance of said cause has been had upon her motion, nor had the delay been caused by any act of hers; that at each of the terms of said court there had been more than sufficient time for said cause to have been tried. The state filed an answer to said petition in three paragraphs: The first, a general denial; the second averred that, after entering into such recognizance, the appellee had left the court room, and Decatur county, and had at no time since entering into such recognizance appeared in court and demanded a trial; wherefore it was claimed that she had waived her right to have said cause tried at one of the three terms. The third paragraph averred that each term of the court after the February term, 1895, the state had appeared by counsel in the circuit court of Decatur county, and requested and demanded of the judge that said cause be set down for trial, but that said court declined to set the said cause down for trial, giving as a reason that, owing to the crowded condition of the docket of the court, it would be impossible to try the cause for want of time, and that upon each occasion the defendant was present in court by her counsel, and made no objection to such continuance. To these affirmative answers the appellee replied by a general denial. The court, after considering the evidence offered in support of the petition and answers, ordered the discharge of the defendant from the indictment and recognizance, from which order and judgment the state appeals.

The abuses and crimes against personal liberty that preceded the granting of Magna Charta first found restraint in that famous document in these words: “No man can be rightfully imprisoned except upon a charge of crime properly made in pursuance of the law of the land; no man when so imprisoned upon a lawful charge, presented in a lawful manner, specifying the crime, can be arbitrarily held without trial.” The spirit and principle of Magna Charta was carried into our federal constitution (article 6) in these words: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial;” and also into our state constitution (section 12, Bill of Rights) in the words following: “Justice shall be administered freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; speedily and without delay.” Section 1852, Burns' Rev. St. 1894 (section 1783, Horner's Rev. St. 1897), follows: “No person shall be held by recognizance to answer an indictment or information, without trial, for a period embracing more than three terms, not including a term at which a recognizance was first taken thereon, if taken in term time; but he shall be discharged unless a continuance be had upon his own motion, or the delay be caused by his own act, or there be not sufficient time to try him at such third term; and in the latter case, if he be not brought to trial at such third term, he shall be discharged.” This is the legislative provision for extending the guaranties of the...