State v. Kuskowski
| Citation | 200 Conn. 82,510 A.2d 172 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 03 June 1986 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Russell KUSKOWSKI. |
Judith Rossi, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, were Dennis Santore, State's Atty., John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., and James G. Clark, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and DEAN, JJ.
A jury found the defendant guilty of both possession of cocaine in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 19-481(a) and possession of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 19-480(a). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of nine years for the latter offense with all but six years suspended, with three years probation, and one year for possession of cocaine. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion to suppress physical evidence; (2) in denying his motion to suppress oral statements; and (3) in allowing the state toxicologist to testify that the substance recovered from the defendant was analyzed and found to be cocaine. We find no error.
On May 3, 1982, at approximately 11:41 p.m., Officer Maureen Doherty of the Brookfield police department was on routine patrol duty near Lake Lillinonah in Brookfield, several hundred yards from the neighboring town of Bridgewater. Accross the lake, Doherty noticed a car with its interior light on parked in a boat launch area in Bridgewater. Doherty drove into Bridgewater, approached the car, and found the defendant unconscious in the driver's seat with a burning propane torch on his lap. Doherty roused the defendant, removed him from the car, and shut off the propane torch. She asked for his identification, and whether he was all right. The defendant responded that he had fallen asleep, but was "okay now." Doherty had noticed drug paraphernalia on the console and passenger seat of the defendant's car. After other officers from the Brookfield police department arrived, Doherty conducted a full search of the defendant's car. In the trunk she found two thermos bottles filled with cocaine. Trooper Jerry Roberts of the state police arrived, arrested the defendant, and read him his Miranda rights. The defendant told Roberts that the cocaine was for his personal use, and that he had been "free basing" in his car when Doherty found him. Later, at the state police barracks, the defendant stated that he sold cocaine to his friends at work. Other facts relevant to the defendant's
claims on this appeal are stated in the opinion.
The defendant claims that the warrantless search of his automobile by Doherty was in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. We address these claims only briefly. The defendant's argument is based on the faulty premise that Doherty violated the law when she left her jurisdiction and entered the town of Bridgewater to investigate the defendant's vehicle. We reject this premise. The defendant's car was parked in a public boat launch area in the town of Bridgewater. Doherty, no less than any other citizen, had a right to stand beside the defendant's car and peer in. When she saw the defendant passed out in the driver's seat with a propane torch burning in his lap, she had every reason to rouse the defendant and put out the fire. In so doing, she observed cocaine and drug paraphernalia in plain sight on the console and passenger seat. These observations gave her probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband and thus to seize and search the car, including the trunk, without a warrant. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985). Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).
The defendant also claims that he was arrested by Brookfield police officers, and that this arrest was unlawful because the Brookfield police were beyond their jurisdiction in the town of Bridgewater. The state counters that the defendant was not arrested until later, when Trooper Roberts of the state police arrived and formally placed him under arrest. We need not decide the precise point at which the arrest occurred in this case, because Brookfield police officers were not without lawful authority to arrest the defendant in the town of Bridgewater.
The authority to arrest without a warrant is set forth in General Statutes § 54-1f. Subsection (b) provides that "[m]embers of ... any local police department ... shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony." General Statutes § 54-1f(b) does not limit the authority to make warrantless felony arrests to any particular political subdivision within the state. Subsection (b) stands in sharp contrast to subsection (a), which concerns the authority to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests. Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 409-10, 198 A.2d 700 (1964); State v. DelVecchio, 149 Conn. 567, 573-74, 182 A.2d 402 (1962); see State v. Anonymous (1977-5), 34 Conn.Sup. 531, 538-39, 375 A.2d 417 (1977) (statutory history). Subsection (a) provides that members of a local police department "shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in their jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others." (Emphasis added.) Read together, these subsections clearly indicate that a member of a local police department does not violate General Statutes § 54-1f by making a warrantless felony arrest beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his or her local police department. The Brookfield police officers clearly had probable cause to believe that the defendant possessed cocaine in his automobile. Under the circumstances of this case, this probable cause supported the defendant's arrest and the subsequent search of his car. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine and narcotics paraphernalia seized from his automobile.
We next address the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying The defendant was formally arrested by Roberts, who arrived at the scene shortly after the Brookfield police officers. Roberts advised the defendant of his rights, and began to question him during the ride to the state police barracks. The defendant never signed a waiver form, and was never asked if he would agree to waive his Miranda rights. On appeal he claims that his confession was involuntary, and that he did not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to his arresting officers. It is undisputed that Doherty never advised the defendant of his Miranda rights before she attempted to ascertain whether anything was wrong with him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Under the circumstances, it was [200 Conn. 87] not necessary that she do so. What Doherty saw when she looked into the defendant's car, was an unconscious individual with a burning propane torch on his lap. The circumstances demanded that she react in the manner in which she did. After the defendant told her that he had merely fallen asleep, she asked him to show her some identification. At this point the defendant was not in custody, he was not being interrogated, he gave no incriminating answers, and he was not entitled to Miranda warnings
Roberts testified that he read the defendant his Miranda rights from a printed card before placing him in the cruiser. He asked the defendant if he understood his rights and the defendant responded that he did. The defendant told Roberts that after fishing all day, he had returned to his car where he fell asleep. The defendant also stated that the cocaine recovered from his car was for personal use. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights at the state police barracks. He again replied that he understood his rights although he was not asked to sign a written waiver form. In response to questioning, the defendant stated that he sold cocaine to friends at work. He also told the troopers that he wanted to cooperate with them. The interrogation at the state police barracks lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. The defendant appeared to be alert, conducted himself normally, and did not appear to...
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......78] times. Although the state concedes that there was no express waiver of Miranda rights by the defendant, it argues that a waiver may be inferred from the defendant's actions and course of conduct. State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 88, 510 A.2d 172 (1986); State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 582, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986). " 'The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative.' " State v. Madera, supra, 210 Conn. at 50, 554 A.2d 263, quoting Oregon v. Elstad, ......
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